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ABSTRACT 
The policymaking process is complex and fraught with challenges. The challenges and 
complexities make the process prone to contestation and capture by vested interests. Recent 
studies on the alcohol industry and their involvement in alcohol policies highlight the use of 
frames and framing (i.e. linguistic devices) as industry strategies for influencing alcohol policy 
processes. The frames used by alcohol industry actors in recent policy debates reflect and 
acknowledge cleavages and fragmentation within the industry. They also signal that cleavages 
within an industry can, in turn, affect their reputation and legitimacy. But is this always the case? 
As such, this study, takes frames, framing, and their possible implications seriously, and explores 
the role frames and framing play in contested and complex policy spaces, which are likely to be 
fraught with cleavages. Drawing from the Alcohol (Minimum Pricing) (Scotland) Act which was 
highly contested, first amongst industry actors and then between industry actors and 
policymakers, this study seeks to unravel the role frames and framing play in: (1) the 
construction and constitution of cleavages, and (2) the maintenance of intra, inter, and extra-
industry legitimacies, despite strong contestations. Scotland offers a fertile ground for the study 
because in recent years, Scotland, under the Scottish National Party (SNP) government, has 
introduced many public health driven policies. Scotland has also gained traction as a global 
pacesetter in public health policies. 
The data sources used in this thesis comprise of documents and semi-structured interviews. The 
data was analysed and interpreted using a theoretical approach to thematic analysis guided by 
frame theory and legitimacy theory. The study found that: (1) a discursive approach to 
deconstructing industry cleavages overcomes some of the challenges inherent in the 
conventional functional and structural approaches to understanding cleavages, and offers 
further insights on interest-based cleavages; (2) actors in a policymaking process use frames and 
framing to simultaneously contest and collaborate; and the ability to create a balance between 
contestation and collaboration is critical in constructing and maintaining both intra and inter 
industry legitimacy; (3) the government adopted various complementary discursive strategies 
that helped to sustain the alcohol industry’s legitimacy; (4) cleavages do not often negatively 
impact on intra-industry cohesion nor the industry ability to work with the government, as 
previous works tend to suggest. Based on this finding further policy recommendations were 
advanced.
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Statement of Problem 
Alcohol consumption has become part of the culture of many societies including the United 
Kingdom (UK) (Brand et al., 2007; Room, et al., 2005; Nicholls, 2012). Although many 
individuals enjoy and consume alcohol responsibly, excessive alcohol consumption is 
harmful and is implicated in many disease conditions including cardiomyopathy, alcoholic 
gastritis, alcoholic liver disease, and alcohol induced chronic pancreatitis (Grant et al., 2009). 
Despite these risks and the prevailing health warning messages against excessive alcohol 
consumption (Chikritzhs et al., 2015), many individuals still consume alcohol in quantities 
that could be classed as harmful (Laranjeira et al., 2010; Carrington et al., 1999; Drummond 
et al., 2005; McManus et al., 2009). 
Alcohol consumption in the UK has significantly increased, and this has been attributed to: 
changes in the Licensing Act, rising disposable income, increased affordability, and 
availability (Nicholls, 2012; Smith and Foxcroft, 2009a; National Statistics, 2007), as well as 
the influence of youth culture and advertising (Filmore, 1984; Smith and Foxcroft, 2009a and 
2009b). The reasons why people drink, and perhaps continue to drink even when they are 
experiencing negative effects, are subjective, complex, contextual, and beyond the scope of 
this thesis to be dealt with in detail. Nevertheless, excessive alcohol consumption is a public 
health concern which the UK Government and governments of many nations are trying to 
combat, because it not only affects the consumer but also those around them indirectly (see 
Casswell, 2008). Governments around the world continually seek measures to control 
overconsumption and misuse of alcohol because of its effects on health and society. Some 
of the measures tried so far include state-control of alcohol production and retail (Ornberg, 
2008; Alavaikko and Österberg, 2000); prohibition of alcohol use; and restrictions on the 
time and location of purchase (Österberg, 1992). 
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In recent years, governments have introduced and implemented policies aimed at curbing 
drink-driving, penalties for direct or ad hoc sales of alcohol to minors, restrictions on alcohol 
advertising, banning of alcohol sales below cost of duty, and use of Value Added Tax (VAT), 
amongst other measures (Nelson, 2006; Madureira-Lima and Galea, 2018). In addition, 
international research evidence shows that the best and most cost-effective approach for 
addressing alcohol related harm is adopting a population-wide approach that controls 
availability, marketing and price (Hawkins and McCambridge, 2020a; see also; Nelson et al., 
2013; Stockwell et al., 2006, 2012a and 2012b; Babor et al., 2010; Wagenaar et al., 2009; 
Brand et al., 2007). However, despite the effectiveness of population-level alcohol policies, 
these measures are often resisted by economically powerful multi-national alcohol 
companies as they have the potential to impact negatively on their business and global 
brands (Hawkins and Holden, 2013; McCambridge et al., 2014). In that regard, alcohol 
industry actors are often not passive about these policies. They proactively seek to influence 
such policies to protect their interests and minimise their negative effects on the industry. 
There is a growing literature (McCambridge et al., 2018, Mialon and McCambridge, 2018; 
Savell et al., 2016; Hawkins and Holden, 2013; Hawkins et al., 2012) that has looked at the 
different strategies adopted by the alcohol industry to influence alcohol policies. Some of 
these strategies include: lobbying government officials, ministers, and policymakers (Miller 
and Harkins, 2010; Holden and Hawkins, 2012; Drummond and Changappa, 2006; Holden et 
al., 2012; McCambridge et al., 2014); shaping opinions through strategic communication – 
especially the framing of alcohol issues (Holden and Hawkins, 2012; Hawkins and Holden, 
2013; McCambridge et al., 2013; Katikireddi, 2013); research and political sponsorships 
(Hawkins and Holden, 2014; McCambridge et al 2014; Nicholls, 2012; Holden et al., 2012; 
Jernigan, 2012; Babor and Robaina, 2013; Babor, 2009; Drummond and Changappa, 2006; 
Anderson and Baumberg, 2006), and the strategic use of corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
initiatives to internalise their social costs through self-regulation (Mialon and McCambridge 
2018; Babor and Robaina, 2013; see Johnston et al., 2019). 
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Mialon and McCambridge (2018), for example, conducted a systematic review on the impact 
of different alcohol industry CSR initiatives and harmful drinking on public health. They 
concluded that alcohol industry CSR initiatives are strategies usually adopted/implemented 
in response to anticipated regulatory threats or as an outcome of regulatory pressures, with 
the aim of reducing such threats. The public benefits of such CSR activities are said to be 
minimal, whereas the public relations benefits are substantial (Babor et al., 2018; Yoon and 
Lam, 2012; Hill, 2008). For instance, these CSR initiatives can confer, confirm, and/or 
contribute to the legitimacy of the alcohol industry (Mialon and McCambridge, 2018). 
In addition, a systematic review by McCambridge et al. (2018) synthesised the alcohol 
industry actors’ involvement in national and supranational policymaking. The authors found 
that the alcohol industry was engaged in shaping public opinion. The industry actors framed 
policy debates consistently to reflect their preferred policy options and adopted both short 
and long-term relationships with key policy actors using a variety of different organisational 
forms (see also Hillman and Hitt, 1999). Savell et al. (2016) also examined the alcohol 
industry efforts to influence alcohol marketing policy1 and compared these strategies with 
those used by the tobacco industry. They found that industry actors in both sectors use 
frames as a key strategy to influence and shape policy negotiations. Similarly, a scoping 
review by Koon et al. (2016) on health policy process found that frames are increasingly used 
in health policy process by policy actors and these frames have impact on the policy process 
(see also Hawkins and Holden, 2014 and Katikireddi et al, 2014a). Frames, in the context of 
this thesis, refer to the language used by industry actors to effect policy change, and framing 
is the process through which this happens (Kuypers, 2010; van Hulst and Yanow, 2016). 
Nevertheless, frames are developed and used by policy actors in different ways. Sometimes, 
they use them to offer alternate lens for understanding issues. Industry actors also promote 
certain frames in order to help diffuse tension, shape alcohol policy, and sway the 
government’s decisions to their favour (Holden and Hawkins, 2012). For example, 
 
1 Marketing policy is a form of regulatory threat which ultimately reduces product visibility to prospective 
customers and impacts on the industry’s profitability and perhaps their legitimacy. 
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Greenaway (2011) explored how the 2003 Licensing Act, as a policy issue, was redefined 
during the policy process, thus shifting the debate to focus on the 24-hour drinking, and 
crime and safety in the night-time economy. Arguably, the framing of the Licensing Act 2003 
gave way to different reframing by policy actors. Greenaway (2011) shows the volatility of 
the policy arena with different stakeholders producing multiple frames, which support their 
individual positions. Katikireddi et al. (2014a) explored the different frames used during the 
Scottish Minimum Unit Pricing (MUP) policy debate, their impact on the policy process, and 
the positions of the different alcohol stakeholders on the policy issue. Their findings showed 
that frames do impact on the policy process, with different stakeholders responding to and 
engaging with frames in different ways in order to reflect their interests. For instance, the 
alcohol industry actors who supported MUP adopted what the authors referred to as hybrid 
framing (Katikireddi et al., 2014a) – i.e. they maintained a combination of their original 
framing and some aspects of the framing propagated by industry actors in opposition – 
whereas the public health advocates redefined the policy issue by presenting a consistent 
alternative frame. This presentation (by public health activists), the authors stated, was 
intentional and helped prioritise public health consideration in the MUP policy debate 
(Katikireddi et al., 2014a). In a similar vein, Hawkins and Holden (2013) explored the alcohol 
industry actors’ use of frames in the UK’s alcohol pricing and promotions policy. In their 
study, the industry actors promoted frames which limit alcohol harm to a small minority of 
consumers, as well as frames that advocate targeted interventions, as opposed to 
population-wide solutions proffered by public health activists (Hawkins and Holden, 2013). 
Some components of frames present as arguments. For example, Savell et al. (2016), studied 
the tactics and arguments used by the alcohol industry to influence alcohol marketing. The 
authors identified twenty arguments which they classified under five frames: regulatory 
redundancy, legal, unintended consequences, complex policy area, and insufficient 
evidence. These frames are similar to those observed in other studies on alcohol industry 
frames (see Hawkins and Holden, 2013; Katikireddi 2013; Katikireddi et al., 2014a) and show 
that the alcohol industry uses frames which resonate with the public with deep cultural 
meaning that surpasses the intentionality of the frame (Dombos et al., 2012). The common 
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point in the studies examined above shows the relevance of frames during the policy 
process. These findings signal the importance and relevance of frames and framing as 
devices for influence in policy debates. Frames, as used in policy documents and during the 
policy process, are important because they can proffer treatments/solutions and change the 
course of the policy debate (Entman, 1993). Frames are not necessarily neutral; they are 
agentic (Koon et al., 2016). 
Beyond the industry use of frames to protect and pursue their interests, frames, as used by 
industry actors, can also highlight differences amongst industry actors, which can lead to 
divisions and cleavages (see Holden et al., 2012; Katikireddi et al., 2014a). Cleavages in policy 
terms are the divisions observed between firms on a policy issue. They involve breaking 
ranks with other members of a group and are said to emerge when firms lack the ability to 
adopt a clear and coherent position on an issue. This can occur within and between 
organisations from the same industry (see Holden et al., 2012; Winn et al., 2008), as well as 
between economic and political actors, especially on trade issues (see Beaulieu, 2002; Kim, 
2017). For example, Holden et al. (2012) found a divergence of interests amongst and within 
alcohol industry actors during the MUP debates. The authors concluded that despite the 
divergence, industry actors cooperate through the actions of their trade representatives 
where they have shared interests and clear advantages. In the case of shared interests, they 
allow the best-placed trade representatives to lead on the issue. They use their trade 
associations to neutralise and harmonise their differences. 
However, industry cleavages in policy negotiations, can lead to inconsistent or poorly 
articulated messages to the government on an issue, which in turn might make it difficult 
for the government to tackle the issue at hand and decide/agree on a strategy that 
encompasses all concerns (Pekkanen, and Solis, 2004). On a broader scale, they can also 
threaten an industry, which might lead to a loss of both legal and social legitimacy (Suchman, 
1995; Winn et al., 2008; Messer et al., 2012; Brooks et al., 2017) over time, especially in 
controversial industries (Buckton et al., 2019; Vollero et al., 2019). 
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Legitimacy is a generalised perception or assumption that the actions of an entity 
(organisation, industry, or government) are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some 
socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions (Suchman 1995: 574; 
see also Deegan, 2002; Hoefer and Green, 2016). Organisations seek legitimacy for many 
reasons including for continuity, credibility, and for passive or active support from the 
government (Aldrich and Fiol, 1994; Tilling, 2004; Suchman, 1995). Legitimacy is, however, 
not fixed; it can be challenged at any point in the lifetime of the organisation. Therefore, the 
organisation needs to be proactive and keep abreast of what is going on within society 
(Deegan, 2006; Tilling, 2002; Suchman, 1995), or face being delegitimised. Legitimacy, in the 
context of this thesis, is about the alcohol industry’s attempts to establish/construct their 
legitimacy in the eyes of their significant others i.e. the Scottish Government, and thus be 
able to continue with its business practice and be seen to be relevant in the alcohol 
policymaking process. This thesis also considers the concept of intra-industry legitimacy, 
which is where organisations within an organisational field confer legitimacy upon each 
other through endorsement (Deephouse et al. 2017). It is this legitimacy that enables an 
industry to continue to collaborate in other ways i.e. inter-industry trading, despite their 
cleavages on policy issues which concern their industry. 
Companies such as alcohol, tobacco, oil and gas, gambling, forestry, and fishing, frequently 
find their organisations legitimacy challenged by policymakers and society, and sometimes 
this happens on a global scale (Palazzo and Scherer, 2006; Du and Viera Jr, 2012; Moerman 
and Van der Laan, 2005; Malone et al., 2012; Comyns and Franklin-Johnson, 2018; Winn et 
al., 2008). Such companies need to adapt or suffer negative impacts, which may include 
divisions and loss of reputation/legitimacy. For example, the study by Winn et al. (2008) on 
the forestry and fishing (salmon) industries in British Columbia finds that competitive 
reputation management strategies adopted by actors from both industries did not help to 
alleviate their legitimacy/reputational woes. The forestry and fishing industries faced 
increased threat to their legitimacy, which resulted to further industry division. 
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Unsurprisingly, research on cleavages and the alcohol industry has focused on establishing 
the presence and classifications of cleavages (Holden et al., 2012) and how divisions 
between various industry actors impacted their ability to organise collectively to influence 
policy (Christiansen and Kroezen, 2016). Although cleavages can impact on an industry’s 
reputation2 (see Winn et al., 2008), it seems the two can also coexist (Hoffman, 1999), which 
is rather paradoxical (Ferns et al., 2019; for more on paradox, as an emerging literature, see 
Hahn et al., 2015). The paradox here lies in the concept of inclusion, as part of an industry 
sharing similar identity, and also the need for the individual organisation to distinguish 
themselves for survival amidst competition. Legitimacy and reputation are both perceptions 
of approval of an organisation’s action based on their stakeholders’ evaluation (King and 
Whetten, 2008). Although their assessments are different, King and Whetten (2008) argue 
that they arise from common social comparison processes and thus can be said to go hand 
in hand3. Based on this, this thesis postulates that the observed cleavages within the alcohol 
industry would impact on their legitimacy, as industry actors are seen to oppose a 
government policy that has the potential to impact positively on the health of harmful and 
hazardous consumers, as well as society as a whole. Such opposition carries with it the 
dangers of de-legitimation (see Malone et al., 2012; Winn et al., 2008).  
Nonetheless, the literature search on the alcohol industry reveals a dearth of knowledge on 
the impact of the observed cleavages on the industry’s legitimacy. One gets the view that 
there is a settled understanding in the literature that cleavages do not negatively impact on 
an industry’s legitimacy. This is rather puzzling given that cleavages are in themselves 
products of interest-powered contestations and struggles. What then could be neutralising 
the potency of cleavages to produce industry de-legitimation in the policy making process? 
Given the demonstrable and significant role of frames as devices for influence in the 
policymaking process, and what we know of frames so far, one wonders if frames contribute 
 
2 Reputation is a perception that organisations are positively distinctive within their peer group (King and 
Whetten, 2008). 
3 That is, the relationship between positive reputation and legitimacy are complementary, reciprocal, and 
interdependent as opposed to antagonistic and one-sided. Reputation is an organisations unique feature whilst 
legitimacy is a shared feature (King and Whetten, 2008). 
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to the maintenance of legitimacy despite the presence of cleavages. This interrogation leads 
seamlessly to the question: 
(How) can industry actors use frames to uphold their collective 
legitimacy, irrespective of disagreements and cleavages, during and 
after a major policy negotiation with the government? 
This is the central question upon which this thesis is built. The study will draw mainly from 
the Alcohol (Minimum Pricing) (Scotland) Act – onwards referred to as MUP – to explore this 
question. The choice of this policy is not arbitrary – the rationale behind this choice is 
explained in the next section below. The concept of cleavages, as used in this thesis, refers 
to disagreement between and within the different sectors of the alcohol industry, and 
between industry actors and the government. 
The aim of the thesis is to advance the understanding of cleavages, expressed as frames and 
as a corporate tool used by the alcohol industry in the face of increased regulatory threats, 
and their potential in the maintenance of industry’s collective legitimacy. The objectives of 
this research are: (1) identify and collate texts submitted by the alcohol industry actors to 
the MUP policy consultation, (2) identify the different frames used by the alcohol industry 
actors, (3) understand the implications of the frames for industry cohesion and legitimacy, 
(4) ascertain why industry cleavages did not result to loss of industry reputation and 
legitimacy, (5) identify any strategies that could have contributed to upholding the industry’s 
legitimacy, (6) collect additional/necessary policy documents/data that could help explain 
the result – i.e. conduct interviews with alcohol industry actors and policymakers, and (7) 
highlight the contribution the thesis makes to the wider literature on the alcohol industry, 
Scottish alcohol policy, alcohol framing, legitimacy, and legitimation. 
The rest of this chapter is structured thus: (1) the rationale guiding the choice of policy is 
presented, with an up-to-date summary of the relevant literatures the thesis draws on, (2) 
a summary of the theoretical perspectives and a brief summary of the methods adopted in 
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answering the set research question, and (3) a brief discussion on the thesis structure which 
provides a summary of the chapters. 
 
1.2 Why Study the Alcohol (Minimum Pricing) (Scotland) Act? And the Anticipated 
Contribution of the Thesis. 
The Alcohol (Minimum Pricing) Scotland Act is an interesting policy to study because it is the 
single biggest policy that has threatened the stability of the alcohol industry since the start 
of the millennium. The Bill has been highly controversial, first between the policy actors, 
then between policy actors and industry actors, and finally between the alcohol industry 
actors. These disagreements make the policy issue interesting to study and it is interesting 
to see how the different interactions over the policy period and the interests that emerged 
were sustained and reconciled for the good of the public health. The MUP policy attracted 
fierce criticism from various stakeholders and received widespread media attention, which 
contributed to the controversy surrounding the policy issue. The policy is also interesting to 
study as it highlights the inherent challenges of devolved administrations and how interests 
between policy actors are managed whilst preserving the legitimacy of the different actors 
involved during the debate. However, pricing is at the heart of this policy. 
Pricing strategies for alcohol have been tried and tested in British Columbia in Canada for 
over 20 years (Stockwell et al., 2012a) and some form of alcohol tax exists in Thailand 
(Sornpaisarn et al., 2011). There is strong evidence that increasing alcohol prices lead to 
decline in both demand and consumption (Stockwell et al., 2012b; Karpoff, 1987). Similar 
pricing strategies are known to have existed in some Nordic countries4 (except for 
Denmark5) in the 1990s (Horverak and Osterberg, 1992; Olsson et al., 2002). Alcohol sales in 
these Nordic countries were primarily under state ownership, in an attempt to reduce the 
 
4 Iceland, Finland, Norway, and Sweden. Finland and Sweden are now formal members of the EU whilst 
Iceland and Norway are part of the EU single market only (Ugland, 2000). 
5 Denmark had high tax policies aimed at limiting the consumption of spirits and has maintained its alcohol 
taxation despite the EU and its single market policies. 
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alcohol consumption rate. However, the European Union (EU) single market led to the 
relaxation of the state control of alcohol sales and the introduction of minimum excise duty 
rate (see Ugland, 2000). 
The Scottish alcohol MUP Bill was first discussed in Scotland by the minority Scottish 
National Party (SNP) government in 2007 in response to Scottish [domestic] drinking 
practices and the resulting negative health consequences. The Bill aimed to introduce a 
pricing mechanism as a mandatory condition for premises’ licences and occasional licences 
(Scottish Government website, March 2009). The MUP as part of the Alcohol Etc (Scotland) 
Act was opposed by the Labour Party in 2010 and the Act failed to pass into law (Hawkins et 
al., 2012; Hawkins and McCambridge, 2019). The MUP component was re-introduced in 
2011 as a standalone policy following the election of a majority SNP government into 
Scotland’s alcohol policy agenda with a proposed set price of £0.50 per unit of alcohol. The 
Alcohol (Minimum Pricing) (Scotland) Act was passed on May 24, 2012, received Royal 
Assent on June 29, 2012, and became law on May 1, 2018 (Parliament. Scot; The Telegraph 
News, 2018). The controversy surrounding the MUP policy persisted despite being passed 
into law. The Scotch Whisky Association (SWA) put forward a legal challenge and this 
resulted to a six-year court battle and a delay to implementation of the policy. 
The Scottish MUP policy deliberations have attracted significant academic attention and are 
widely researched (see Katikireddi et al., 2014a; Hawkins and Holden, 2013; Holden et al., 
2012). The study by Katikireddi et al. (2014a) reported a division amongst the policy actors 
and also a division amongst the alcohol industry actors on the proposed bill. The authors 
used political argumentation framework to investigate the relationship between competing 
frames and their influence on policy debate. In discussing the differences in frames by 
industry actors, Katikireddi et al. (2014a) categorised the industry actors based on their 
sector/structure. In a similar, but earlier study Hawkins and Holden (2013) analysed the 
submissions made to the consultation on the Scottish Government’s (2008) Green Paper 
Changing Scotland’s Relationship with Alcohol and thirty-five interviews with policy actors, 
including the alcohol industry. They adopted the naming and framing approach to frame 
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analysis set out by Schön and Rein (1994) to map the different positions adopted within the 
alcohol industry on the minimum-pricing debate, and found that alcohol industry actors 
framed the policy debate in ways consistent with their underlying commercial interests. 
Holden et al. (2012) in a similar vein analysed publicly available documents and thirty-five 
semi-structured interviews in 2010 drawn from industry and non-industry policy actors. The 
study found that industry actors had divergent interests between and within the different 
sectors and evidence of ad-hoc cooperation on specific issues especially through their trade 
representatives.  
The studies by Hawkins and Holden (2013) and Holden et al. (2012), like Katikireddi et al. 
(2014a)’s analysis of the industry actors’ submission, focused on the structural differences 
between industry actors. However, all three studies emphasised the importance of framing 
in policy debates. This thesis complements these previous studies and hopes to extend them 
by going beyond the sector/structural divide and categorising industry cleavages based on 
the industry actors’ interests, as reflected in the language used. It hopes to achieve this by 
collecting and analysing all the identifiable written and oral evidence submissions made by 
alcohol industry actors during the MUP policy deliberations and other policy documents, 
including the Health and Sports Committee (HSC) and the Finance Committee (FC) reports 
to the Scottish Parliament, the transcript of Parliamentary deliberations on MUP, and 
conduct interviews with industry representatives and policymakers. 
Cleavages are thought to have implications for industry legitimacy (Buckton et al., 2019; 
Vollero et al., 2019). However, the process through which this happens is relatively and 
arguably underexplored and hence the relevance of this thesis. This thesis hopes to 
interrogate the data collected and understand the perceptions and implications of cleavages 
on the alcohol industry actors legitimacy. Given the nature of the research question this 
thesis sets out to answer, which focuses on frames as a potential strategy for constructing 
industry legitimacy, this thesis hopes to bring together two theories - frame theory and 
legitimacy theory from different academic disciplines (particularly 
management/organizational and socio-political sciences), in a complementary manner to 
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understand how the industry actors construct the world around them when their existence 
and business practices are under scrutiny. Moreover, it could be argued that framing and 
legitimacy are closely connected. These theories underpin this thesis and are explored 
below. 
 
1.3 Theoretical Perspectives 
This thesis draws largely from frame theory and legitimacy theory, which are interlinked 
(Benford and Snow, 2000; Messer et al., 2012; Brooks et al., 2017; Suddaby et al., 2017). 
Frames explain how individuals, groups, and societies organise, perceive, and communicate 
what is a reality; and frame theory suggests that how an issue is presented to the audience, 
influences the choices people make about how to process the information (Entman, 1993). 
Entman’s approach to frame theory identifies and makes explicit the common tendencies 
among the various uses of the term [frame] and suggests a more precise and universal 
understanding of them. He defines a frame as the “ability to select some aspects of a 
perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to 
promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or 
treatment recommendation for the item described” (Entman, 1993: 52). This definition 
incorporates his four key frame elements – problem definition, causal interpretation, moral 
evaluation, and treatment recommendation (Entman, 1993). Based on this, he suggests an 
approach to framing, which is compatible with the interpretivist-constructivist epistemology 
and the social constructionist ontological view. 
Legitimacy theory is a social construct (Deephouse et al., 2017; Deegan, 2002; Suchman 
1995; Yoon and Thye, 2011) which reflects a congruence between the behaviours of an 
entity and the shared (or assumedly shared) beliefs of some social groups (Suchman 1995). 
Within the legitimacy theory discourse, organisations seek to ensure that they operate 
within the bounds and norms of their respective societies (van der Laan, 2009). Legitimacy 
theory, according to Suddaby et al. (2017), can be understood from three distinct paradigms: 
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(1) legitimacy as property, (2) legitimacy as an interactive process, and (3) legitimacy as a 
socio-cognitive perception. These paradigms of legitimacy draw from Suchman (1995)’s 
definition of legitimacy as: “Legitimacy is a generalized perception or assumption that the 
actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed 
system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions” (Suchman 1995: 574). This thesis adopts 
the paradigm of legitimacy as ‘perception’ and reflects on Deephouse et al. (2017) and 
Suchman (1995)’s legitimation strategies for gaining, maintaining, and repairing pragmatic, 
moral, and/or cognitive legitimacy as a guide for matching industry actors’ frames and 
actions to known legitimation strategies as proposed by Vaara and colleagues (Vaara et al., 
2006; Vaara and Tienari 2008; Vaara and Monin, 2010). 
Legitimacy as a perception explores not only the perceptual and subjective nature of 
legitimacy but also the social construction of legitimacy (Bitektine, 2011; Bitektine and 
Haack, 2015). According to Suddaby et al. (2017: 462), legitimacy as perception retains the 
components of legitimacy as property, but “adopts a metaphor of property as taste, 
assessment or judgement of the appropriateness of the organisation's product, practice or 
characteristics”. This approach also retains the understanding of legitimacy as a process 
because it has its theoretical roots in the social construction of reality by Berger and 
Luckman, (1966). Legitimacy as perception focuses on the role of individuals in the process 
of social construction. As such, this thesis adopts the definition of legitimacy as perception  
Studies on organisational legitimacy have often looked at legitimacy from the external 
stakeholders’ perspective and have somewhat neglected the opinions of internal 
stakeholders (i.e. the staff and different organisations within an industry) and their 
perceived legitimacy for their organisation or those of their rivals. This thesis hopes to make 
a theoretical contribution by capitalising on intra-industry cleavages emerging from industry 
actors’ frames and exploring its role through interviews with industry actors to ascertain 
intra-industry cohesion and perception of legitimacy following the outcome of the MUP 
deliberations. It is anticipated that these would enhance legitimacy theory by bringing to 
attention the idea that legitimacy can be conferred not only by external stakeholders but 
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also by internal stakeholders and by the organisations themselves on one another within the 
organisational field (see Deephouse et al., 2017). In addition, by analysing policymakers’ 
reports, this thesis shows how policymakers use discursive legitimation strategies to 
preserve the legitimacy of the alcohol industry. That way, this study extends the works of 
Vaara and colleagues (2006, 2008, 2010) and van Leeuwen and Wodak (1999) on discursive 
legitimation. 
 
1.4 Summary of Methods 
This study adopts a qualitative method approach for answering the set research question 
and draws from an interpretivist-constructivist epistemology and social constructionist 
ontology. The empirical data for this study is derived from documents and semi-structured 
interviews. Examples of documents include industry texts submitted during the MUP 
consultation, policy reports from the committees, and transcripts of parliamentary debates 
and evidence sessions all collected from the Scottish Parliament website. Interviews were 
targeted at alcohol industry actors and Members of the Scottish Parliament (MSPs) who 
were members of the HSC and FC, respectively. The analytical method is thematic analysis 
which is guided by Entman (1993)’s frame theory; Deephouse et al., (2017) and Suchman 
(1995)’s take on legitimacy theory; and Vaara et al., (2006)’s discursive legitimation. The 
study of documents fits well with the research philosophical position, the data analysis 
methods, and the theoretical perspectives adopted. 
 
1.5 Thesis Structure 
This thesis is divided into ten chapters. This introductory chapter (Chapter 1) presents the 
research problem that the thesis seeks to answer, provides a rationale for the selected 
policy, gives a summary of the key literatures on which this thesis draws on, and a summary 
of the theoretical perspectives and methods guiding this thesis. 
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Chapter 2 Research Context. This chapter explores the challenges of alcohol in Scotland, in 
relation to the Scottish policy process, and the recent industry changes and developments. 
It reflects on some of the industry actors’ CSR activities and involvement in alcohol harm 
reduction and presents a critique of the schemes. Understanding the policy process and the 
activities of the industry actors provides context for the thesis and help in understanding the 
findings of this thesis. Industry actors’ participation in social responsibility schemes, active 
participation in the government’s Public Health Responsibility Deal (PHRD) programme, and 
publicising the successes relating to these on their websites may suggest some form of self-
regulation and quest for legitimacy. 
Chapter 3 Theoretical Underpinnings – Frame Theory and Legitimacy Theory. This chapter 
reviews the literatures on frames, framing, legitimacy theory, and cleavages. The finding of 
this review points to the significance of framing in the policy formulation process. The 
chapter also explores the literature on alcohol policy studies and framing, with the aim to 
understand the types of studies that have been conducted and to identify any potential 
research gaps. The studies reviewed indicate that the alcohol industry is divided, and this is 
driven by the differences in their interests. These differences are evident in the language 
they used to represent themselves during policy negotiations in the bid to maintain their 
reputation and legitimacy. Next, the chapter examines legitimacy theory and the empirical 
utility of legitimacy, and explores the impact of cleavages on organisational legitimacy. 
Finally, the chapter reflects on the concepts of frames, framing, legitimacy, legitimation, and 
cleavages and their interconnections. 
Chapter 4 Methodology 1 – Philosophical Position and Data Collection. This chapter presents 
the underlying research epistemology and ontology guiding the thesis, and the data 
collection methods. The data collection methods are documents and semi-structured 
interviews and the rationale for this selection is provided. This chapter discusses the 
document identification and selection process and the recruitment of interview participants. 
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Chapter 5 Methodology 2 – Data Analysis. The data analytical approach adopted is thematic 
analysis. In this chapter, a step-by-step guide of how thematic analysis is applied in this thesis 
using extracts from the data pool is presented for both frame theory and legitimacy theory. 
Chapter 6 Frames, Cleavages, and the Alcohol Industry. This chapter sets out to address the 
research question on how the alcohol industry responded to the Scottish MUP consultation, 
the frames they used, and how cleavages were created and expressed through language. 
The chapter presents the positions of the industry actors on the MUP Bill using a structural 
or functional approach. It then takes the analysis a step further to understand how cleavages 
are expressed through frames used by industry actors. It shows the commonalities in 
industry actors’ use of language that would otherwise not be captured using the structural 
or functional approach to cleavages. The chapter finds that the discursive approach to 
understanding cleavages has the effect of blurring the historical traditional divide between 
the industry sectors and the functional boundary lines, and allows for a more detailed 
understanding of cleavages. 
Chapter 7 We Love You Despite Your Shortcomings - Policymakers’ Perceptions of Alcohol 
Industry Cleavages and Strategies Adopted to Prevent  Delegitimation. This chapter explores 
the impact of cleavages on policymakers in their deliberations. The study finds that industry 
cleavages did not significantly impact on the policymakers, the policy process, and/or on the 
alcohol industry's legitimacy. The chapter explores the strategies adopted by the 
policymakers which could have contributed to preserving the alcohol industry’s collective 
legitimacy. The chapter concludes that the discursive approach to understanding cleavages 
has the potential to help diffuse the tensions associated with cleavages and mitigate against 
the loss of legitimacy from the policymakers. 
Chapter 8 Divided We Stand - Cleavages, and the Alcohol Industry’s Strategies for 
Maintaining Collective Legitimacy. This chapter focuses on how industry actors perceive 
each other’s legitimacy and the strategies they adopt in ascribing or protecting each other’s 
legitimacy in the face of competition. The chapter shows how industry actors use both 
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discursive and relational strategies in a complementary manner to prevent delegitimation 
and uphold the collective legitimacy of the industry. 
Chapter 9 Discussion. This chapter brings together and discusses the findings of the thesis in 
relation to the research questions. It discusses the empirical contribution of the findings, the 
theoretical contribution to frame theory, and legitimacy theory, and the wider utility of the 
findings. 
Chapter 10 Conclusion. This chapter summarises the thesis and reflects on the experience 
of conducting the research, (i.e. the research challenges, and my research assumptions in 
relation to my non-drinker identity), the implication for the thesis, and how these were 
managed. It highlights the limitations of the thesis and provides some recommendations for 
future studies. 
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CHAPTER 2. RESEARCH CONTEXT 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter helps to situate the research for a better understanding of the Scottish alcohol 
policy space, the alcohol industry, their use of frames, and overall strategy during the  MUP 
policy deliberation. In this chapter, I present a broad view of the challenges of alcohol in 
Scotland and an overview of the Scottish Government alcohol policy process, with an 
emphasis on the MUP Bill. Next, a summary of the Scottish alcohol industry is presented, 
paying attention to the structure, capabilities, and growth. Finally, the chapter presents 
some of the recent changes and developments in the Scottish alcohol industry – including 
the current alcohol debate, the industry actors’ position on MUP, their CSR schemes, and 
the alcohol harm reduction strategies they support. 
 
2.2 Alcohol Consumption and Challenges within the Scottish Context 
Concerns about Scottish alcohol consumption and its effect on health and wellbeing dates 
to the 18th century and perhaps beyond (The Scotsman, 2010). Alcohol-related deaths in 
Scotland since the 1980s has been on the rise and accounts for 1 in 30 deaths as of 2003 
(NAIR, 2005: 36; Nicholls, 2014; Katikireddi et al., 2014b). Between the periods of 1987–1991 
and 1997–2001, deaths from liver cirrhosis in men more than doubled in Scotland, to the 
highest rate increase in Europe (Leon and McCambridge, 2006; Nicholls, 2014), with a 
sevenfold higher rate in deprived communities compared to affluent areas (Leyland et al., 
2007; Emslie et al., 2009). Between 1980 and 2000, the rate of hospital admissions increased 
more than fivefold from 120 per 100,000 to 649 per 100,000, with men twice as likely to be 
admitted as women. This has however changed with increased admission from acute 
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intoxication observed in young men and women, a rise in binge drinking6, and an increase in 
unsupervised drinking amongst children aged between 12 and 13. Alcohol consumption is 
directly implicated in nineteen conditions including alcoholic cardiomyopathy, alcoholic 
gastritis, alcoholic liver disease, and alcohol induced chronic pancreatitis, and it is linked to 
fifty-three other disease conditions including certain cancers (Grant et al., 2009). 
Alcohol affects the drinker and the society in three different but interconnected ways 
(Edwards, 1997; Edwards et al., 1995). The first way involves a physical, psychological, and 
sociological effect on the drinker (ONS, 2014; Holmes and Dale et al., 2014). The second 
involves acute events (for example, accidents) and the chronic consequences of alcohol to 
the individual drinker’s health. The third considers the damage because of consumption to 
the individual drinker and harm done to others (Edwards, 1997; Kuntsche and Muller, 2012; 
Lyvers et al., 2010). These and many more have led to a rethink of alcohol policies. 
Nevertheless, alcohol consumption contributes to social interaction and local life, and 
enhances the UK economy through the job provision and tax contribution to the UK 
Exchequer (Home Office, 2013; WSTA, 2013). In spite of the economic benefits derived from 
alcohol sales and consumption, most academics (for example Babor et al., 2003) and the 
government, see alcohol as a commodity which should be controlled. Babor et al. (2003) 
argue that alcohol should be controlled just like all drugs because of its harmful effects, and 
that the use of taxation is a beneficial side effect of a drug being legally controlled rather 
than being made illegal. Most industry actors and consumer groups see alcohol as a part of 
the UK culture with potential health benefits (Movva and Figueredo, 2012; Ronksley et al., 
2011; Marmot et al., 1994). The health benefits associated with low alcohol consumption 
have been refuted in many studies (for example, Chikritzhs et al., 2015; Stockwell et al., 
2016; Gakiduo, et al., 2018); this is, however, open to contestation (see Bell et al., 2017). 
Nevertheless, the advice remains that “future estimates of the alcohol-related burden of 
 
6 Binge drinking is defined as an extended period of heavy drinking over several days, which is strongly 
associated with clinical definitions of alcoholism (Berridge et al., 2009; see also: Jellinek's 1960s classification; 
Wechsler and Austin, 1998) and often with intervening periods of abstinence (WHO, 1994). 
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disease and national drinking guidelines should no longer assume any protective effects 
from low dose consumption” (Chikritzhs et al., 2015) and that “alcohol control policies might 
need to be revised worldwide, refocusing on efforts to lower overall population-level 
consumption” (Gakiduo, et al., 2018). 
From the 1990s, alcohol issues have also been conceptualised within a criminal justice 
framework with the introduction of terms such as surveillance, harm reduction, and 
community safety approaches, and policies focused on anti-social behaviour orders, fixed 
penalty notices, and the introduction of ‘alcohol-free’ zones in city centres (Berridge, 2009). 
Concerns with binge drinking are also thought to have led to the reform of the 2003 
Licensing Act and the subsequent introduction of the Licensing (Scotland) Act 2005 and the 
MUP policy. 
 
2.3 Scottish Policy Process 
It is the responsibility of the Scottish Parliament to initiate, deliberate, and pass Bills7 into 
an Act8. This process is known as the ‘policy process’. Prior to devolution in 1999, “all Bills 
affecting Scotland were introduced in, and subject to the procedures of, the UK Parliament” 
(Scottish Parliament website). Some Bills were however limited in extent to Scotland, and 
others, which applied to the whole of the UK, had distinct provisions that are only applicable 
to Scotland. Notwithstanding, Scotland has since 1707 maintained a separate legal (including 
alcohol licensing) and education system. The Scotland Act 1998 established the Scottish 
Parliament (Holyrood) and gave it the power to legislate on certain matters referred to as 
devolved matters9. Other policy areas including trade and foreign affairs were however 
 
7 A Bill is a proposal for a new law or a proposal to change an existing law. (Parliament.uk). There are four 
types of Bill – Public Bill, Private Members Bill, Private Bills and Hybrid Bill (see 
http://www.parliament.uk/about/how/laws/bills/) for the life-cycle of a Bill and definitions of the different 
types of Bill. 
8 An Act after obtaining a Royal Assent becomes an Act of Parliament and is Law which every citizen is bound 
to respect and obey (parliament.uk). 
9 For example: health; education; local government; home affairs (criminal and civil law, the prosecution 
system, and the courts) and the Police. 
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reserved to the UK Parliament (Westminster). Laws made by the Scottish Parliament are 
known as Acts of the Scottish Parliament; they apply only in Scotland and are expected to 
comply with the European Convention on Human Rights and with EU laws. The 1998 Act 
made provision for the legislative competence of a Bill to be challenged after it is passed, 
but before it can become law (Scottish Parliament website). It is on this basis that the SWA 
challenged the MUP Bill at a Court of Session in Edinburgh. 
According to Cairney (2013), “the Scottish policy system was designed, in part, to diverge 
from ‘old Westminster’ – but the UK and Scottish policy styles are often rather similar”. 
Some observed differences include the introduction of a Bill and the absence of a House of 
Lords in the Scottish parliament. In Scotland, new public Bills can be introduced by the 
government, Members of the Scottish Parliament (MSP), or the Convener of the 
parliamentary committee. All Bills are, however, subject to parliamentary scrutiny over 
three distinct stages, as set out by amendments made to the 1988 Act in 2012 and 2016 (see 
Figure 1 below). An additional fourth stage involves the “reconsideration” of a Bill by 
Parliament. This additional stage is required for Bills subject to challenge after being passed. 
Notwithstanding, the Scottish (and the UK) policy process does not occur in a rational 
manner but instead is rather multifaceted and has been rationalised using different political 
theories (see Katikireddi et al., 2014b; Smith and Katikireddi 2013). As earlier stated, 
problems with alcohol consumption were on the rise and this was linked to the availability 
of cheap alcohol from large retailers. Scotland and the rest of the UK, like most other 
countries in Europe, were in a period of economic recession, and government action was 
required to curb the rising health care and social welfare bills associated with excessive 
alcohol consumption. This is what Kingdon (1984) referred to as convergence of policy 
streams which gives rise to ‘policy window’ (see also Hawkins and McCambridge, 2020b). A 
‘policy window’ is said to be frequently exploited by policy entrepreneurs (for example, 
government officials, public health practitioners and industry actors) to promote preferred 
solutions (Cairney and Jones, 2016). The SNP explored this policy window and made reducing 
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alcohol consumption one of its election manifesto commitments in 2011 (SNP Manifesto, 
2011). 
Figure 1: Stages in the passage of a Scottish Public Bill. 
 
Source: Scottish Parliament Website [online] 
http://www.parliament.scot/parliamentarybusiness/Bills/99986.aspx [Accessed, 
05/04/2017] 
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As earlier mentioned, the Scottish parliament and policy process is said to be different to 
the Westminster parliament (Cairney, 2013), and one of this differences involves the use of 
communities of experts and policy committees made up of MSPs for policy deliberation 
(Cairney and Jones, 2016; True et al., 2007). In pursuit of an evidence-based approach, the 
Scottish Government commissioned a group of researchers at Sheffield University to study 
the link between pricing and alcohol consumption for different consumer groups (Angus and 
Holmes et al., 2016). This is an example of community of experts. The School of Health and 
Related Research (ScHARR) report produced models, which the Scottish Government and 
policymakers relied on during the MUP deliberations. Outsourcing policies in this manner is 
thought to bring about radical policy changes as the community of experts can reframe the 
policy problem to attract the attention of interested parties (Cairney and Jones, 2016). The 
use of parliamentary policy committees, such as the HSC, the FC, and the Subordinate 
Legislation Committee, for policy scrutiny and deliberations is said to free up time for the 
government to carry out other parliamentary business. These committees are explored 
further below. 
2.3.1 Scottish Alcohol Policy Process: An Overview of the  MUP Bill:  
The Scottish alcohol policy process, like most other Scottish policies, follows three distinctive 
stages: the introduction, amendment, and the passage of the Bill, (see Figure 1 above and 
the Scottish Parliament, March 2012). The Scottish Government introduced its first post-
devolution alcohol strategy in January 2002 and this heralded further alcohol policies 
including the 2003 Licensing Act, changes to the blood alcohol concentration limit for 
automobile drivers, the Licensing Act 2005, and the MUP. These policy initiatives faced fierce 
but mixed criticism from interested industry actors, amidst evidence presented by non-
alcohol industry actors linking alcohol availability and affordability to increased consumption 
and harm (Chaloupka et al., 2002; International Centre for Alcohol Studies (ICAP), 2005). The 
alcohol MUP was a key aspect of the Licensing Act 2005, which aimed to introduce a pricing 
mechanism as a mandatory condition for premises’ licences and occasional licences (Scottish 
Government website, March 2009). The MUP policy was first discussed in Scotland by the 
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minority Scottish National Party (SNP) in 2007 in response to Scottish [domestic] drinking 
practices and the resulting negative health consequences. McCambridge et al. (2014) argued 
that the election of the minority SNP government disrupted the longstanding relationship 
between alcohol industry actors and the Scottish Government. The Bill was opposed by the 
Labour party in 2010 (Hawkins et al., 2012) and following the election of a majority SNP 
government in 2011, MUP was reintroduced into Scottish alcohol policy agenda with a 
proposed set price of £0.50 per unit of alcohol. The idea of MUP was taken up by 
Westminster and other devolved administrations elsewhere in the UK, but Westminster 
later announced in July 2013 that the MUP policy would not be implemented, citing the need 
for more evidence on its effectiveness (Hawkins and Holden, 2013; Hawkins and 
McCambridge, 2020a; see also Godlee, 2014). 
The MUP Bill is an executive Bill and was introduced in October 2011 by Nicola Sturgeon, the 
then Deputy First Minister. The Bill was accompanied by a Financial and Policy Memoranda 
in accordance with the Parliament’s Standing Orders. This stage of the Bill includes the 
research briefing on the Bill by the Scottish Parliament Information Centre (SPICe) in January 
2012 and May 2012 (stage 3). The second stage is the inquiry and committee stage. The 
Health and Sports Committee (HSC) was designated as the lead committee to oversee the 
consultation process of the Bill and report its findings back to Parliament (Scottish 
Parliament, March 2012). A sub-committee, the Finance Committee (FC) reported its views 
on the Financial Memoranda (FM) to the HSC. The FC sought the views of some organisations 
identified by the FM as being potentially affected by the Bill. The FC also heard evidence 
from industry actors. A third committee, the Subordinate Legislation Committee reported 
its finding on the Bill also to the Parliament. The HSC reviewed the submissions made by the 
different alcohol stakeholders and the public. It is at this stage of the policy process that 
alcohol stakeholders seek to influence the policy. The HSC also heard oral evidence. 
Understanding industry obstruction through framing can help anticipate and overcome that 
obstruction and a more nuanced understanding will help with overall policy progression.  In 
addition, the input from different stakeholders helps moderate the policy process and 
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ensures that the concerns of all affected stakeholders are considered before the Bill is 
passed. 
Following the receipt of consultation response from stakeholders and the oral evidence 
sessions, the HSC reviewed the evidence from the different stakeholders, made 
amendments, and produced a revised Bill. The revised Bill is then passed to the Subordinate 
Committee for further scrutiny and the amended Bill is then presented back to parliament 
and debated before being passed. The MUP Bill was passed on May 24, 2012, and received 
Royal Assent on June 29, 2012 (Parliament. Scot). The Scotland MUP Act became law from 
May 1st, 2018 (Scottish License Trade News, November 2017; The Telegraph News, 2018) 
following a six-year court battle with the SWA (Woodhouse and Ward, 2014; Woodhouse, 
2017: 10). The court ruled in favour of the Scottish Government on November 15th, 2017, 
making Scotland the first country in the world to introduce a MUP for alcohol (Holden and 
Hawkins, 2016). 
MUP was negotiated under Scottish devolved arrangements with restrictions as to their 
remit in applying pricing intervention at a population level (Holden and Hawkins, 2016; 
Katikireddi et al., 2014). This meant that MUP could be introduced as a devolved health 
measure that would impact Scotland, given the significant alcohol-related health 
inequalities between Scotland and the rest of the UK and other EU countries (Hawkins and 
McCambridge, 2020a; Leon and McCambridge, 2006). 
Katikireddi (2013) identified devolution and the changing nature of the political institutions 
as an enabler, as well as a challenge, for public health advocates during the MUP 
negotiations. Policy negotiations can be facilitated or hindered by the presence of multi-
level governance systems (see Cairney 2013; Hawkins and McCambridge, 2020a; Hawkins 
and McCambridge, 2020b). As earlier stated, the Scottish MUP was challenged by the SWA 
in the Court of Session Edinburgh and the court ruled in favour of the Scottish Government 
in May 2013. The SWA appealed the ruling in the Scottish Court of Appeal (the Inner House). 
Following the defeat at the Court of Appeal, the case was referred onwards to the Courts of 
Justice of the European Union (Inner House) in April 2014 for a preliminary ruling on the 
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points made in relation to the EU laws (Holden and Hawkins, 2016; Hawkins and 
McCambridge, 2020a). In December 2015, the Court of Justice referred the case back to the 
Court of Appeal, which upholds the initial ruling of the Court of Session and made MUP legal 
in October 2016. The SWA again appealed the decision at the UK Supreme Court, which 
again in November 2017 upheld the ruling of the Scottish Courts (Holden and Hawkins, 
2016). The venue-shifting tactics adopted by the SWA were made possible by the multi-level 
governance system adopted for when policy issues cross over between policy jurisdictions. 
The multi-level governance system makes it possible for policies to be disputed and for 
decisions made on a policy issues in one policy arena to impact directly on policy decisions 
in others (see Ackrill and Kay, 2011). Multi-level governance is therefore double edged in the 
sense that it creates “additional capacity for policy development”, and also “new additional 
veto points at which policies may be challenged and blocked” (Hawkins and McCambridge, 
2020a: 29). The authors state that this could slow down the policymaking process and “make 
policy change harder to achieve”(see also Hawkins and McCambridge, 2020b; Hawkins et 
al., 2018; Hawkins and Holden, 2016; Holden and Hawkins, 2012 on venue shifting and multi-
dimensional lobbying strategies). These literatures on multi-level governance are relevant 
to the current study given the delay in the implementation of the MUP policy and also for 
understanding the challenges of the devolved administration (Hawkins and McCambridge, 
2020b). Despite an end to the long legal battle, and the implementation of the MUP Scottish 
Bill, the debate is however far from being over as both industry actors and public health 
advocates wait patiently for the evaluation of MUP. 
 
2.4 The Scottish Alcohol Industry 
The alcohol industry, in broad terms, refers to corporations engaged in the development, 
production, distribution, packaging, marketing, and sales of alcoholic beverages and their 
representative trade associations (O’Connor, 2018, IAS, 2016; Jernigan, 2008). The alcohol 
industry is traditionally divided into three categories of producers (based on their products 
– beer, wine, and spirits) and two categories of retailers (on- and off-trade) (Jernigan, 2008). 
Divided We Stand: Exploring the Alcohol Industry Framing of the Alcohol (Minimum Pricing) (Scotland) Act Consultation. 
 
 
 
PhD Thesis 2020  I. J. Amaeshi.  Page | 40 
 
 
Historically, there have always been strong boundaries between these categories 
(Christiansen and Kroezen, 2016) and these boundaries became more evident following 
industrialisation. For example, in the pre-industrialised era, the brewing, sales, and 
consumption of ale were merged. Brewing ale was predominantly done by women at home 
for family consumption before safe water and the excess was sold (Harrison, 1971). Home 
brewing of ale was a gradual process before it became commercialised, shifting from home 
to the workplace, and then the gradual detachment of breweries from public places of 
consumption which were created predominantly for men (Harrison, 1973; Hey, 1986). These 
changes are said to be driven by legislative, political, and economic interests (see Harrison, 
1994; Warner et al., 2001). 
Within the industry, there are also trade associations. Trade associations for the purpose of 
this thesis, are classed as industry actors because they are funded by their members (i.e. the 
alcohol producers and retailers), act as a governing body and informal regulators to their 
members, seek to influence policy decisions to the benefit of its members, and provide 
legitimacy (Rajwani et al., 2015). Trade associations are often able to influence policy 
debates more effectively than individual companies acting unilaterally, and their responses 
often represent the collective views of their members (Rajwani et al., 2015). Nevertheless, 
alcohol-producing companies remain the most prominent industry actor during alcohol-
related policy debates, especially the global Multi-National Companies (MNC) (Aggarwal et 
al., 2011). 
In discussing the Scottish alcohol industry, this section focuses on the producer sector of the 
industry (distillers and brewers) due to available data for measuring their economic impact. 
Scotland's brewing and distilling sectors play a vital role in the Scottish economy and 
Scotland is the whisky capital of the world, with hundreds of years of distillery expertise 
(O’Connor, 2018). The spirits industry contributes approximately 3% to total Scottish Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP), compared to 0.3% from the brewing sector (O’Connor, 2018). 
Scotland has the greatest concentration of whisky producers in the world and had £4.37 
billion in sales of scotch whisky exports for 2017 (O’Connor, 2018). The scotch whisky and 
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gin sector has seen massive growth over the years compared to the brewing sector whose 
increase has been in the growth of micro-breweries in response to localised consumers 
choice in more expensive specialised beers (O’Connor, 2018). 
Scotland is home to the largest distillers in the UK. According to SPICe report, a total of 1.23 
billion bottles of scotch whisky were exported to 180 markets worldwide in 2017 (O’Connor, 
2018). Scotch whisky is a protected name and only whisky produced or matured in Scotland 
can be called scotch whisky (O’Connor, 2018: 5). Some of the top spirit companies in 
Scotland are Macallan which is part of Edrington Group, Diageo, Whyte and Mackay, and 
Chivas Brothers. Diageo has its headquarters in London, and in addition to scotch whisky and 
other spirits, they also produce beer (Diageo, 2020). Diageo prides itself as a global leader in 
beverage alcohol –  it has over 29 malt and grain distilleries across Scotland, and has a huge 
number of visitors to its distilleries and its visitor centre in central Edinburgh, which 
contributes significantly to Scottish tourism (Diageo, 2020). Its close rival, Edrington Group, 
is headquartered in Scotland and is also international in its composition (O’Connor, 2018). 
Edrington owns route to market in 13 countries and operates through joint ventures and 
third-party arrangements in the other countries and regions it trades in (O’Connor, 2018; 
23). Whyte and Mackay, another significant player in the scotch whisky business, is based in 
Glasgow. In 2011, it formed an import company in the United States to handle its US 
portfolio, and in 2014, it was bought over by a Philippine based Emperador Inc (Whyte and 
Mackay, 2010). Chivas Brothers is the scotch and gin branch of French company Pernod 
Ricard. Chivas Brothers has its headquarters in Scotland and operates 13 malt distilleries, 1 
grain distillery, and 2 gin distilleries across Scotland (Chivas Brothers, 2020). 
Beer has been produced in Scotland for over 5,000 years (Archeo News, 2011). Scotland has 
seen a growth in the brewing industry since the twentieth century despite the global 
reduction in beer consumption (O’Connor, 2018). The SPICe reports state that “87% of UK 
brewing business are micro in size and only 2% can be classed as medium or large”. This 
trend applies to Scotland where 83% of breweries are micro-breweries specialising in 
premium beers which are sold locally (O’Connor, 2018: 27). Nevertheless, few Scottish 
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brewers, for example Stewart Brewing, BrewDog, and the C&C Group (following its 
acquisition of Tennent Caledonian in 2009), export their products to other countries 
(O’Connor, 2018). The Scottish Beer and Pub Association (SBPA10) lists 20 brewing 
companies as being members and some of these companies include Diageo, Molson Coors, 
C&C Group PLC, Caledonian Brewery company, Carlsberg UK, AbInBev, and Edinburgh Beer 
Factory. The SBPA members listed are some of the big players in the UK brewing industry 
and they are active within the UK alcohol policy arena (see DOH, 2011a). The SBPA states 
that their “members are responsible for around 20,000 pubs and account for 90% of beer 
produced across the UK (SBPA website 2020). This statement aligns with Abbott et al. (1998) 
and Harrison (1793) who believe  that British brewers traditionally own the pubs that sold 
their beers prior to the 1989 Beer Order (See also O’Connor, 2018: 3511; Knowles and Egan, 
2001; Hey, 1986; The Pub expert guide, 2020; House of Commons report, 2004). Such 
ownership was relaxed following the introduction of the government’s 1989 Beer Orders 
which stipulated that no brewer could own more than 2,000 licenced establishments 
(Abbott et al., 1998). This however led to the development of a new business model called 
pub companies, and these pubs are then leased out to potential licensees (Abbott et al., 
1998; House of Commons report, 2004) under strict agreement that the licensees stock and 
sell their products. The Scottish alcohol industry however goes beyond its distillers and 
breweries to include close ties, for example with the agricultural and tourism sectors, all of 
which contribute to the tax revenue and Scottish GDP (O’Connor, 2018). 
 
2.5 Current Alcohol Debate and Industry Position 
The alcohol industry is not oblivious to the problems caused by their products; they however 
maintain and push frames that projects the majority of their customers as responsible 
 
10 The SBPA is the Scottish branch of the BBPA which stands for the British Beer and Pub Association. A trade 
association representing the drinks and hospitality industry. 
11 The Aberdeenshire brewer Six0North is noted to have multiple operational sites which includes 5 bars in 
Aberdeen, Stonehaven, Edinburgh, Dundee, and Glasgow (Six°North, 2020). Also, BrewDog is noted to have at 
least 30 bars in the UK (O’Connor, 2018: 35). 
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consumers who enjoy their products responsibly and that the cases of misuse occur only in 
a minority group (Hawkins and Holden, 2013). Industry actors’ positions on the minority 
irresponsible consumers align with the results of studies by Drummond et al. (2005)12 and 
McManus et al. (2009)13. Alcohol industry actors also assume that the benefits of moderate 
consumption outweigh the costs however defined (Taylor et al., 2005; Andréasson and 
Allebeck, 2005). The alcohol industry has been accused of irresponsible pricing and 
marketing which has fuelled excessive alcohol consumption, causing harms. According to 
Sheron and Gilmore (2016) harmful consumers are the industry’s best customers and their 
consumption accounts for almost 70% of drinks sales by volume (see Habel et al., 2008 on 
the Pareto principle). Industry actors however argue that the introduction of MUP would 
disproportionately affect moderate drinkers and have little or no impact on 
harmful/hazardous drinkers. This argument is however flawed considering the population 
consumption theory. The theory links the population level consumption of a product to harm 
caused by the product (Sheron and Gilmore, 2016; Edwards, 1997). This is the basis for 
modern alcohol control policies such as the MUP, which is said to target the cheapest 
supermarket alcohol consumed by hazardous and harmful drinkers and not alcohol prices in 
the on-trade. 
Industry actors have advocated for alcohol tax as a legal pricing mechanism, which would 
deliver the same result as MUP. However, critics argue that increases in alcohol taxes are 
not always passed onto consumers as the supermarkets can absorb tax increases and 
continue to sell alcohol as a loss leader to drive footfall into their stores (Sheron et al., 2008; 
Rabinovich, et al., 2009; see also Hess and Gerstner, 1987). This practice led to the 
introduction of a ban on selling alcohol below cost in 2012 (Woodhouse, 2017), but the 
additional policy has inherent loopholes which have been exploited by retailers. MUP 
nevertheless addresses these tax loopholes. At a population level, alcohol duty could be 
 
12 The study reveals that 4% of adults in England are alcohol dependent, which involves a significant degree 
of addiction to alcohol, making it difficult for them to reduce their drinking or abstain despite increasingly 
serious harm. 
13 The authors found that 24% of the adult population in England (33% men and 16% women) consume 
alcohol in a way that is harmful to their health or well-being. 
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effective (Elder et al., 2010; Sheron et al., 2008), but industry actors’ lobbying makes it an 
unreliable method on its own (Yoon and Lam, 2012). The Alcohol Health Alliance (2016) 
argues that both MUP and duty increase can be used together in a complementary manner 
to reduce alcohol harm. 
In defence of their product, industry actors blame the consumer and the culture of 
irresponsible consumption for the problems with alcohol, and they fail to link low alcohol 
prices to increased consumption and harm despite growing evidence from public health and 
alcohol health researchers (Chaloupka et al., 2002; Kuo et al., 2003; Mueller et al., 2010). 
The way the industry positions the consumer (majority responsible/minority irresponsible) 
paves the way for industry preferred treatment options – education. Education is a 
treatment frame promoted by the alcohol industry (Anderson and Baumberg, 2006). This, 
however, supports other frames which they sponsor for example: “an ‘educate and prevent’ 
approach is more effective than blanket controls” and “alcohol harm-reduction measures 
should target the minority” (Drummond and Chengappa, 2006). Education is said to be the 
least effective in bringing about behavioural change (Brown and Richardson, 2011; Mazis et 
al., 1991; Creyer et al., 2002 on the diminishing effect of persistent health messages on 
habitual drinkers). Targeting the minority harmful/hazardous drinkers is not without 
challenge14 (Raistrick et al., 2006). Alcohol Brief Intervention (ABI) has been cited by industry 
actors as an education option that should be explored. ABI has been used successfully in the 
healthcare setting (Kaner et al., 2007; McQueen et al., 2011) but are more suited for 
adolescents who are not yet substance dependent. Raistrick et al. (2006) opine that 
hazardous drinkers will benefit from a simple ABI in a generalist setting, harmful drinkers 
may require extended ABI in a generalist setting, and severely dependent drinkers would 
require and benefit more from intensive specialist treatment. But this is not the type or 
extent of “education” the industry is advocating. 
 
14 Challenges include recruitment into ABI scheme; compliance issues, duration required for maximum effect, 
and relapse following the intervention (Raistrick et al., 2006). 
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The impact of MUP on income groups has been debated and researched (Crawford et al., 
2012; Angus and Holmes et al., 2016). For a population-based policy like MUP, there will be 
winners and losers. Industry actors argue that MUP disproportionately penalises those on 
low income. If the low-income group is considered stereotypically (i.e. the homeless and 
people on benefits), they are classed as the minority harmful/hazardous drinkers who 
consume cheap supermarket spirits targeted by MUP (see Institute of Fiscal Studies (IFS), 
2011). High-income earners nevertheless have been found to exceed drinking guideline 
limits but harmful drinkers in a low-income group tend to drink more and are more likely to 
be admitted to hospital or to die from an alcohol-related cause (Robson, 2012; see also 
Leyland et al., 2007; Emslie et al., 2009). The industry actors’ argument on low-income 
consumers being disproportionately penalised is flawed because the government’s 
approach with MUP looks to address the total alcohol consumption and reduce the burden 
of alcohol harm which is shared by all. 
2.5.1 Recent Changes and Developments in the Scottish A lcohol Industry 
The shift towards a whole-population approach by the Scottish Government after 
2007represents a sea of change in the UK alcohol debate (Hawkins and Holden, 2013), with 
an end result of cleavages amongst and between the alcohol stakeholders. These cleavages 
were more pronounced within the industry with spirits producers, some brewers and the 
majority of the off-trade retail sector strongly opposed to any form of price-based measure 
(Hawkins and Holden, 2013). Most of the alcohol producers that participated in the MUP 
debates have been in business for many years. Most of them have undergone a series of 
mergers and acquisitions. They are classed as MNC as they operate in more than one country 
and employ 250 workers or more (Aggarwal, et al., 2011). The off-trade retailers are classed 
as big companies as they have traded for many years with multiple retail outlets. A summary 
of the key characteristics of the industry actors that participated in the Scottish alcohol MUP 
debate is presented in Appendix 1. Information provided by all the industry actors involved 
in the MUP debates on their websites presents the businesses as successful and that they 
contribute to the economic development of their resident countries. The industry actors 
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that participated in the MUP debates are signatories to the UK Public Health Responsibility 
Deal (PHRD15) and they engage in numerous corporate reputation management activities as 
well as in schemes aimed towards reducing alcohol misuse and harm. 
As part of the UK PHRD pledge A7(a), alcohol industry actors pledged to “provide support 
for schemes appropriate for local areas that wish to use them to address issues around social 
and health harms, and act together to improve co-operation among such schemes operating 
in local areas” (Department of Health (DoH), 2011b; Hadfield and Measham, 2014; Knai et 
al., 2015). Examples of schemes alcohol industry actors participate in, include Best Bar None 
(BBN16), Business Improvement Districts (BID17), Community Alcohol Partnerships (CAP18), 
PASS19, Pubwatch20 and Purple Flag21 and Challenge 21. Most of these activities are also part 
of the existing Scottish Government Alcohol Industry Partnership (SGAIP22). The PHRD was 
not without consequence as it shaped the alcohol policy landscape in England with 
 
15 The PHRD is a government scheme introduced by the UK coalition government in 2010. The involves 
businesses signing up voluntarily to set pledges. The scheme was established on the premise that businesses 
understand their customers better and working alongside public health practitioners, it is assumed that they 
would find solutions to resolve problems associated with business practices at a lesser cost than legislation 
(DOH, 2011a). 
16 BBN is a national award supported by the Home Office and the drinks industry. It aims to promote 
responsible management and operation of licensed premises and reducing crime in the night-time economy 
(BBN website). 
17 BIDs are business led partnerships created to deliver additional services to local businesses. They 
encourage local businesses to get involved in local activities, enables business community and local 
authorities to work together to improve the commercial environment and embody several key dimensions of 
contemporary policing (Cook, 2010). 
18 The CAP scheme supports local partnership working to address issues such as under-age alcohol sales, 
proxy purchase and reducing alcohol-related anti-social behaviour (Tesco Plc, 2016). WSTA helps coordinate 
CAPs. Their actions include co-operating and liaising between retailers and the trading standard, police, 
schools, local authority licensing teams and health networks. 
19 PASS is a UK’s national guarantee scheme for proof-of-age cards. This scheme is supported by the 
Government; the Association of Chief Police Officers; the trading standards institute and the trade 
associations connected with those selling age-restricted products. Acceptance of PASS cards is furthermore 
promoted as part of the Challenge 21 and Challenge 25 scheme (BBPA, 2012). 
20 Pubwatch is a voluntary organisation set up to promote best practices and aims to achieve a safer drinking 
environment in licensed premises. 
21 Purple flag is an award scheme aimed at making city centers and business districts safe, consumer friendly 
and appealing within the night-time economy. 
22 The SGAIP is a forum created in 2007 by the devolved Scottish government with the aim of bringing 
together government and the alcohol industry members to deliver joint initiatives to promote responsible 
drinking and address alcohol related issues (Scottish Government Website, 2013). 
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implications for wider alcohol strategy and MUP when it was being considered by the 
Westminster Government (Hawkins and McCambridge, 2019). 
Industry actors take pride in and publicise their activities on their websites and in their 
strategy reports. Arguably, this could be a way of reducing regulative pressures on the 
industry (Yoon and Lam, 2012) and enhancing its reputation (see Guthrie et al., 2007; 
Deegan et al., 2002),  instead of addressing the health impacts and risks inherent in alcoholic 
products (Yoon and Lam, 2012; Hill, 2008). The activities mentioned above are said to keep 
customers safe (or at least provide a sense of safety) in the night-time economy, but not 
necessarily impact on their drinking levels or consumption pattern. Babor et al. (2010) argue 
that these schemes were created out of desperation or are circumstantial to avert attention 
from “evaluated multi-component programmes that might demonstrably support legislative 
intentions” and from strict legislation (Bond et al., 2009; Martineau et al., 2014). In addition, 
the effectiveness of these schemes is questionable, especially in relation to ‘hard’ measures 
such as local crime and disorder statistics (Hadfield and Measham, 2014). For example, an 
evaluation of the BBN scheme in Croydon found no “credible evidence to suggest that the 
implementation […] had an impact on the reduction of crime and disorder in the town centre 
on its own”. The authors cautioned that indicators to measure successes should be designed 
before the scheme is rolled out across the UK (Ackerman and Rogers, 2007). Hadfield and 
Measham (2014) found the BBN and Purple Flags awarded to licensees were used as a 
bargaining chip with the public licensing and enforcement agents to avoid tough 
sanctions/legislation. Critics of industry actors’ responsibility programmes Barry and 
Goodson (2010) asserted that the amount spent on alcohol advertising in a year outweighs 
that spent on alcohol education, awareness, and consumer responsibility campaigns over an 
eighteen-year period (for example, $320 million on advertising  in 1999 versus $300 million 
on responsible drinking campaign between 1982 - 2000). In addition, 2397 responsible 
drinking adverts were placed compared to 208,909 alcohol promotion adverts in the year 
2001 (Barry and Goodson, 2010). This places doubts on the industry actors’ commitments 
to alcohol harm reduction and their self-acclaimed identity as a responsible industry. The 
effectiveness of the PHRD pledges has been questioned by Petticrew et al. (2013) and Knai 
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et al. (2015). Knai et al. (2015) in their review found that alcohol labelling is likely to have 
limited effect on consumption and labels promoting drinking guidelines and pregnancy 
warning are unlikely to influence drinking behaviour. The authors also stated that 
“responsible drinking messages [were] ambiguous”, and that “industry-funded alcohol 
prevention campaigns can promote drinking instead of dissuading consumption” (Knai et al., 
2015: 3). It is not surprising that industry actors should favour self-regulatory or co-
regulatory measures such as those within the remit of the PHRD. 
Hawkins et al. (2012) identified that organisations who front their CSR activities do so to 
promote self-regulation as an alternative to legislation. These activities are often regarded 
as delay tactics, as they lack evidence to substantiate their effectiveness (see Hadfield and 
Measham, 2014; Ackerman and Rogers, 2007). As Hawkins and Holden (2013) put it, 
partnerships formed by alcohol industry actors involve lots of compromise and favour the 
status-quo, leaving little or no room for effective policy interventions to be deliberated. 
Moreover, the CSR activities championed by industry actors and their involvement in the 
policy process have been rationalised and justified amongst industry actors against stringent 
government legislature (Hawkins and Holden, 2013: 61, see quote from the Portman Group; 
see also Hawkins and McCambridge, 2019). 
Despite the critics, social responsibility activities are said to have positive outcomes – for 
example, adherence to the pledge to remove 2 billion units of alcohol from the market, 
which has been achieved (see Health Improvement Analytical Team, 2014). Nevertheless, 
studies by Knai et al. (2015) and Holmes et al. (2015), based on the methods adopted in the 
HMRC’s calculations of alcohol units sold, suggest that the industry 2-billion-unit pledge is 
yet to be achieved. The question remains, are alcohol industry social responsibility activities 
a mirage? (Bond et al., 2009; Baumberg, 2009). 
Unfortunately, CSR and industry self-regulation cannot be trusted to address the challenges 
of alcohol in society. Hence, the need for government intervention especially through 
regulation. As earlier discussed, regulation comes with its challenges and it is often resisted 
by the industry to protect and pursue their interest. How these interests are framed and 
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pursued can lead to cleavages, which in turn might influence or impact negatively on the 
legitimacy of an industry.  An example can be drawn from the legal challenge to the MUP by 
the SWA and the reputational impact this had on the industry following their defeat in the 
courts (see Hawkins and McCambridge, 2020a) and the potential legitimacy implication on 
the sector for opposing a governments legislation with potential impact of reducing alcohol 
harms at a population level. 
 
2.6 Summary 
The aim of this chapter is to help situate the study on the alcohol industry and their 
involvement in the Scottish MUP consultation. This chapter has discussed the challenges of 
alcohol in Scotland, the Scottish policy process, the Scottish alcohol industry, the current 
debates and industry positions, and the recent industry changes and developments. It 
presented some of the industry actors’ CSR activities and involvement in alcohol harm 
reduction and a critique of the schemes. Understanding the policy process and the activities 
of the industry actors provides context for the thesis, and helps in understanding the findings 
of this thesis. Industry actors’ participation in social responsibility schemes, active 
participation in the government’s PHRD programme, and publicising the successes relating 
to these on their websites may suggest some form of self-regulation and quest for 
legitimacy. This thesis moves on to present the theoretical underpinning of this thesis and a 
review of the literatures on the alcohol industry use of frames, the literature on legitimation, 
and cleavages.   
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CHAPTER 3. THEORETICAL UNDERPINNING – FRAME THEORY 
AND LEGITIMACY THEORY 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines the theoretical underpinnings of this thesis and the rationale for the 
choice of theories – i.e. frame theory and legitimacy theory. It starts with a theoretical 
exploration of frame and framing, and some of their empirical applications, before finally 
exploring the literature on legitimacy theory, the different forms and definitions of 
legitimacy, and the general challenges to legitimacy, as proffered by Suchman (1995). It also 
explores the relationship between frames and framing, and legitimacy and legitimation. 
Based on the anticipated relationship, the chapter explores their implications for the 
creation and sustenance of industry cleavages in policy negotiations. The chapter ends with 
a summary of the identified research gaps, how the research questions posed seek to 
address these gaps, and a glimpse into the contributions this thesis seeks to bring to 
knowledge. 
 
3.2 Frame and Framing: A Theoretical Exploration 
Frame theory and framing have become very popular and prominent in the social sciences 
(Schon and Rein, 1994; van Dijk, 1997), especially in communication and media studies 
(Entman, 1991; D’Angelo, 2002; Van Gorp, 2005; Van den Bulck et al., 2008; Paricio-Esteban 
et al., 2012). Frame theory suggests that how an information (the frame) is presented 
influences the choices people make about how to process that information (Chong and 
Druckman, 2007a). The theory has a deep root in sociology and psychology (Tewksbury and 
Scheufele, 2009; Borah, 2011) and draws largely from Erving Goffman (1959, 1974)’s corpus 
on frames of references, which straddled both sociology and psychology (Tewksbury and 
Scheufele, 2009). Goffman (1974) articulated frames as ways of making sense of the world 
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with the aid of some interpretive schemas to classify new information. He used frames as 
‘schemata of interpretation’ that allow individuals or groups ‘to locate, perceive, identify, 
and label’ events and occurrences, thus giving meaning to organising experiences, and 
guiding actions (Goffman, 1974). This approach to framing has been referred to as the 
hermeneutic approach to framing, in which frames are described in-depth primarily to elicit 
the meanings embedded in them (Matthes and Kohring, 2008). Drawing from his symbolic 
interactionism influence and tradition (Goffman, 1959), Goffman (1974) argued that 
meaning can be symbolic, and the symbolic aspects of meaning are continually negotiated 
through ongoing interactions, which also reaffirm or challenge the frame repertoires 
available in the wider culture. This has been referred to as interactional framing and uses a 
bottom-up approach to framing (see also: Gray et al., 2015). In this regard, frames can also 
act as symbolic signals and points of reference – i.e. ‘frames of reference’ (Sherif, 1967). 
Frames of reference are contextual and refer to how an individual’s judgment and 
perception of an issue change depending on the context (Sherif, 1967; see also Goffman, 
1974 in Chong and Druckman, 2007b). Kahneman and Tversky (1979), expanding on the 
work of Sherif (1967), claimed that all perception is dependent on references. The 
understanding of an issue, however, is dependent upon the values impressed upon the 
audience and the audience’s innate understanding of the issue, if any (Chong and Druckman, 
2007b; Druckman and Nelson, 2003; see also Kahneman and Tversky, 1984). 
Accordingly, frames are “composed of little tacit theories about what exists, what happens, 
and what matters” (Gitlin 1980: 6). Frames can occur as words, phrases, presentation styles, 
and images used to shape perceptions and exert influence (Goffman, 1974; Druckman, 
2001). Frames structure the way we think of and define problems, the values behind the 
definitions of those problems, and what counts as ‘solutions’ to those frame-defined 
problems (Lakoff and Ferguson, 2006). In that regard, frames are described as ‘weapons of 
advocacy’ (Weiss, 1989), which can be propagated through different mechanisms and 
platforms – for example, the media, social movements, texts, speeches, visuals, et cetera – 
and by different actors (for example, organisations, political leaders, corporate actors, 
policymakers, et cetera). 
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Nevertheless, frames are products of framing. Framing involves using certain techniques or 
frame packages (Entman, 1993), which include stereotypes, syntax, metaphors, stories, 
symbols, images, traditions, catchphrases, spins, and artefacts (Gamson and Modigliani, 
1989; Entman, 1993; Fairhurst and Sarr, 1996). The frame packages considered in this thesis 
are stereotypes, syntax, and stories as they are the most prevalent across the data set from 
preliminary analysis. According to Lippmann, stereotypes, for example, are cognitive 
structures that help individuals to process information about their environment (Ashmore 
and Del Boca, 1981). They are generalisations about social group characteristics that are 
attributed to all members of a given group, without regard to variations that might exist 
among members of that group and thus result in distortion of facts (Seiter, 1986; Allport, 
1935). Syntax is how words and phrases are arranged in a sentence – i.e. sentence formation 
(van Dijk, 1988; Entman, 1993). Empirical evidence shows that elites and the media use these 
frame packages when discussing issues and it is presumed that these frame packages can 
influence how individuals understand, interpret, and react to an issue (Tewksbury and 
Scheufele, 2009). 
Framing is both an analytical and a theoretical method (Benford and Snow 2000), which has 
varied definitions informed by disciplinary differences and approaches – for example in: 
cognitive psychology (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981); linguistics (van Dijk, 1997); media 
studies (Scheufele, 1999; Miller, 1997; Paricio-Esteban et al., 2012); management (Gray et 
al., 2015); political science and policy studies (Schon and Rein, 1994); and communication 
(Entman, 1993)23. In communication studies, in particular, it refers to how the media 
presents information to the public within a context to either encourage or discourage certain 
interpretations of events (Johnson-Cartee, 2005). Accordingly, Entman (1993) defined a 
frame as the 
ability to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more 
salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular 
 
23 For more on the disciplinary definitions of and approaches to framing, please see de Vreese, 2005. 
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problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or 
treatment recommendation for the item described (Entman 1993: 52). 
Whilst frames and framing are often used interchangeably in research writing, a frame 
describes an end product of an action, whereas framing in itself describes the process 
(Kuypers, 2010). Framing is regarded as the more dynamic of the two terms according to van 
Hulst and Yanow (2016). The work of van Hulst and Yanow (2016) makes a distinction 
between frames and framing and links the theoretical aspect to framing as a method of 
analysis. They also highlight the politics of framing analysis and the associated power-laden 
barriers of such framing identities. Framing is defined as a process whereby communicators, 
either consciously or unconsciously, act to construct a point of view that encourages the 
facts of a given situation to be interpreted by others in a particular manner (Kuypers, 2010). 
Framing looks at how everyday reality is constructed, and can occur at the individual or 
group levels. This thesis focuses on policy frames, and by no means treats frames as a stable 
or self-contained entity, but instead sees frames as evolving as they are negotiated between 
policy actors throughout the policy deliberation or life-span. This thesis adopts frame theory 
as an analytical guide. Given that the thesis draws heavily from the communication tradition 
of framing and frame theory, it uses Entman’s theory to guide the data analysis. This is 
discussed much later in this chapter. 
From the policy perspective, frame theory captures the strategic and purposive nature of 
policy actors’ interventions in policy debates and provides a conceptual framework for its 
analysis (Desrosiers, 2012; see also van Hulst and Yanow, 2016). It also offers important 
insights into the dynamics of the policymaking process as a contest between competing 
conceptualisations of both problems and solutions (Hawkins and Holden, 2013). As such, 
framing has widespread consequences from a political perspective. In policymaking, for 
instance, ‘policy frames’ represent an alternative way of thinking and presenting arguments 
in favour of or against proposed policies (Smith and Katikireddi, 2013). As “weapons of 
advocacy”, frames have actual effects (Garcia-Retamero and Galesic, 2010; Levin et al., 
1998). In alcohol studies, for instance, frames are said to have been used strategically to play 
down levels of alcohol harm, keep alcohol problems off the policy agenda, and prevent 
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government legislations (Hawkins and Holden, 2013; Hawkins et al., 2012). They are usually 
expressed through language and propagated by actors in the bid to exert influence by 
shaping the consultation agenda and eliciting public support (Sturdy et al., 2012). 
In summary, frame theory is a broad, theoretical approach used by analysts in various fields. 
Given the focus of this study on language, it takes seriously the view that frames are linguistic 
tools that help convey meanings embedded in language (Vaara et al., 2006; Fairclough, 
1995). The study also takes a communicative view of frames, which implies that frames are 
communicative devices to shape views and influence with real effects. A framing effect is 
said to occur when a phrase, image, or statement suggests a meaning or interpretation of 
an issue (Tewsbury and Scheufele, 2009: 20). Pan and Kosicki (2005) describe the process of 
framing effect as the initial ‘exposure to the framing device’, then the ‘activation’ of the 
framing device, and finally, the ‘suitability judgements’ (see also: Chong and Druckman, 
2007b). Suitability judgement, according to Pan and Kosicki (2005), is the individual 
characters that can shape the influence of frames and thus make framing effect a subjective 
phenomenon (see also: Druckman and Nelson, 2003). Understanding these different 
individual characteristics that influence framing effects is thought to advance framing 
theory, and this has been extensively discussed in Chong and Druckman (2007b). 
Given the real effects of frames on people and society, some authors regard framing as an 
extension of agenda-setting (McCombs, 1995, quoted in Maher, 2008), although this has 
been strongly disputed in the literature (see Kosicki, 1993). While framing and agenda-
setting share a common interest in shaping and influencing opinions and views, the later 
influences audience perception in two ways by directing them on: (1) what to think about, 
and (2) how to think about the issue. Kosicki (1993) argued that framing begins from an 
explicit cognitive perspective whereas agenda-setting does not. Nevertheless, agenda-
setting is usually grouped with framing research under the broad category of “cognitive 
media effects” (Borah, 2011; see also: Scheufele, 1999; Scheufele and Tewksbury, 2007), 
despite the view that agenda-setting is a highly contested notion and scholars over the years 
have tried to differentiate between agenda-setting theory and frame theory (Borah, 2011). 
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Frame theory and agenda-setting theory focus on how the media draw public attention to 
specific topics or issues, and in this way, they can be said to have set the agenda in the 
public’s mind for further rationalisation and interpretation. Framing, however, takes this a 
step further, by showing that the way in which information is presented, creates a frame for 
that information; and this is usually a conscious choice by journalists (Davie, 2014). In this 
case, Davie asserts that a frame refers to the way the media, as gatekeepers, organise and 
present the ideas, events, and topics they cover (2014) (see also: Hallahan, 1999: 222). This 
is arguably a form of social mobilisation, which is at the heart of the social movement theory. 
Social mobilisation (also known as social movement) is how groups use frames to garner 
support. It explains the strategies behind the creation of frames (Chong and Druckman, 
2007a). The term has been adopted in many framing research (see, for example, Benford 
and Snow, 2000; Sturdy et al., 2012). Benford and Snow (2000), explored the potentials for 
frames to be used as tools for social mobilisation and opined that frames have a strategic 
function, which is used in reality construction. In this case, the social mobilisation actors are 
viewed as agents actively engaged in the production and maintenance of meaning for 
constituents, antagonists, or bystanders (Snow and Benford, 1988). In another example, 
Sturdy et al. (2012), writing on the framing of Scottish mental health policy, regards 
stakeholder consultation as a form of social mobilisation and an arena for framing, where 
different actors present different frames with the aim of garnering support. They utilised 
social movement theory to show that the policy consultation process can serve as a means 
of enrolling, orienting, and mobilising stakeholders to implement a largely pre-existing set 
of policy aims (Sturdy et al., 2012). 
3.2.1 Frames, Framing, and Collective Actions 
The impacts of frames and framing can also manifest at group/collective levels, as well as in 
policy negotiations. 
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Benford and Snow (2000) explored the roles frames play in how social movements are 
generated and diffused, and the functionality of mobilising and counter-mobilising ideas and 
meaning – especially in relation to collective actions. They examined literatures addressing 
the conceptualisation of collective action frame and suggested that collective action frames 
are not just carriers of ideas and meaning that emerge from structural arrangements of 
social movements but are signifying agents “actively engaged in the production and 
maintenance of meanings …” (Benford and Snow 2000: 613). The authors also sought to 
understand how framing processes can be identified (for example, collective action frame 
generation; elaboration; and diffusion as framing processes) and the elaboration and 
consequences of framing process on the outcomes and processes of other movements. The 
authors regarded the ‘framing process’ as a central dynamic in understanding the character 
and course of social movements. By these, the authors imply that the way an issue is framed 
can draw support from those influenced by the frame and influence the negotiations. 
Alcohol frames, as used by different alcohol stakeholders in alcohol policy documents and 
during policy debates, have been studied by Greenway (2011), Katikireddi (2013), Katikireddi 
et al. (2014a), and Hawkins and Holden (2013), Koon et al. (2016).Greenaway (2011) 
conducted a case study on the Licensing Act 2003. His study shows how a preconceived 
policy issue definition can be redefined through framing and reframing by other political and 
non-political actors like the media and industry actors (see also: Nicholls and Greenaway, 
2015). The English and Welsh Licensing Act 2003 was originally framed by New Labour in 
terms of regulation and enhanced trading practices. Following the widely criticised report 
by the Alcohol Harm Reduction Strategy for England (AHRSE) report, the Licensing Act was 
redefined in a manner that focused on the 24-hour drinking, crime, and safety, and this 
signaled volatility and the possibility of multiple framing in the policy arena. The multiple 
frames generated at the time impacted on the overall policy outcome and thwarted the UK 
Labour Government plans at deregulating alcohol licensing (see Hawkins and Holden, 2013). 
The study materials used consisted of parliamentary and newspaper coverage, official 
reports, and semi-structured interviews with civil servants, politicians, pressure group 
activists, and members of the drinks industry. The study was well articulated but failed to 
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signify the data analysis method, the sampling techniques, or study rationale. The author 
concluded that the bureaucratic structure of the British political system is susceptible to 
radical alteration by political actors (Greenaway, 2011). The alteration of frames by the 
media, for example, is in line with agenda setting theory coined by McCombs and Shaw 
(1972). 
Katikireddi (2013) examined the role of evidence during the policy formulation process using 
case study design. The author presented two cases. The first case examines the English 
White Paper on ‘Healthy Lives, Healthy People’ to reveal the extent in which three 
prominent discourse within academic works are reflected in the policy statements. The 
second case draws on evidence submissions to the HSC and interview data to explore the 
development of “a high-profile public health policy of minimum unit pricing of alcohol” in 
2010, and identifies the crucial role of public health advocates in reframing alcohol policy 
issues, which led to significant policy changes (see also Katikireddi et al., 2014a24). The 
authors used a framework for analysing political argumentation. They reported that the 
public, the voluntary-sector stakeholders, and the on-trade alcohol retailers tend to support 
the MUP policy, whilst other sectors of the alcohol industry opposed the policy. These results 
are in line with the findings observed in Holden et al. (2012), and Hawkins and Holden (2013). 
Katikireddi (2013) identified three different frames. These frames reflect the policy actors’ 
position as either supporters or opposers of MUP. Supporters of MUP framed alcohol 
problems in terms of the health consequences of alcohol consumption at a population level, 
whilst opposition actors framed alcohol in narrow terms reflecting on minority irresponsible 
consumers and responsible majority consumers framed as being penalised by the 
government (see also Katikireddi et al., 2014a), and framed the MUP as an ineffective 
population-wide measure. Public health advocates were said to have worked hard to 
“redefine the policy issue by presenting a consistent alternative frame” (Katikireddi et al., 
2014a). A third frame was a mixture of the overarching frames and was propagated by 
 
24 This study builds on the second case study in Katikireddi (2013) thesis. 
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industry actors who support the MUP. This third frame, the author regards as a hybrid frame 
(Katikireddi, 2013). The different frames produced during the policy debates, helps one to 
understand the relationship between evidence, competing frames and policy development 
(Katikireddi, 2013). The author also found that even though evidence relied upon in the first 
case study did have an influence, it did not determine the policy, whereas the frames 
propagated by non-industry advocates of MUP did determine the MUP policy. In other 
words, the epidemiological concepts adopted by public health advocates were key to 
actualising the shift in the policy framing of alcohol issues in Scotland. These epidemiological 
concepts draw from evidence presented in the econometric modelling published by a team 
of researchers at Sheffield University. The role of evidence was identified to be of particular 
importance in the changing of the framing of the MUP policy debate, although this was not 
always reflected during the policy process (Katikireddi, 2013). Katikireddi et al. (2014a) in 
their paper, emphasised  that “public health advocates worked hard to redefine the policy 
issue by presenting a consistent alternative frame” which centred on the health 
consequences of alcohol consumption at a population level. These consistent frames are 
said to have impacted on the policy outcome. 
In their review of fifty-two articles that focused on the framing of contested health issues, 
Koon et al. (2016) reported the presence of at least one frame in the papers reviewed and 
how the frame sponsors promoted these during the policy process. The majority of the 
papers reviewed (n = 33) acknowledged that the frames promoted did impact on the policy 
negotiation and 19 papers reported little or somewhat effect on the policy process. The 
authors concluded that framing is an important part of the policy process that has been 
overlooked. They recommend for further understanding of frames, framing processes and 
frame conflict as this would help researchers and policymakers to understand contested 
policy issues, and facilitate the resolution of such policy issue (Koon et al., 2016: 1). 
The study by Hawkins and Holden (2013), Hawkins et al. (2012), Holden et al (2012), and 
McCambridge et al. (2014) examined the UK alcohol MUP policy consultation documents 
produced by the alcohol industry during the second attempt of the SNP government to pass 
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the bill into law in 2012. They also conducted interviews with government officials, 
policymakers, and alcohol industry representatives. The authors aimed to extract the 
strategies (including the different policy frames) adopted by the industry in influencing the 
Scottish alcohol policy process (see Hawkins and Holden, 2013 and Hawkins et al. 2013). 
Hawkins and Holden (2013), writing on “framing of alcohol policy debates”, state that policy 
actors seeking to avoid government regulation downplay the significance of issues to keep 
it off the policy agenda. They also suggest that industry actors invoke principles of “liberty 
or personal responsibility to steer government towards less interventionist form of 
regulation” which mostly aligns with their business interests. The authors used the ‘naming 
and framing’ approach to frame analysis set out by Schön and Rein (1994), to identify the 
positions of each actor. This approach, ‘naming and framing’, “selects what should be seen 
and diverts attention from other features” of the text (van Hurst and Yanow, 2016: 97). They 
examined the different frames presented by actors, the connections and overlaps as well as 
the cleavages between the framing of issues by different sets of actors (see also Holden et 
al., 2012). Some of the frames identified by Hawkins and Holden (2013) as used by industry 
actors reflect the positive effects of alcohol on society, the economy, and the lives of the 
consumers. These frames portray the majority – responsible consumers – as the victims of 
sensationalist media for the negative effects of alcohol portrayed. They also portray alcohol 
as a legal product enjoyed safely and in moderation by most consumers, and the positive 
contribution to the economy in terms of revenue for the government and the framing of 
alcohol industry as socially responsible. The points of interest in the study by Hawkins and 
Holden (2013) are: (a) how frames are evoked by industry actors on opposing sides of the 
debate whilst still presenting their organisation as socially responsible, and (b) the sense of 
collaboration amidst their disagreements (see also Holden et al., 2012). 
A recent study by Thornton and Hawkins (2017) examined five British newspapers on 
framing strategies adopted by transnational alcohol corporations. The study found two 
conflicting frames for the alcohol industry. The first frame portrays the industry as socially 
responsible actors who are keen to help the government in tackling alcohol-related harm. 
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The second highlights the industry potential for economic growth through establishing new 
markets, customer base, and investors. The frames are conflicting in the sense that reducing 
alcohol misuse should have a knock-on effect on alcohol promotion, and it appears that the 
industry is saying one thing and doing another. The study by Holden et al. (2012) for 
example, examined the differing interests of actors (expressed as frames) within the alcohol 
industry, the cleavages which emerged between them on this issue, and how this impacted 
on their ability to organise themselves collectively to influence the policy process. The 
authors noted that the trade associations representing a single product category, such as 
the National Association of Cider Makers (NACM), or a single section of the industry such as 
the Association of Licensed Multiple Retailers (ALMR), felt they were able to adopt a united 
position on most issues of importance to their membership. But larger trade associations 
containing members from different sectors of the industry and with varying interests found 
it difficult to speak with a unified voice on a given issue (Holden et al. 2012). Holden et al. 
(2012) emphasised that these “potentially conflicting interests of different groups must be 
taken into account in order to arrive at positions on which most members can agree”. 
Recent studies by Hawkins and McCambridge (2020c) have elucidated the extent of industry 
actors’ activity at the EU and UK government level in the bid to discredit the Scottish MUP 
Bill. Sensing the defeat in their framing of alcohol issues which focused on the majority 
versus minority consumers and penalty of low-income consumers, the industry moved to 
reframe the policy issue to focus on legality of MUP and the potential breaches to the EU 
single market and competition laws. This reframing enabled the industry actors to shift the 
venue of the decision-making process (see also Holden and Hawkins, 2018), thus taking 
advantage of the multi-level systems of governance to hinder the MUP policy and debates 
which run counter to their interests (Hawkins and McCambridge, 2020a). The authors 
interviewed government officials, civil servants, and Non-Governmental Organisations 
(NGOs), in order to understand the extent of industry lobbying and advocacy work carried 
out at the EU level – i.e. venue-shifting and the dynamics of policy-level governance. The 
authors alluded that the case of MUP “demonstrates the importance of policy networks and 
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the multi-level structure of civil society organisations within the EU in ways which mirror the 
political structures which they seek to influence”. 
The review of the literature on UK alcohol industry actors and frames they produce, reveals 
a dearth of research especially the potential for frames to be used as a legitimating tool. This 
is an important gap. Next, this section of the chapter on frames, presents Entman (1993) 
frame theory, as the selected theoretical framework considered to be used in the analysis 
of the data generated for this thesis. 
3.2.2 Entman (1993) Frame Theory  
As seen in the literature review on framing studies pertaining to alcohol (Van Den Bulck et 
al., 2012; Nicholls, 2011; Greenaway, 2011; Paricio-Esteban et al., 2012; McCombs and 
Shaw, 1972; Anglin et al., 2000; Hawkins and Holden, 2013; Katikireddi et al., 2014a; Savell 
et al., 2015), “framing is often defined casually, with much left to an assumed tacit 
understanding of the reader and researcher” (Entman, 1993: 52). This highlights one of the 
many challenges with the concepts of framing. Entman, however, attempts to correct the 
notion by identifying and making explicit common tendencies among the various uses of the 
term [frame] and suggesting a more precise understanding of them. Entman (1993) went on 
to suggest that how information (the frame) is presented and influences the choices people 
make about how to process that information. He put together a definition of frames, 
reflecting on four key frame elements – problem definition, moral justification, causal 
interpretation, and treatment recommendation. With this definition in mind, Entman is said 
to advocate for a generic paradigm for framing research. Entman’s definition of frames 
distinguishes frames from the agenda setting by suggesting that salience is not reached by 
repetition of certain words or arguments but by the structure of the narrative. This definition 
of framing and Entman’s conceptualisation of the frame is the backbone on which this 
current study is set. Entman’s definition of frames focuses on the ‘agent’ (the people who 
produce the frames); this was later modified in his 2003 corpus. Entman (2003) redefined 
‘framing’ in a manner which emphasises the ‘process’ over the ‘agent’. That is, how people 
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go about framing as opposed to those who produce the frames. He described this as the 
processual nature of frames which is distinct to the linguistic approach to framing. These are 
explained further below. 
3.2.2.1 The Processual Nature of Frames 
The processual nature of frames focuses on its communicative abilities. de Vreese (2005) 
supports Entman’s view but argues that communication is a dynamic process that involves 
a combination of frame building and frame setting. Entman explains that frames have 
different locations. For example, a frame can be located in the communicator (for example, 
the source, the journalist, or the newsreader), the text, the receiver, or the culture. These 
four locations and their interactions with the frame are thought to determine the framing 
process. However, Entman reduced the emphasis on the subjective elements to focus more 
on the concrete, more objective or quantifiable elements within a perceived reality (2003). 
He replaced the phrase ‘define a problem’ with ‘select an issue’, thus moving away from 
problems to issues. He also replaced the phrase ‘moral evaluation’ with ‘evaluation’, thus 
signifying his lack of interest in people’s perception of good or bad, but to whether these 
perceptions are useful or not and on the outcomes. Entman (2003) explains the difference 
between cultural resonance and repetition (agenda setting) for influencing audience 
perception of the media. According to Edy and Meirick (2007), agenda setting studies 
measure how closely related media agenda matches public agenda, whereas framing 
research measures the uptake of media frames and its ability to influence or change the 
audience perception of an issue. 
3.2.2.2 Linguistic Approach to Framing 
Another method used by Entman in frame identification involves the analysis of specific 
words – how the words are used as building blocks to denote a frame and their position in 
relation to other words within the text. The unit of analysis, in this case, is the paragraph 
and not the article (Entman, 1991). This method shares similar characteristics with the post-
structuralist approach of discourse theory. To amplify Entman’s work, Pan and Kosicki (1993) 
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highlight ‘structural dimensions’ of frames that are measurable. Their method of frame 
analysis distinguishes between syntax, script, themes, and rhetoric as used within a text, and 
these are referred to as framing devices (see Pan and Kosicki, 2005; Gamson and Modigliani, 
1989; Borah, 2011). A framing device thus signifies the presence of a frame and gives 
meaning to a text (Van Gorp, 2005; Entman, 1993; Gamson and Modigliani, 1989). Pan and 
Kosicki (1993) used these measurable structural frame dimensions to construct a data 
matrix, which is then used for analysis. This approach although systematic and rigorous can 
only be used to analyse single news text samples and thus cannot be applied to the current 
study in its entirety. Nevertheless, the limitations of Pan and Kosicki’s method, their concept 
of syntax identification as a framing device, is incorporated into this study, as it enables the 
reader to appreciate how statistics and research evidence used when making economic 
arguments signal and/or make cleavages between industry actors visible. Entman’s linguistic 
approach to framing, which is largely based on his 1993 work, is more subjective in character 
than the processual approach, which tends to place slight emphasis on objective reality. The 
former – i.e. the linguistic approach – aligns well with the epistemology and ontology of this 
study, hence, the emphasis here is on Entman (1993). Entman (1993) frame theory is used 
as the theoretical guide for the thematic data analysis of data obtained for this study (see 
Chapter 5 section 5.2). This chapter moves on to introduce legitimacy theory and the 
literature on legitimation. 
 
3.3 Legitimacy Theory and Legitimation – A Review of the Literature 
Legitimacy is a social construct (Deegan, 2002; Suchman 1995; Yoon and Thye, 2011) which 
reflects a congruence between the behaviours of an entity and the shared (or assumedly 
shared) beliefs of some social groups (Suchman 1995). As a social construct, Hoefer and 
Green (2016) acknowledge that legitimacy is both constituted by, and constitutive of, the 
act of exchange between parties – for example, an organisation and its stakeholders, or 
communication exchanges between ‘senders’ and ‘listeners’. The term legitimacy is an 
abstract concept, which is not easily measurable. It is highly subjective, yet its presence or 
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absence has concrete consequences (Zimmerman and Zeitz, 2002; Suddaby et al., 2017). In 
organisation studies, for instance, legitimacy is seen as an organisational trait, belief, or 
resource that is necessary for the acquisition of other resources – such as government 
support (Suchman, 1995; Diez-Martin et al., 2013), quality employees (Aldrich and Fiol, 
1994), financial resources and technology, and survival (Aldrich and Fiol, 1994; Zimmerman 
and Zeitz, 2002; Suddaby et al., 2017; Bitektine, 2011; Diez-Martin et al., 2013; Barnett, 
2006; Winn et al., 2008). In some cases, organisations seek legitimacy for many reasons 
including continuity (Suchman, 1995; Tilling, 2004), credibility (Aldrich and Fiol, 1994; 
Suchman, 1995), and passive or active support (Suchman, 1995). Although legitimacy is 
dependent on a collective audience, it is independent of observers. In some cases, an 
organisation may deviate from specific societal values and retain legitimacy because the 
deviation draws no public disapproval (Suchman, 1995). A legitimate organisation therefore 
has largely unquestioned freedom to pursue its activities (Deephouse and Suchman, 2008). 
Legitimacy theory examines the social, political, and economic framework within which 
human life takes place (Gray et al., 1996: 47; Deegan, 2002 and 2006). It is concerned with 
the interactions between groups in an essentially pluralistic world (Deegan, 2002; Deegan 
and Blomquist, 2006). Although there are different schools of thought in legitimacy theory 
represented by different scholars (for example, Althusser 1965; Gramsci 1971; Habermas 
1975 for instance25, and also Jost and Major, 2001), legitimacy theory can be classified into 
two theories in one (Tilling, 2002). The first is institutional legitimacy, which focuses on the 
process in which organisations at an industry/sector level collectively seek and gain 
acceptance from groups in society. This is the most common form of legitimacy theory 
portrayed in literature and it has informed and shaped the understanding of the theory. At 
the macro theory level, legitimacy and institutionalisation are used interchangeably to mean 
the same thing. Legitimacy is a prerequisite for institutionalisation and institutionalisation 
contributes to legitimacy. These terms, when used, empower organisations and make them 
appear natural and meaningful (Suchman, 1995). The second theory is strategic legitimacy, 
 
25 These scholars often explore legitimacy in the context of power relations and hegemony, which is not the 
approach adopted in this study. 
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which operates at the individual organisational level. Organisational-level legitimacy is a 
legitimation process whereby an organisation individually seeks approval from groups in 
society. It is the most common form of legitimacy theory used in management and 
organisational studies (Tilling, 2004). At this level, it is used as an operational resource. It is 
sometimes used competitively in the pursuit of an organisation’s goal (Suchman, 1995). 
Legitimacy thus operates and relies on the notion of a ‘social contract’ (Suchman, 1995). 
Nevertheless, legitimacy has many definitions, forms, and expressions; and some of them 
are illustratively explored below. 
3.3.1 Definitions and Forms of Legitimacy 
Organizational legitimacy is the perceived appropriateness of an 
organization to a social system in terms of rules, values, norms, and 
definitions (Deephouse et al. 2017). 
This definition is a modified version of the widely-used definition of organisational legitimacy 
by Suchman (1995: 574). Suchman’s definition has been used by scholars from different 
disciplines, including management, organisational studies, and social policy and is by far the 
most widely cited definition of the term legitimacy (Deephouse et al. 2017). Deephouse et 
al. (2017) sought to bring greater clarity to the use and conceptualisation of the term 
legitimacy and document the changes in the use of the term legitimacy over time with the 
aim of identifying the broad trends in theory and research. At the organisational level,  three 
expressions of legitimacy, which can be conferred upon an organisation are pragmatic, 
moral, and cognitive (Díez-de-Castro et al. 2018; Scott, 2014; Suchman, 1995; Deephouse 
and Suchman, 2008). Once legitimacy is conferred, organisations are said to take it for 
granted (Hannan and Freeman, 1984; 1986; Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990; Suchman, 1995), and 
the assessment of legitimacy becomes increasingly perfunctory (if not mindless) (Ashforth 
and Fried, 1988) until such a point where the organisation’s business practice is questioned. 
By this, Ashforth and Gibbs (1990: 183), imply that organisations take for granted the 
conferred legitimacy and do little or nothing in maintaining it as it becomes a routine. A brief 
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description of these forms of legitimacy are presented below with some references to the 
alcohol industry. 
3.3.1.1 Pragmatic Legitimacy 
Pragmatic legitimacy is the perception of an organisation judgement or evaluation  
(Deephouse et al., 2017). According to Deephouse and Suchman (2008; 52), pragmatic 
legitimacy comprises an act of exchange, influence, interest, and character; It evaluates 
whether a specific action benefits the evaluator (Suchman, 1995), i.e. it focuses on the 
performance of the organisation (Deephouse et al., 2017). This form of legitimacy is said to 
be under threat with increasing government legislation and legal sanctions (Christiansen and 
Kroezen, 2016). Pragmatic concerns can be managed by reassuring the audience of the 
organisations efficacy (Deephouse et al., 2017). Concerning the alcohol industry, regulative 
pressure has come in the form of taxation, licensing systems, restrictions on distribution, 
and advertising, amongst others. Regulative pressure may typically reflect a diminished 
trustworthiness of the industry in the eyes of policymakers and the public, and this is said to 
affect brand positioning in the market (Christiansen and Kroezen, 2016). Nevertheless, the 
alcohol industry is said to have responded to the pragmatic concerns by: promoting self-
regulation (i.e. responding to needs) aimed at producing codes, which ensure compliance 
amongst members (for example, policing their members’ activities); promoting 
trustworthiness with policymakers and the public (i.e. locating friendly audiences); and 
limiting formal regulation by creating monitors (Suchman, 1995). Other strategies 
organisations adopt for pragmatic legitimacy are advertising their products and image; 
consulting opinion leaders; protecting their exchanges (by communicating honestly and 
stockpiling trust); and denying any problems associated with their organisation or products 
(Suchman 1995). 
3.3.1.2 Moral Legitimacy 
Moral legitimacy  is attained when certain moral values are generally agreed upon within 
the social system (Deephouse et al., 2017). Moral legitimacy reflects a positive, normative 
evaluation of the organisation and its activities (Suchman, 1995; see also Deephouse and 
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Suchman, 2008). It considers what should be done. Aldrich and Fiol (1994) characterised 
moral legitimacy (i.e. socio-political legitimacy) as the degree of congruence between a focal 
organisation’s characteristics or behaviours and the normative expectations in the cultural 
meaning system of the other organisations surrounding it (see also Scott, 1995). Social 
disapproval affects any moral legitimacy an organisation holds (Suchman, 1995; Christiansen 
and Kroezen, 2016). For example, the resultant effect of moral legitimacy challenge on the 
alcohol industry, is observed in the shrinking size of the market (Christiansen and Kroezen, 
2016) and an increased focus on alcohol advertising regulation. Moral legitimacy can be 
sustained by reassurances of good character through public advocacy and a display of social 
responsibility (Deephouse et al. 2017). Threats against the alcohol industry’s moral 
legitimacy can be challenged through the normalisation of moderate alcohol consumption, 
and by promoting education to individuals and groups at risk of alcohol harm (Christiansen 
and Kroezen, 2016). The combined effect of regulative and normative pressure has had its 
impact on the socio-cultural meaning attributed to alcohol and the behaviour towards 
alcohol consumption (Christiansen and Kroezen, 2016). The moral legitimacy of an 
organisation can be managed by: (1) conforming to ideals through offering symbolic displays 
or embedding the organisation with other legitimate institutions; (2) (re-)defining the 
organisation’s goals; (3) through persuasion; (4) consulting professionals; (5) protecting 
propriety by communicating authoritatively and stockpiling esteem; (6) dissociating 
themselves from normal practices or restructuring the organisation; and (7) excuse or justify 
the presence of a problem (Suchman, 1995). 
3.3.1.3 Cognitive Legitimacy 
Cognitive legitimacy is an affirmative backing for an organisation or a mere acceptance of 
the organisation as necessary or inevitable based on some taken for granted cultural account 
(Deephouse and Suchman, 2008; Suchman, 1995; Aldrich and Fiol, 1994). Cognitive 
legitimacy, is an extension of moral legitimacy and is attained when there is such a high 
degree of congruence or acceptance between the normative expectations of the 
organisation and its environment that they are unquestioned or taken for granted (Aldrich 
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and Fiol, 1994; see also Suddaby et al., 2017; Deephouse and Suchman, 2008; Scott, 1995). 
Cognitive legitimation, in this case, refers “to the spread of knowledge about a new venture” 
(Aldrich and Fiol, 1994: 684). Cognitive legitimacy is, however, threatened by 
deinstitutionalisation (Suchman, 1995) and because of cultural-cognitive pressures 
(Christiansen and Kroezen, 2016). An attempt at deinstitutionalising alcohol, for example, is 
evident in the reduced association of alcohol and cultural gatherings; a decline in the 
numbers of pubs; a growth in the number of coffee shops; and an increased focus on alcohol 
harms (Christiansen and Kroezen, 2016). The alcohol industry, for example, has attempted 
to counter cognitive legitimacy concerns by sponsoring research aimed at producing 
alternative facts about their product or the industry (Christiansen and Kroezen, 2016; see 
also, Jepperson, 1991; Lawrence and Suddaby, 2006). Suchman (1995) referred to this action 
as popularising and standardising new models. Other ways in which organisations manage 
cognitive legitimacy concerns include conforming to model (i.e. copying or adapting other 
organisations standards); consulting opponents or doubters; stockpiling interconnections; 
and offering explanations for the organisation’s shortcomings (Suchman, 1995; Deephouse 
et al. 2017). 
Of the three legitimating strategies proffered by Suchman, (1995); Scott, (1995); and Aldrich 
and Fiol, (1994), Suchman’s model was selected as it offers the most comprehensive 
typology on legitimacy (see Deephouse et al. 2017; Suddaby et al., 2017). It is applicable to 
organisations facing legitimacy threat because of their business practices at different stages 
of their lifespan, as opposed to Aldrich and Fiol (1994)’s approach, which focuses on 
emerging industries. These forms of legitimacy (pragmatic, moral, and cognitive) are 
revisited in the findings chapter, with examples of how they apply to the alcohol industry as 
evident from the data gathered for this thesis. 
Suddaby et al. (2017) conducted a thematic analysis of empirical and theoretical works on 
legitimacy. They argued that the popularity and widespread use of legitimacy, as a construct 
in many theoretical and empirical studies, has resulted in various meanings, which in turn 
has led to the use and misuse of the term ‘legitimacy’. Their work aligns with the works of 
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Deephouse et al. (2017). Suddaby et al. (2017), in line with earlier works (Suddaby, 2010), 
attempted to bring some clarity on and theoretical discipline to the construct by thematically 
analysing the literature on the topic. They found that the 170 articles on legitimacy they 
analysed could be theorised into three distinct configurations of legitimacy, as a property, 
an interactive process, or a socio-cognitive perception. The authors also identified how 
legitimacy is manifested and the characterisations of the key roles of actors engaged in 
constructing legitimacy within the three configurations they identified. These three 
configurations of legitimacy are discussed briefly below. Some studies included in Suddaby 
et al. (2017)’s review are revisited in this thesis because of their relevance to this current 
study. In addition, other studies relevant to this thesis, identified through literature searches 
but not included in Suddaby et al. (2017), are included in this review, especially those 
pertaining to alcohol policy studies. 
3.3.2 The Three Configurations of Legitimacy 
As earlier stated, Suddaby et al. (2017) categorised studies on legitimacy based on the 
study’s conceptualisation of legitimacy either as a property, process, or perception. These 
concepts of legitimacy encompass Suchman’s definition of legitimacy (1995) and are 
discussed briefly below. 
Legitimacy as property, as the name implies, is an operational resource (Suchman, 1995); a 
thing owned, which can be maintained or potentially lost. Legitimacy as a property is the 
least common of the three typologies (Aldrich and Ruef, 2006) and focuses on the 
organisation and its external environment (Suddaby et al., 2017). The actors are said to own 
legitimacy, which is measurable and quantifiable (Bitektine and Haack, 2015), but not 
necessarily observable (Suchman, 1995). Legitimacy as the property is measured by the 
degree of fit or congruence between the material manifestation of legitimacy in an 
organisation and its normative expectations, which reflects an organisation’s degree of 
learning (Aldrich and Ruef, 2006; Suddaby et al., 2017; Deephouse et al., 2017).  
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The second typology, legitimacy as a process, focuses on discursive legitimation and the 
process of legitimacy construction (i.e. persuasion, theorisation, and categorisation) (Sillince 
and Brown, 2009; Mueller et al., 2004). Legitimacy as a process occurs between multiple 
actors and the key focus is the interaction, language negotiation, and how congruence is 
achieved (Suddaby et al., 2017). 
The final typology, legitimacy as a perception, explores not only the perceptual and 
subjective nature of legitimacy, but also the social construction of legitimacy (Bitektine, 
2011; Bitektine and Haack, 2015). As earlier stated in the introduction chapter, legitimacy as 
perception retains components of legitimacy as property, but “adopts a metaphor of 
property as taste, assessment or judgement of the appropriateness of the organisation's 
product, practice or characteristics” (Suddaby et al., 2017: 462). This approach (i.e. 
legitimacy as perception) also retains the understanding of legitimacy as a process because 
it has its theoretical roots in the social construction of reality by Berger and Luckman, (1966). 
Legitimacy as a perception, however, focuses on the role of individuals in the process of 
social construction of legitimacy. Like legitimacy as a process, legitimacy as a perception 
adopts a multi-level approach but concentrates on the individual at the micro level (Suddaby 
et al., 2017). For a more in-depth view of these typologies, see Suddaby et al. (2017). 
However, this thesis adopts the concept of legitimacy as a perception as this fits well with 
the social constructionist approach adopted and is also “based on the notion that legitimacy 
is not an attribute of individuals, actions, or institutions that can be objectively observed, 
but is instead a communicatively constructed concept that is ascribed to individuals, actions, 
or institutions in processes of social construction” (Palazzo and Scherer, 2006; see also 
Deephouse et al. 2017: 7; Berger and Luckman 1966; Habermas, 1996). Legitimacy as a 
perception can be measured by the level of organisational trust, i.e. trust perception from 
the government and trust perception from the industry actors on one another (Suchman, 
1995; Deephouse et al. 2017). Consequently, perceptions determine whether “private 
actors are considered legitimate” (Scherer et al., 2013: 479-480). This thesis moves on to 
explore how legitimacy is portrayed in language studies, at the industry level. 
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3.3.3 General Challenges of Legitimation  
The legitimacy of an organisation comes under attack when its business practices conflict 
with the societal expectations, and stakeholders (including the government) are compelled 
to intervene to bring about stability. In response, the organisation, and the government both 
produce a normative account or perception of organisational normativity, which is then 
endorsed by the organisational audience. As stated earlier, legitimacy threats come in the 
form of regulative, normative, and cultural-cognitive pressures. The alcohol industry has 
been subjected to all three forms of legitimacy threats in recent years (Christiansen and 
Kroezen, 2016; Scott, 2001 and 1995). All three forms of legitimacy (pragmatic, moral, and 
cognitive) described in the preceding section can be challenged during the process of 
gaining, maintaining, and/or repairing an organisations legitimacy (Suchman, 1995; see also 
Tilling, 2004). Suchman argued that few organisations pursue all three forms of legitimacy 
concurrently, albeit to different degrees, but cautions that not all legitimation approaches 
result in success for organisations and that organisations may inadvertently start to lose 
legitimacy (see also, Tilling, 2004; Barnett, 2006). Below is a description of these legitimation 
challenges and the different strategies adopted by organisations to overcome each 
challenge under the three different forms of legitimacy. 
3.3.3.1 Gaining Legitimacy 
Gaining legitimacy is a daunting task for organisations to win acceptance, either for their 
propriety of the activity in general or for their own validity as practitioners (Suchman, 1995). 
An organisation seeking to gain legitimacy adopts three main tactics in response to threats: 
they conform to their environment; select amongst the environment; or manipulate the 
environment (see Zimmerman and Zeit, 2002; Suchman, 1995). Organisations conform to 
their environment by associating or identifying with legitimate institutions (O’Donovan, 
2002; Suchman, 1995; Lee et al., 2017; Winn et al., 2008). 
The actions of the alcohol industry from the literature, where they acknowledge the 
presence of misuse in a minority of drinkers, and their suggestion of targeted intervention 
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in the form of alcohol education for such consumer groups as an alternative to government 
legislation, are a form of symbolic display. By doing so, they are said to manipulate the 
environment and institutionalise (see Zimmerman and Zeit, 2002) alcohol consumption by 
promoting the concept of responsible drinking and industry self-regulation. These three 
tactics require persuasive organisational communication (Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975). It is 
expected that an organisation seeking to gain legitimacy or having recently been conferred 
as legitimate engage in ongoing dialogue with its constituents and continually seek to 
influence these constituents’ views about them, which helps to maintain their legitimacy 
(Barnett, 2006). 
3.3.3.2 Maintaining Legitimacy 
Maintaining legitimacy is said to be far easier than gaining or repairing legitimacy (Suchman, 
1995). When organisations are seeking to gain or maintain their legitimacy, they are said to 
be proactive (Deegan, 2006). Nevertheless, when organisations are challenged with 
heterogeneous audiences and opposition from other institutions, they react to protect their 
past accomplishments (Suchman, 1995). Three aspects of legitimacy make maintenance a 
challenge and these are: (1) the presence of a heterogeneous audience; (2) stability (which 
entails rigidity); and (3) institutionalisation, which often generates its own opposition. 
Ongoing dialogue is, however, recommended to sense changes to social values, which may 
pose a threat to the organisation’s legitimacy (Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975). Legitimacy threat 
can be event-based or a threat to the existence of the organisation which results to 
delegitimisation, as seen in the case of the tobacco industry (Malone et al., 2012). 
3.3.3.3 Repairing Legitimacy 
Organisations facing delegitimisation adopt strategies like those used for gaining legitimacy 
in the bid to repair their legitimacy (Suchman, 1995). Organisations are said to be generally 
reactive at this phase (Deegan, 2006; Deephouse et al., 2017) and they respond to crises 
when they occur, but they link them to wider issues. Strategies adopted include normalising 
their actions, restructuring their governing board, and avoiding overreactions such as 
panicking or accepting blame (O’Donovan, 2002; Suchman, 1995). To normalise their 
Divided We Stand: Exploring the Alcohol Industry Framing of the Alcohol (Minimum Pricing) (Scotland) Act Consultation. 
 
 
 
PhD Thesis 2020  I. J. Amaeshi.  Page | 73 
 
 
actions, organisations in the process of repairing their legitimacy, deny the problems they 
are accused of, and in doing so, help allay constituents’ pragmatic concerns. Organisations 
also excuse the problem by questioning the organisation’s moral responsibility and 
explaining the disruptive events in ways that preserve an otherwise supportive worldview 
(see Winn et al., 2008). Another example is observed with the alcohol industry’s assertion 
that MUP disproportionately penalises low-income individuals and families (Hawkins and 
Holden, 2012). The alcohol industry in this case, is said to justify their position, by raising 
questions on fairness, choice, and human rights amongst others, all of which appeal to 
human concerns as noted in Vaara and Tienari (2008). 
Legitimacy needs to not be rigid; a variety of strategies can be elicited at any point in the 
lifetime of an organisation. Legitimacy, as used in this thesis, means the continued existence 
of the alcohol industry in Scotland as a legitimate sector positively perceived to be in 
alignment with societal expectations (Deephouse et al., 2017; Deephouse and Suchman, 
2008; Suchman, 1995). In other words, the alcohol industry in Scotland is not a sector 
inhabited by businesses that have been forced to go underground because of MUP or one 
that has lost “public sympathy”, even if it is a sector recognised by the law. For instance, 
although the tobacco industry is a legal business, it has continued to lose public sympathy in 
different regions of the world (Malone et al., 2012). Industry legitimacy often comes from 
different stakeholder groups including the government (i.e. external source of legitimacy), 
as well as from the industry actors themselves (i.e. internal source of legitimacy) (Deephouse 
et al., 2017; Suchman, 1995; Hoefer and Green, 2016). This section moves on to examine 
how legitimacy is portrayed in language studies. 
3.3.4 Legitimacy in Language Studies – Discursive Legitimation  
Luyckx and Janssens (2016: 1595) argued that legitimacy is “shaped through linguistic 
resources”. This section of this thesis examines the works of Vaara and colleagues, whose 
empirical studies examined the discursive aspect of legitimation through texts produced by 
MNC (Vaara et al., 2006; Vaara and Tienari 2008; Vaara and Monin, 2010). A discursive 
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approach to legitimation focuses on the sensemaking processes through which legitimacy is 
established (see Luyckx and Janssens, 2016). 
Vaara et al. (2006), in their study of media texts, attempt to understand the process of 
legitimation during an industrial restructuring. Using critical discourse analysis (CDA) 
approach, they distinguished and analysed 4 semantic functional categories of legitimation 
strategies in line with the work of van Leeuwen and Wodak (1999). Vaara et al. (2006) 
labelled these legitimation strategies as: (1) authorisation, (2) rationalisation, (3) 
moralisation, and (4) narrativisation (see also Deephouse and Suchman, 2008; Deephouse 
et al. 2017). Authorisation is defined as legitimation by reference to the authority of 
tradition, custom, law, and persons in whom institutional authority of some kind is vested 
(Vaara et al., 2006). Rationalisation is legitimation by reference to the utility of 
institutionalised social actions, and to the knowledge that society has constructed to endow 
them with cognitive validity (Vaara et al., 2006). Moralisation or moral evaluation is 
legitimation by reference to specific value systems (Vaara et al., 2006). Narrativisation or 
Mythopoesis is legitimation conveyed through narratives (van Leeuwen and Wodak, 1999). 
Vaara et al. (2006) added a fifth legitimation strategy which they labelled as normalisation 
and described it as a sub-type of authorisation, and ‘fact-of-life rationalisation’ or 
‘naturalisation’ in van Leeuwen and Wodak (1999). Normalisation is defined as “legitimation 
by reference to normal or natural functioning or behaviour” (Vaara et al., 2006: 797). The 
authors argued that although journalists construct news texts, their use of specific 
legitimation strategy is not intentional or conscious. Vaara et al. (2006) acknowledged the 
lack of specific knowledge concerning the discursive processes, practices, and strategies 
used to (re)construct senses26 of (il)legitimacy. 
Vaara and Tienari (2008) focused on the micro-level discursive perspectives of controversial 
MNC actions using media text samples. Their study demonstrated the role of central 
discursive strategies as proposed by van Leeuwen and Wodak (1999), and these are already 
discussed in previous paragraphs (see Vaara et al., 2006). Vaara and Tienari (2008) 
 
26 Legitimacy as perception 
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highlighted in their analysis the inherent politics of legitimation and advised that future 
studies should pay attention to these textual strategies (i.e. the interplay of different 
discourses and ideologies in text) as this enables one to see how legitimacy is created and 
manipulated in texts. 
In another related study, Vaara and Monin (2010) focused on the role of discourse in the 
social construction of power relationships and social order at the micro-level with regards 
to the post-merger and acquisition process of organisations. The authors considered 
“discursive legitimation as an inherent part of the dynamics of merger or acquisition 
processes” (Vaara and Monin, 2010: 4), and highlighted the problematic consequences of 
legitimation frequently associated with mergers and acquisitions. One consequence is the 
“talking up” strategy used to manage impression and the adverse effect it has if the 
expectations cannot be met after the merger. The study concentrated on the problematic 
aspects and implications of discursive legitimation: how legitimacy and illegitimacy were 
constructed through specific discursive strategies and how these discursive constructions 
were linked with organisational action and the interests of particular actors. The legitimating 
strategies identified in van Leeuwen and Wodak (1999) and Vaara et al. (2006) were 
modified in line with the empirical evidence by Vaara and Monin (2010) to 
(de)naturalisation; rationalisation; exemplification; authorisation; and moralisation. 
(De)naturalisation was defined as rendering something natural (unnatural) by specific 
discursive means. Rationalisation involved providing specific rational arguments to establish 
legitimacy. Exemplification involved using specific examples to establish legitimacy (Vaara 
and Monin, 2010). Luyckx and Janssens (2016)’s study focused on how a sense of legitimacy 
is maintained for a controversial actor over a long period of time. The study found that 
discursive legitimation can take the form of both ‘discursive antagonism’ and ‘discursive co-
optation’. Discursive antagonism, the authors stated, consists of counter-narratives that aim 
to produce a positive image of the actor under scrutiny which is opposite to the criticism as 
well as a negative image of the opponents to undermine their credibility (Luyckx and 
Janssens, 2016). Discursive co-optation “is a form of legitimation that engages with criticism 
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by strategically appropriating previous opponents” (Luyckx and Janssens, 2016; see also 
Oliver, 1991 on influencing and neutralising the opposition). 
Legitimacy from a discursive perspective is a “created sense of acceptance in specific 
discourses or orders of discourse” (Vaara et al., 2006) for organisations to conduct their 
business practices without fear of retribution from other key stakeholders or legitimacy 
conferrers (Deephouse et al., 2017). In this regard, it allows attention to be shifted from 
established legitimacy to the processes of legitimation through the examination of concrete 
discursive practices and strategies used. While these and other studies have given us 
important insights into the discursive side of legitimation, they have not focused on the 
alcohol industry or the discursive cleavages produced during policy deliberations. 
Industry actors facing legitimacy threats seek to protect their legitimacy at an organisational 
or company level, or collectively at the industry level through the actions of their trade 
representatives. This is known as collective legitimacy and the literature on strategies for 
collective legitimacy are explored next. Alcohol industry, Collective Legitimacy, and Industry 
Level Strategies  
The literature on the alcohol industry and their collective legitimacy strategies is sparse 
despite having faced increased legislative and regulative pressures from governments 
around the world because of the impact of their products on the health and wellbeing of 
their consumers. Increased regulatory change, however, posed a severe threat to the 
alcohol industry and resulted in the adoption of several strategies aimed at preventing 
deinstitutionalisation (Christiansen and Kroezen, 2016; Bond et al., 2009). 
Christiansen and Kroezen (2016), in their study, examined how the alcohol industry 
maintained its business practice by using business collective actions to address alcohol 
issues. The authors used institutional theory to explain how the alcohol industry shaped 
their environment in response to social issues, in efforts to prevent the deinstitutionalisation 
at the organisational field level. Christiansen and Kroezen (2016: 125) argued that the 
“emergence of the issue of alcohol-related harm led to the emergence of a new 
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organisational form, the Issue-Based Industry Collective (IBIC)”. The IBIC is a non-profit 
organisation that is established and funded by multiple industry actors to engage with a 
social issue. Examples of IBIC identified in the study include the Portman Group and the 
Drinkaware Charity. Christiansen and Kroezen (2016) argue that the actions of IBICs have 
contributed to the reframing of alcohol social issues, for example: the increased focus on 
responsible drinking, consumer education on safe drinking limits, and self-regulation. These 
alternate frames have contributed to maintaining the general institution of alcohol 
consumption. At the industry level, this thesis considers how different organisations choose 
to work independently and/or together to achieve collective legitimacy or perhaps work 
against each other and still achieve legitimacy. 
The use of collective legitimation at a national and international level has been examined by 
Brewer (1972). Brewer (1972) stated that members of international organisations capitalise 
on their membership in order to strengthen their legitimacy, and concluded that this type 
of legitimation will be increasingly used by organisations. Collective legitimation is defined 
as an act by which legitimacy is attributed to a national policy and other objects (in this case 
an industry) by multilateral organisations (i.e. relevant alcohol stakeholders) (Brewer, 1972, 
emphasis added). This form of legitimacy has also been used by various organisations as 
observed in the studies by Barnett (2006), Winn et al. (2008), and Lee (2009), among others. 
The study by Barnett (2006) shows that firms compete through individual and collective 
strategic actions. The individual activities may sometimes overshadow the collective 
activities, but firms persist until such a time where a force large enough to topple the 
collective action becomes a threat. During a legitimacy threat, firms attempt to regain 
control through a collective action which is said to resemble the resource mobilisation 
perspective of social movement theory (Barnett, 2006). The idea of collective legitimacy is 
explored by organisations through conformity to enhance their performance (Barnett, 2006; 
DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Accordingly, Deephouse et al. (2009: 9) support this notion and 
affirm that organisations with similar characteristics stand a better chance of gaining 
legitimacy, whereas organisations that stand out gain a favourable reputation. The pressure 
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to conform, nevertheless, constrains a firm’s behaviour. Whilst a successful collective action 
results in legitimation, the downside is a loss of independence for individual organisations 
(Barnett, 2006). Barnett (2006) explains that the collective actions of organisations vary 
depending on the lifecycle of the organisation. It has been observed that new/start-up 
organisations are sceptical of forming or entering a collective action partnership. On the 
contrary, established organisations form collectives much quicker and stay in them longer 
even after the threat to their legitimacy is gone (Winn et al., 2008). Matured organisations 
are said to form collective actions quickly in the face of legitimacy threats and once 
legitimacy is regained, they break off and resume competitive action against each other. In 
the declining phase (for example, organisations at the end of their lifecycle), the rewards of 
collective action are diminished, and it becomes extremely difficult to form or engage in 
collective action following a legitimacy challenge. If the attempt is unsuccessful, this results 
in delegitimisation and the death of the industry (Barnett, 2006). 
Winn et al. (2008) conducted a qualitative longitudinal study of the forestry and salmon 
farming industries. They highlighted the different collective and competitive (individual) 
strategies adopted as the legitimacy threats progressed. One of the first strategies adopted 
was to change the face representing The British Columbia Salmon Farmers Association 
(BCSFA). This Suchman (1995) referred to as dissociation – a strategy aimed at repairing 
moral legitimacy. The BCSFA hired a former Public Relations firm that represented the 
tobacco industry to help manage their declining legitimacy. This transformed the trade body, 
but the legitimacy threats persisted. The BCSFA changed tactics by not challenging their critic 
but rather acknowledging their concerns – conforming to environment to gain both 
pragmatic and moral legitimacy (see Suchman, 1995). Another strategy adopted was to 
adopt the tactic of their contenders (conforming to models to gain cognitive legitimacy) and 
emotionally accuse them of bullying and harassment. These strategies however failed to 
rectify the legitimacy challenges facing the industry. 
Failure of the collective action through the trade representative resulted in competitive 
actions by individual firms. The leading industry member (Marine Harvester) differentiated 
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itself, siding with its critics and accepting blame. This led to the promotion of a ‘socially 
responsible’ construct for the industry and the establishment of a joint venture with a rival 
aquarium and the United States environmental group to develop standards for salmon 
farming. Another strategy employed competitively was an increased corporate disclosure 
on the levels of sea lice and water quality data. Despite the mix of collective and competitive 
actions over the years, the controversies surrounding salmon fish farming persisted until 
2007 and collective actions continue to focus on the economic viability of the industry. Other 
fish farming companies bought into and signed the salmon farming standards, and this 
enhanced the reputation of the individual companies. When organisations agree and adhere 
to an identity, they will be more accepted and viewed as appropriate in the eyes of their 
audience (Lee et al., 2017). Next, this chapter reflects on the connections between frames, 
cleavages, and legitimacy. 
 
3.4 Reflections and Linkages 
Having explored frames and framing, and legitimacy and legitimation, it becomes obvious to 
examine (1) how these concepts are related, and (2) how this relationship informs the key 
question of this thesis which is: 
(How) can industry actors use frames to maintain collective legitimacy, irrespective 
of disagreements and cleavages, during and after a major policy negotiation with the 
government? 
This section reflects on the potential for frames to be used as a legitimating tool by industry 
actors amidst the cleavages and disagreements. This study assumes that language used by 
the industry actors studied is not intended only for policymakers but has a wider audience 
reach (including other policy actors, the public, and academics). From the foregoing, it is 
apparent that frames have the ‘power to imbue or deny legitimacy to specific political 
actions’; this is however dependent on their resonance with the broader cultural repertoire 
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(see Ariel, 2008: 116). For example, Haunss (2007), writing on the Iraq war and the Bush 
administration, advised that empirical research on legitimacy and/or the processes of 
legitimation should pay attention to the role of actors in discourses and conflicts about 
legitimacy. By this the author means the language use. 
The findings of the review on alcohol, framing, and policy studies raised more questions than 
answers and led me to question the rationale behind industry actors’ use of frames amidst 
their differing opinions. I questioned the potential for frames to be used strategically for 
legitimation and or for reputation management. By legitimation, this thesis means the 
process  by which legitimacy is conferred on the alcohol industry or protected. The literature 
suggests that the alcohol industry is not united (see Holden et al., 2012; Katikireddi et al., 
2014a; Herrick, 2011). Signs of cleavages emerged during policy deliberation on MUP. 
Language as frames can be used to unpack the differences amongst industry actors. This 
thesis seeks to understand how frames can inform our understanding of the different 
cleavages and the forms of cleavages that emerged during the consultation process. 
The word cleavage often evokes a negative connotation of disagreement, disunity, 
separation, and so much more. An organisation, industry, or family that is not in agreement 
is thought to suffer or fail in line with the ‘divided we fall’ analogy (see Barnett, 2006). The 
study by Katikireddi et al. (2014a: 250) states that the public health advocates during the 
MUP debates, “worked hard to redefine the policy issue by deliberately presenting a 
consistent alternative framing”. The key word of interest from the quote above is 
‘consistent’. Their consistent approach helped in “prioritizing public health considerations” 
and the alcohol industry’s divided approach may have contributed to their loss in 
successfully pushing the industry frames. But does the presence of cleavages always mean 
failure or a loss of legitimacy? Not necessarily. Cleavages between organisations are 
however harmful especially the conflict of interests that arise when organisations 
aggressively attempt to undermine public policy at the expense of public health. These 
actions are what undermines their legitimacy. This section of this thesis seeks to review the 
literature on cleavages and its impact on the policy process. 
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Cleavages have a negative impact on industry cohesion (Christiansen and Kroezen, 2016), 
their collective legitimacy, as well as on their ability to put forward a coherent argument to 
influence policy decisions (Holden et al., 2012). A departure from the agreed line by the 
biggest and potentially most influential member poses clear problems (see Winn et al., 2008; 
Lee et al., 2017). Cleavages mainly arise under the following conditions: (1) Where there is 
an interest to be protected; (2) Where there is a target audience (for example, government 
or regulator); (3) Where there is a disagreement between two or more parties in relation to 
the interest to be safeguarded (Barnett, 2006; Kim, 2017); and (4) the presence of large 
groups with different interests (Olson, 1965; McPherson and Sauder, 2013). 
Cleavages become evident when a government or an individual seeks to introduce new 
regulatory measures. They are said to tap into existing interpretive schemas (frames) which 
offer meaning and they use this to make sense of their actions and also to appeal to their 
audience (Kim, 2017). In policymaking, policymakers often find it useful to exploit the 
cleavages between actors in order to drive forward their policy agenda (see Song, 2019). 
Some authors have examined the effect of political cleavages on trade policies (see Brock 
and Magee, 1978; Feenstra and Bhagwati, 1982; Findlay and Wellisz, 1982; Kim, 2017) and 
election results (Irwin, 1996). These authors argue that “intergroup conflict expressed 
through lobbying activities determines trade policy outcome” (Beaulieu, 2002). By this, the 
authors imply that cleavages do have an effect and form along factor lines and in the case 
of immobile factors, the cleavages appear along the industry lines (Beaulieu, 2002). Inter-
industry differences have been used to explain the politics of trade policy (Kim, 2017). Kim 
(2017) found that firms with high exporting rates are more likely to lobby against any factors 
that would increase the exportation cost, “especially when their products are highly 
differentiated”. And also, that firms, lobby on trade policies targeting specific products,  thus 
suggesting that firm-level preference matters more to those firms, compared to industry-
level preference in trade policy, and hence, propagating to inter-industry division. 
Cleavages as expressed through frames impact on the legitimacy of an organisation. The 
literature on cleavages so far however is inconclusive and thus signals a potential gap in the 
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literature. This thesis attempts to address this gap by questioning the role of cleavages in 
maintaining inter-industry cohesion during crucial policy deliberation and its overall impact 
on organisational legitimacy. One of the aims of this thesis is to understand the micro-level 
discursive strategies used in legitimating cleavages within an industry and between an 
industry and policymakers. This chapter moves on to present a summary of the research 
gaps identified and the steps taken in this thesis to resolve the identified gaps with the 
research questions and the subsequent research methods. 
 
3.5 Summary of Research Gap and Research Questions 
Studies on the UK alcohol industries and alcohol policy process have focused on how the 
industry seeks to influence policymakers. In recent years, interests in frame production by 
different actors have emerged (Hawkins et al. 2012; Hawkins and Holden 2013; Katikireddi, 
et al., 2014a; Anderson and Baumberg, 2006; Greenaway, 2011). Cleavages were identified 
in the literature on the alcohol industry use of frames and framing. These cleavages have 
been understood through the structure and function of the industry actors. This study 
however posits that cleavages can also, be understood by examining how industry interests 
are reflected through frames and seeks to explore any potential impact cleavages may have 
on legitimacy at the industry level as this, is underexplored in the literature so far. 
The study of legitimacy has been approached by scholars who have adopted different 
assumptions about the phenomenon and Zald (1978: 71) asserts that legitimacy remains 
“one of the great unanalysed concepts” of organisational theory. This assertion could be as 
a result of the many and potentially infinite attributes of legitimacy which is constantly being 
generated by theorists with only a few attributes being empirically tested (see Deephouse 
and Suchman, 2008; Deephouse et al., 2017). This leads to yet another challenge as 
highlighted by Foreman and Whetten, (2002) and Tornikoski and Newbert, (2007). This 
challenge is in the form of an appropriate empirical measure that satisfies the different 
legitimacy constructs. This study acknowledges these concerns and chooses to use Suchman 
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(1995)’s conceptualisation of legitimacy to understand the rationale behind the alcohol 
industry actors’ use of frames during the Scottish MUP policy debates and the impact of the 
observed cleavages on the policy actors and industry cohesion. 
This study also examines the empirical utility of legitimacy as advocated by Deephouse and 
Suchman (2008). Collective institutional strategies are said to be reflected in the language 
used by organisations. It also suggests that the use of frames by industry actors positioning 
themselves on different sides of a debate, and that the inherent cleavages may be 
intentional and thus warrant further investigation. The literatures reviewed as part of this 
thesis give an important insight into the discursive side of legitimation, but none of them 
have focused on the alcohol industry or the document they produced as part of an alcohol 
policy and in relation to their legitimacy as an industry. 
The finding of this review nevertheless points to the significance of framing in the policy 
formulation process and addresses the following topics: frames, framing, the importance of 
framing and the different ways frames are propagated in alcohol studies and social policy 
studies. The literature on alcohol policy studies and framing was further explored to 
understand the types of studies that have been conducted and to identify any potential 
research gaps. The studies reviewed showed disunity amongst alcohol industry actors, and 
this was evident in the language they used to represent themselves during policy 
negotiations. Next, the empirical evidence on cleavages was explored. The review on 
cleavages identified a dearth of evidence in the discursive representation of cleavages. 
Frames are often used to legitimate industry actors’ positions and to understand industry 
actors’ use of frame, the literature on legitimacy, and legitimation was explored. This 
reinforces the core question of this study: (How) can industry actors use frames to uphold 
their collective legitimacy, irrespective of disagreements and cleavages, during and after 
a major policy negotiation with the government? This question has three main parts – 
frames, cleavages, and collective legitimacy – and in order to enable a detailed interrogation 
of the question, it has been broken down into four sub questions as shown in the Table 1  
below. 
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Table 1: Thesis sub questions 
Themes  Sub questions 
Frames and 
Cleavages  
Question 1: How did the alcohol industry actors respond to the Scottish MUP policy 
consultation and what frames did the industry actors use to either oppose or support 
the policy?  
Question 2: How do these frames inform our understanding of the alcohol industry 
cleavages?  
Legitimacy  Question 3: How do policymakers as legitimacy conferrers, perceive and respond to 
cleavages without negatively affecting industry legitimacy? 
Question 4: How do the alcohol industry actors discursively confer legitimacy on each 
other despite their cleavages? 
Source: Author 
The first question revisits the industry actors position on MUP, (re)establishes the presence 
of cleavages, and identifies the frames used to either oppose or support the MUP. This 
question, in line with the works of Holden et al. (2012), establishes the presence of 
cleavages. Holden et al. (2012) observed a divergence of interests between producers and 
retailers (inter-sectoral cleavages) and within the retail sector (intra-sectoral cleavages27), 
divergence between on-trade and off-trade. This thesis hopes to tease out more divergence 
and similarities between actors from different sectors and within the sectors, the reason 
behind industry actors position on MUP, and what this means for the MUP and the policy 
process. Question 2 focuses on the frames industry actors used. Katikireddi et al (2014) 
explained hybrid framing as used by alcohol stakeholders and the competing frames as used 
by industry actors on opposing side of the debate (see also Hawkins and Holden, 2013). 
These existing literatures on the alcohol industry and the MUP policy incorporate 
consultation submissions and interviews from all alcohol stakeholders including public 
health practitioners. This thesis however focuses primarily on the alcohol industry actors 
and included the complete corpus submitted by the industry actors during the 2012 
consultation period, including the evidence sessions and committee reports. The study also 
collected additional documents and interviews with policymakers in order to answer the 
research question on industry legitimacy. The focus on two stakeholder groups was to 
 
27 Intra-sectoral cleavages refer to cleavages within the sector for example cleavages between producers based 
on the alcohol strength. 
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ensure that the opinion of the industry actors was understood and that the policymakers’ 
perception on the industry as legitimacy conferrers was not overshadowed by other 
stakeholder groups. This thesis adds to these bodies of literature (i.e. Holden et al., 2012, 
Katikireddi et al., 2014; Hawkins and Holden, 2013) by focusing on frames which reflect the 
industry actors’ interests on the economy and the society, and how these frames inform our 
understanding of cleavages, thus moving on from industry actors who support or oppose 
the MUP Bill. 
Questions 3 and 4 focus on the perception of legitimacy of the alcohol industry first from the 
Scottish policymakers as conferrers of legitimacy and from the industry actors themselves 
(see Deephouse et al. 2017). It is apparent that the alcohol industry is not illegitimate 
following the MUP deliberations. The literature suggests that an industry or organisation 
which is not united will struggle to collectively influence policy (Christiansen and Kroezen, 
2016) or withstand external negative pressures on their reputation (Winn et al., 2008; see 
Barnett, 2006). This thesis hopes to add to these bodies of literature and also extend the 
literatures on alcohol industry frames and cleavages by showing that an industry can be 
divided and yet retain its positive reputation and legitimacy. It also brings together the social 
sciences and business literature (i.e. frame theory and legitimacy theory) in a way that shows 
complementarity. The literature on discursive legitimation by Vaara et al. (2006), Vaara and 
Tienari (2008), and Vara and Monin (2010) explored in this chapter looks at the legitimation 
strategies adopted by MNC to prevent delegitimation (see also Luyckx and Janssens, 2016). 
This thesis builds on these bodies of work and establishes that these discursive legitimation 
strategies could also be use by legitimacy conferrers to protect the legitimacy conferred on 
an industry. In addition, industry actors in their submission and during the interviews used 
some discursive legitimation strategies to uphold the legitimacy of their competitors. This 
research is important as it makes an original contribution to existing body of literature and 
brings a new perspective to the study of the alcohol industry by interrogating policy 
submissions using legitimacy theory. Next, the thesis presents the methods adopted for 
answering the research questions this thesis asks and the rationale for the selected 
methods.  
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CHAPTER 4. METHODOLOGY 1 – PHILOSOPHICAL POSITION AND 
DATA COLLECTION METHOD 
4.1 Introduction 
The policymaking process is complex. In particular, it involves many language-mediated 
interactions, amongst other things. The complex nature of the policy setting makes the 
process prone to contestations, cleavages, and sometimes capture by parties with stakes 
(i.e. vested interests).  In this chapter, I present the philosophical position guiding this thesis: 
interpretivist-constructivist epistemology and social constructionist ontology and the data 
collection method – i.e. document selection and participants’ selection for the interviews 
and the rationale for these choices. 
 
4.2 Research Epistemology and Ontology 
Given the nature of the research question this thesis seeks to answer, which is exploratory 
and dependent on meaning-making, this study adopts an interpretivist epistemological 
position. Interpretivism takes the subjective meanings of social actions seriously, which is 
fundamentally different from the quest for objectivity characteristics of positivism. 
Interpretivism assumes that experiences are unique, worthy to be   understood in their own 
right, and therefore cannot be easily generalised. It aims to understand the differences 
between people and objects in the natural world, relying on the subjective or lived 
experiences of the individuals or phenomenon being studied. It accepts the possibility of the 
coexistence of multiple truths and empowers the researcher to exercise a significant amount 
of agency to the object of inquiry through subjective meaning making. In other words, 
interpretivism calls for a different logic of research procedure that reflects the 
distinctiveness of socially constructed realities against the apparent objectivity and 
concreteness of the natural world. 
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Interpretivism has a longstanding influence in the emergence of the social sciences. Max 
Weber, in his 1947 work, for instance, described sociology as a science which attempts the 
interpretive understanding of social action in order to arrive at a causal explanation (Bryman, 
2012). Weber’s work has influenced great scholars over the years, including Alfred Schutz 
on phenomenology, which is concerned with how individuals make sense of their world, and 
Von Wright (1971) on hermeneutics (Bryman, 2012). 
An interpretivist stance, as used in this thesis, presents the researchers’ interpretation of 
the actions of the social actors involved in the study, with the aim of using this interpretation 
to contribute to theory development (Bryman, 2012). The contribution to theory building, 
in this case, can be either through inductive or abductive strategies. Inductive strategy 
implies the building of theories from observations – the research observes a phenomenon, 
interprets it, and uses that interpretation to either create or contribute to a theory. 
Abductive strategy starts with a puzzle, observes it, and seeks to explain or make sense of it 
with some theories. An abductive strategy closely resembles an inductive strategy as it 
assigns a confirmation-theoretic role to explanation (Douven, 2017). However, the 
distinguishing factor is that the theoretical account in an abductive strategy is grounded in 
the worldviews of those researched. For example, in attempting to understand the industry 
actors’ perspectives from the documents they produce (which reflect their worldviews on 
policy issues), the social scientific account of the social world from that perspective can be 
teased out for a better understanding (Bryman, 2012) of the industry actors’ position and 
for a reasoned conclusion (Dudovskiy, 2018). 
This thesis adopts an abductive view because it focuses on the theoretical understanding of 
the context and the interactive actions of the actors involved (i.e. the alcohol industry actors 
and policymakers). As an interpretivist methodology, abductive strategy fits well with the 
social constructionist ontological position (which is discussed next), the selected theories, 
the proposed data collection, and the analytical method selected for the thesis (see 
Creswell, 2012). An abductive strategy moves iteratively between empirical findings and the 
selected theories (frame theory and legitimacy theory) for the thesis. The data collected is 
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used to explore a phenomenon, identify themes and patterns, and locate these in a 
conceptual framework (Dudoviskiy, 2018). 
As earlier stated, the thesis adopts a constructionist ontological position which considers 
how social phenomena or objects of consciousness develop in the social context (Blaikie, 
2000). Constructionists contend that reality is subjective, multiple, and socially constructed 
by its participants (Tuli, 2010). This closely aligns with the relativist position, but the 
constructionist posits that the world, as we know it, is not given but continuously being 
created and recreated to reflect different actors’ perceptions of reality (Berger and 
Luckmann, 1966). Social construction is defined as a theory of knowledge with its roots in 
sociology and communication theories (Leeds-Hurwitz, 2009). Leeds-Hurwitz (2009: 892) 
describes social construction as a “development of jointly constructed understandings of the 
world that form the basis for shared assumptions about reality”. In other words, social 
construction theory centres on the notions that humans make sense of their experiences by 
creating models of the social world, which they then share through language (Leeds-Hurwitz, 
2009; Berger and Luckmann, 1966). 
Social constructionism as a theory became popular in the United States of America following 
the publication of the book The Social Construction of Reality by Peter Berger and Thomas 
Luckmann in 1966. Berger and Luckmann's social constructionism have its roots in 
phenomenology28 and symbolic interactionism29 (see Bryman, 2012). Fairhurst and Grant 
(2010: 174) argue that “all knowledge, including the most basic, taken for granted common 
sense knowledge of everyday reality, is derived from and maintained by social interactions”. 
Social constructionism does not deny reality. It contends that reality is brought to life 
through language and is changed in the process (see Baghramian and Carter, 2019). Social 
constructionism is an extreme form of relativism, which contends that reality is not given 
but is constructed (Baghramian and Carter, 2019). It challenges the concept of objectivity, 
 
28 Phenomenology questions how individuals make sense of the world around them without undue influence 
by the researcher (see Bryman, 2012: 714). 
29 Symbolic interactionism is a theoretical perspective adopted in sociology and psychology. It views social 
interaction as taking place in terms of the meaning’s actors attach to things and actions (Bryman, 2012: 716). 
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truth, and accuracy, which most scientific experiments rest on and accept that there are 
different ways of understanding the world and that no singular construct can be said to be 
the truth (Mallon, 2019). In other words, social constructionism is not interested in the truth 
but the coexistence of different perspectives of events. The main criticism of the social 
constructionist approach is the fact that reality is often taken for granted (Andrew, 2012). 
Nevertheless, constructionism and interpretivism constitute an inter-related process of 
making sense of reality and perceptions, which is central to the research problem of this 
thesis as well as the selected theories, the type of data collected, and the analytical methods 
adopted. The social construction of an issue is closely linked to the framing of that same 
issue. The similarities of social construction and framing lie in the fact that how a problem 
or an issue is presented determines how it is perceived and managed. This perception, 
however, is not static – it is continuously being negotiated and renegotiated over time 
(Berger and Luckmann, 1966; Fairhurst and Grant, 2010). The social constructionist 
viewpoint adopted in this thesis aims to understand how industry actors perceive and 
respond to regulative threats during a policy consultation process. The benefits of a social 
constructionist viewpoint to this thesis is that knowledge is viewed as a socially constructed 
outcome. It views society as existing as both subjective and objective reality where meaning 
is continuously shared (Andrew, 2012). A constructionist approach is not concerned with 
ontological questions of causation. This study asks broad, general, and open-ended research 
questions, which focus on the interactions and process of sense-making. Greener (2011) and 
many others maintain that the epistemology, ontology, and methodology are intrinsically 
linked and that knowledge of the philosophy of social research makes the researcher more 
likely to make informed choices about the methods. The data collection methods for this 
thesis – texts and semi-structured interviews – are in line with the researchers’ philosophical 
positions. They are subsequently analysed thematically and guided by frame theory and 
legitimacy theory. Thematic analysis, as an analytical method, shares some similarities with 
a grounded theory approach30 (Braun and Clarke, 2006), and fits in with the interpretivist 
 
30 Grounded theory is an iterative approach to the analysis of qualitative data which aims to generate theory 
(Bryman, 2012). 
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epistemology and the social constructionist ontology viewpoint adopted. The choice is also 
a reflection of the research question and the data sources, as explained below. 
 
4.3 Data Collection Methods 
The empirical data for this study is mainly derived from industry/policy texts and semi-
structured interviews with alcohol industry actors and Members of the Scottish Parliament 
(MSPs). By texts, this thesis means documents submitted by alcohol industry actors to the 
Scottish MUP consultation, transcripts of evidence sessions between industry actors and 
designated committees, the committee reports, transcripts of parliamentary debates, 
information from the industry actors’ websites, and corporate reports. The data collection 
for this thesis was conducted in two waves. Wave 1 (October 2014 to April 2015) – 
identification of industry actors’ submission to the MUP consultation, identification of the 
transcripts of the evidence sessions with the committees and first attempt to recruit 
interview participants. Wave 2 (March to August 2019) – addition of the committees’ reports 
and the transcripts of parliamentary debates, second attempt at recruiting interview 
participants from the alcohol industry and the committee members (i.e. MSPs), and the 
selection of industry actors annual/corporate reports from their websites. 
4.3.1 Documents as Empirical Data Source 
According to Fairclough (1992), the act of producing and disseminating texts confers a 
political stand and underlies the most fundamental struggle for power and control. Textual 
data is arguably the most widely available data source in the study of politics, and political 
documents have great potential to reveal information about the positions, attitudes, and 
activities of their authors at a precise point in time (Kluver and Mahoney, 2015). The 
texts/documents included in this thesis are the alcohol industry actors’ submissions to the 
Scottish MUP consultation, the transcripts of evidence sessions between the policy 
committees and industry actors, the committees report, transcripts of parliamentary 
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debates with MSPs, evidence from industry actors’ websites, and corporate reports. These 
documents were chosen for this thesis because they are perceived to have the ability to 
inform discourse and shape policies (Phillips, Lawrence, and Hardy, 2004). As such, they are 
critically relevant to the study. In addition, they are publicly available and remove the 
problem with access to informational materials to a large extent. Access to research 
materials/information is key to the success of any research. 
Documents are said to be “windows into social and organizational realities” (Bryman, 2012). 
Atkinson and Coffey (2011; quoted in Bryman, 2012) argue that documents should be 
viewed as a “distinct level of reality in their own right”. This means that documents should 
be examined based on the context in which they are written and who the targeted 
audience(s) is/are (Bryman, 2012). As such, documents are said to be written to convey an 
impression that will be favourable to the authors and their representatives and should not 
be assumed to be a “transparent representation” of the social reality of an organisation. To 
understand the content of a document, other documents related to the issue being 
discussed (be it produced by the same organisation or not) may need to be analysed for 
contextualisation. Atkinson and Coffey (2011) referred to this as ‘intertextuality’. 
I present below the collection sequence of the texts used in this study. 
4.3.2 Wave 1 – Consultation Submissions 
The data collection process started off with emails sent to alcohol industry actors for the 
submissions they made to the Scottish MUP consultation process. The feedback from this 
process was not encouraging. Some industry actors sent across by email submissions they 
made to the Westminster consultation and one signposted me to the Scottish Parliament 
website. The Scottish Parliament website is not the easiest to navigate, especially if you do 
not know the title(s) of the document(s) you are looking for. Two separate phone calls to 
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the Scottish Parliament soon resolved this and a link31 to the MUP consultation page was 
sent to me officially by email by an official of the Scottish Parliament. 
The webpage highlighted five sections: the introduction of the Bill; stages 1, 2, and 3, and a 
fifth section titled ‘after passing’. These five sections correspond to the five stages of the 
MUP Bill (see section 2.3. above). All five sections from the Scottish Parliament website were 
studied in detail. 
The first section was the introduction of the Bill and this reflected on the nature of the Bill. 
The second section is the first stage of the Bill which involves the deliberation of the Bill at 
the committee stage by the HSC and the FC. The HSC received 95 written submissions from 
different alcohol stakeholders following the call for evidence from affected parties. It is at 
this stage of the policy process that alcohol stakeholders seek to influence the policy 
consultation. 85% of the respondents were in favour of the Bill and 15% opposed it (HSC 
report, 2012, paragraph 11). The committee heard oral evidence from 28 witnesses, of 
which eight were alcohol industry actors. The FC scrutinised the Financial Memoranda (FM), 
which accompanied the Bill and reported its findings to the HSC. They also considered both 
written and oral evidence from affected organisations identified by the FM as being 
potentially affected by the Bill and the Scottish Government Bill team. The FC heard oral 
evidence from two industry actors and the transcripts of the sessions are accessible via a 
link from the main FC report document. Another committee, the Subordinate Legislation 
Committee reported its finding on the Bill to the Parliament. The third section was the 
second stage of the Bill. This stage was overseen by the HSC who considered the lists of 
amendments to the Bill and took evidence from the NHS Boards budget scrutiny. The fourth 
section is the list of amendments that was debated and agreed upon by the Scottish 
Parliament prior to the Bill being passed. This stage of the Bill includes the research briefing 
 
31 Link to the MUP consultation page on the Scottish Parliament website - 
http://www.parliament.scot/parliamentarybusiness/bills/43354.aspx accessed June 20 2017 
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on the Bill by SPICe in January 2012 and May 2012. The fifth section contained the Bill in its 
final form. 
After studying the various sections of the Bill, on the website, it was apparent that the 
submissions from the alcohol industry actors were considered at stage 1 of the Bill, section 
two. All three documents under stage 1 (from the website) were reviewed and are described 
below. The parliamentary debates and the transcripts of these were obtained from the links 
on stage 3. 
4.3.2.1 Data source 1 - Industry actors’ consultation submission to the HSC 
The first document of Stage 1 Report on the Alcohol Minimum Pricing (Scotland) Bill (2MB 
pdf) was downloaded, printed, and read cover to cover. This document is the HSC 2nd report 
(session 4), and it is 76 pages long. The document gave a detailed account of the MUP 
consultation process, the debates, and the minutes of the committee meetings. It cited both 
quotes from oral evidence given by alcohol stakeholders and quotes from the written 
evidence submitted. Some of the evidence received by the committee were deliberated in 
private. Documents submitted by alcohol industry actors and the oral evidence sessions 
were considered at the 3rd Meeting, 2012 (Session 4) held on Tuesday 17 January 2012. 
Page 64 of the report provides the link to the written evidence submitted by eight alcohol 
stakeholders of which two are alcohol producers (Diageo and Tennent Caledonian Breweries 
UK) and four trade representatives (Scottish Whisky Association (SWA), National Association 
of Cider Makers (NACM), Scottish Beer and Pub Association (SBPA), and Scottish Licensed 
Trade Association (SLTA)). The remaining two stakeholders are non-alcohol industry actors. 
The above submissions were considered in private by the HSC. All six industry actors’ 
submissions were downloaded, printed, and added to the data pool. Page 65 of the report 
provided further links to four supplementary written evidence submitted by three alcohol 
trade association – SWA, SBPA (parts 1 and 2), and SLTA. These supplementary submissions 
were made in response to the HSC call for additional information on the ‘Pricing Mechanism’ 
for the proposed MUP. These four supplementary submissions were also downloaded, 
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printed, and included in the data pool. There was a link on page 65 to the oral evidence 
session to the HSC and this document is discussed in the next section. 
On page 67 - 68 Annexe C, was a list of other written evidence from all alcohol stakeholders, 
with a total of 97 links. The list of alcohol industry actors who participated in the PHRD was 
used as a guide to search for eligible industries’ submissions. All submissions to the HSC and 
the FC by known alcohol producers, retailers, and their trade representatives were 
automatically eligible for inclusion into the studies. Other less-known brands/organisations 
were identified by reading the title page of the submission to ascertain eligibility for 
inclusion. This approach resulted in the identification of submissions made by the Scottish 
Grocers Federation (SGF), Scottish Retail Consortium (SRC), and Campaign for Real Ale 
(CAMRA). The individual submissions by names (six in total) identified by the suffix “indv.”, 
were read and those who identified themselves as ‘Licensee’ (two out of six) were included 
into the study. This led to the identification and inclusion of two submissions from individual 
licensees (Mr J. Stewart and Mr D. Bremner). A total of thirteen submissions were retrieved 
from this list as a result and added to the data pool bringing the total of industry actors’ 
submissions to the HSC to 23 as shown in Table 2. All the consultation responses retrieved 
were downloaded, printed, and read a couple of times, so that I could familiarise myself with 
their content, prior to analysis. 
 
Table 2: Alcohol industry’s written submissions to the Health and Sports Committee  
Evidence type Document reference Industry Sector 
Section 1   
3rd Meeting 
2012 (Session 
4), 17 January 
2012 - Written 
evidence 
Scotch Whisky Association - Alcohol (Minimum Pricing) 
(Scotland) Bill MIN65 
Trade 
association 
Diageo - Diageo Response to the Health and Sports 
Committee’s call for Evidence on the Alcohol (Minimum 
Pricing) (Scotland) Bill 
Producer  
Tennent Caledonian Breweries UK - Alcohol (Minimum Pricing) 
(Scotland) Bill MIN85 
Producer 
National Association of Cider Makers (NACM) - Alcohol 
(Minimum Pricing) (Scotland) Bill MIN43 
Trade 
association 
Scottish Beer and Pub Association (SBPA) - Alcohol (Minimum 
Pricing) (Scotland) Bill MIN68 
Trade 
association 
Scottish Licensed Trade Association Alcohol (Minimum Pricing) 
(Scotland) Bill MIN72 
Trade 
association 
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Evidence type Document reference Industry Sector 
Section 2   
Supplementary 
Written 
Evidence 
Scotch Whisky Association - Alcohol (Minimum Pricing) 
(Scotland) Bill Pricing mechanism 
Trade 
association 
BBPA - ALCOHOL TAXATION IN THE UK Why alcoholic drinks are 
not, and should not, be taxed solely on equivalent alcohol 
content.  October 2010 
Trade 
association 
Scottish Beer and Pub Association - Alcohol (Minimum Pricing) 
(Scotland) Bill Pricing mechanism   
Trade 
association 
Scottish Licensed Trade Association - Alcohol (Minimum 
Pricing) (Scotland) Bill Pricing mechanism  
Trade 
association 
Wine and Spirit Trade Association - Alcohol (Minimum Pricing) 
(Scotland) Bill Pricing mechanism  
Trade 
association 
Section 3   
Stage 2 – List of 
other written 
evidence 
Dave Bremner - Alcohol (Minimum Pricing) (Scotland) Bill 
MIN10 
Individual 
licensee  
Campaign for Real Ale (CAMRA) - Alcohol (Minimum Pricing) 
(Scotland) Bill MIN14 
Trade 
association 
Chivas Brothers Ltd and Pernod Ricard UK32 - Alcohol 
(Minimum Pricing) (Scotland) Bill MIN19  
Producer 
Co-operative Group - Alcohol (Minimum Pricing) (Scotland) Bill 
MIN26 
Off-trade 
retailer 
The Edrington Group - Alcohol (Minimum Pricing) (Scotland) 
Bill Response to the Health and Sports Committee’s call for 
Written Evidence - Draft  
Producer  
Molson Coors Brewing Company (UK) Limited - Alcohol 
(Minimum Pricing) (Scotland) Bill MIN41 
Producer 
SABMiller - Alcohol (Minimum Pricing) (Scotland) Bill  Producer 
Scottish Grocers’ Federation - Alcohol (Minimum Pricing) 
(Scotland) Bill MIN70 
Trade 
association 
Scottish Retail Consortium - Alcohol (Minimum Pricing) 
(Scotland) Bill MIN75 
Trade 
association 
Jonathan Stewart - Alcohol (Minimum Pricing) (Scotland) Bill 
MIN83 
Individual 
licensee 
Whyte and Mackay - Alcohol (Minimum Pricing) (Scotland) Bill 
MIN92 
Producer 
Wine and Spirit Trade Association - Alcohol (Minimum Pricing) 
(Scotland) Bill MIN93  
Trade 
association 
WM Morrison Supermarkets - Alcohol (Minimum Pricing) 
(Scotland) Bill MIN94 
Off-trade 
retailer 
Source: Author 
 
Of the twenty-four written submissions to the HSC, nineteen responded to two key 
consultation questions. These questions focus on “the advantages and disadvantages of 
 
32 Referred onwards as Chivas Brothers 
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establishing a minimum alcohol sales price based on a unit of alcohol” and “the level at which 
such a proposed minimum price should be set and the justification for the level”. The third 
question was on “any other aspect of the Bill” that the industry actors wished to comment 
on. Six of these highlighted the questions above at the beginning of the respective sections; 
the other thirteen submissions were free-flowing and covered at least the first two questions 
in their responses. The written submissions to the HSC ranged between two to eight pages 
long and most often began with a corporate statement about the organisation, its products, 
and employee numbers. For the analysis, the nineteen submissions were initially categorised 
to reflect the three different alcohol sectors (i.e. producers, retailers, and trade associations) 
and then later categorised to reflect industry actors’ interests as either supporters or 
opposers of the Bill (cleavage lines). 
The additional five submissions responding to the HSC call “on the mechanism by which a 
minimum price for a unit of alcohol could be adjusted periodically” focused on two options 
(index-linked and modelling based) as set out by the committee. Four of these five 
submissions were free-flowing and were straightforward with no subheadings or numbered 
paragraphs. The responses were 1 to 2 pages long and the trade associations who opposed 
the MUP made it clear (on the first page) that responding to the government’s call on ‘pricing 
mechanism’ does not change their position on the Bill. The fifth and additional submission 
by BBPA, the sister company of SBPA, focused on alcohol taxation. The BBPA used graphs 
and charts to present its evidence on the disadvantages of alcohol taxation based on 
“equivalent alcohol content”. 
4.3.2.2 Data source 2 - Transcript of evidence session with the HSC 
As earlier stated, the HSC document reviewed above provided a link33 on page 65 to the oral 
evidence session conducted by the HSC. The HSC heard evidence from 13 industry 
stakeholders, eight of which were alcohol industry actors (SBPA, SWA, Tennent Caledonian, 
Asda, Diageo, NACM, Tesco, and SLTA). The document is 83 pages long and consists of 
 
33 Link to the HSC oral evidence session 
http://www.parliament.scot/parliamentarybusiness/report.aspx?r=6862&mode=pdf 
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transcripts of the meetings on various subjects. The section/transcript pertaining to alcohol 
industry actors was 44 pages long (pages 819 to 862). There were no prepared statements 
from the industry representatives, so the session went straight to questions and answers. 
The eight representatives answered questions from committee members; some of the 
questions were directed to specific industry sector representatives whilst other questions 
were asked openly for any of the representatives to respond to. The responses from the 
representatives were either directly responding to a question or comment on another 
representatives’ response. The transcript of the session was downloaded, printed, and 
added to the data pool. 
4.3.2.3 Data source 3 - Industry actors consultation submission to the FC 
The second document from the Scottish Parliament website under Stage 1 Report on the 
Alcohol (Minimum Pricing) (Scotland) Bill (414KB pdf) is the Finance Committee (FC) report, 
a web-only document which is 80 pages long. The report covered the FM associated with 
the MUP Bill, contained a summary of the evidence presented, and copies of submitted 
written evidence by alcohol stakeholders. The FC agreed to seek written evidence from 
several organisations identified in the FM as being potentially affected by the Bill at their 
meeting on November 16th, 2011. Written submissions were received from thirteen alcohol 
stakeholders, four of which were industry actors with a total of six submissions as shown in 
Table 3 below. Of the six eligible submissions, the submission from the SGF was excluded as 
it is a duplicate which was also submitted to the HSC. Another submission from the NACM 
was also excluded from this group because it was written in a different format and did not 
address the set consultation questions posed by the FC. The submission by the NACM was 
instead included with the analysis of alcohol trade association submissions to the HSC on 
‘Pricing Mechanism’. The four eligible submissions from this data pool were added to the 
data pool. 
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Table 3: Alcohol industry’s written submissions to the Finance Committee 
Evidence type Document reference Alcohol industry actors 
Written 
evidence – 
Submitted to the 
Finance 
Committee  
Submission from the National Association of Cider 
Makers (NACM). Page 31-34 
Trade association (wrong 
category) 
Submission from the Scottish Grocers Federation. 
Page 49-52 
Trade association (Duplicate 
copy) 
Submission of written evidence - Scottish Grocers 
Federation. Page 52-57 
Trade association 
Submission from the Scotch Whisky Association. Page 
58-64 
Trade association 
Submission from the Wine and Spirit Trade 
Association. Page 67-73 
Trade association 
Appendix A - WSTA34 response to the government’s 
initial consultation to its minimum unit pricing 
proposals. Page 74-78 
Trade association 
Source: Author 
The FC received six written submissions from four alcohol industry actors, of which two were 
duplicates. Three submissions from the SGF, SWA, and WSTA responded to eight questions 
posed by FC. The submission by SGF was brief and straightforward. The submissions by the 
SWA and WSTA were lengthy and deviated occasionally from the questions. The fourth and 
last submission by the WSTA responded to six different questions. This submission was also 
long with lots of repetitions of points already presented in other submissions made to the 
HSC. 
4.3.2.4 Data source 4 - Transcript of evidence session with the FC 
The FC heard oral evidence from two alcohol industry actors – the SWA and the SGF on 
December 21st, 2011. The report was 22 pages long and the link35 to the oral evidence 
session was on page 3 of the FC web-only report. There were no prepared statements taken 
from the industry representatives, so the session went straight to questions and answers. 
Some of the questions asked made references to comments made by the trade associations 
in their written submissions to the committee and also referred to the FM. The transcript of 
the evidence session was downloaded, printed, and added to the data pool. 
 
34 The Wine and Spirit Trade Association (WSTA) is the trade body representing over 345 companies 
producing, importing, and selling wines and spirits. 
35 Link to FC oral evidence session 
http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/parliamentarybusiness/28862.aspx?r=6641&mo de=pdf. 
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Adequate checks and steps were taken to ensure that no alcohol industry actors’ submission 
to the Alcohol MUP Scotland policy debate was omitted from the data pool. All eligible 
submissions and transcripts (mentioned above) were downloaded, printed, and read and 
then uploaded onto Nvivo 12 in preparation for analysis. 
In summary, textual analysis of freely available documents offers a quick, relatively easy, 
efficient, and cost-effective way of obtaining volume and comparative data (Bowen, 2009) 
on industry actors’ use of language. Documents as a qualitative research method enable the 
researcher to “capture more naturalistically what research participants wish to express 
because they are able to use their own words” (Greener, 2011). In addition, they are 
effective means of gathering data when events can no longer be observed or when an 
informant has forgotten the details of the event in question (Bowen, 2009). Finally, 
documents have been used as accessories to other research methods, such as interviews 
and participant observations for triangulation (Glaser and Strauss 1967 in Heath and Cowley 
2004; Bryman, 2012), but are employed as the primary data collection method in this study. 
4.3.3 Interviews: Data Source for Triangulation  
Interviews are one of the most common methods for data collection in qualitative 
healthcare and social science research (Ryan et al., 2009). They are used to explore the 
views, experiences, beliefs, and motivations of individual participants (Legard et al., 
2003). Interviews provide “a ‘deeper’ understanding of social phenomena” compared to 
the use of quantitative methods (Gill et al., 2008). This thesis adopts a semi-structured 
interview style. Gill et al. (2008) advocate that interview questions should be designed in 
such a way as to yield enough information as possible about the study phenomenon and to 
address the research aims and questions (see also Bryman, 2012). The downside of 
interviews includes challenges with the duration and setting up an appropriate time for both 
interviewee and interviewer. Nevertheless, a growing number of interviews are now being 
conducted over the telephone (Holt, 2010). The challenge with this form of interview is the 
inability to capture non-verbal responses (body language, a pause, or snigger et cetera.) 
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which add to the richness of the data. This is, however, managed with the growing use of 
online video interfaces (i.e. Skype) (Lo Iacono et al., 2016; Deakin and Wakefield, 2014). In 
whatever way the interview is conducted, the interviewer should ensure that the 
environment is non-threatening for both parties, that the process is well explained, and that 
issues around informed consent, confidentiality, and anonymity are clarified (Connaway and 
Powell, 2010; Ryan et al., 2009). 
4.3.4 Wave 2 – Interviews and Additional Documents  
Following the analysis of the submissions by the alcohol industry actors to the MUP policy 
consultation, and the initial failed attempt at recruiting interview participants, it was decided 
that a further attempt be made to speak with alcohol industry actors to explore some 
emerging themes and burning questions on cleavages. I approached my department and 
filled out an ethics permission form. The study obtained ethical permission from Durham 
University, Department of Sociology ethics committee. Ethical permission was obtained for 
permission to approach potential interviewees and speak to them on the subject related to 
the research question the thesis seeks to answer. Written and verbal consent was then 
obtained from the interviewees prior to the interview. The initial consent was for their 
participation and subsequent consent was for the interview to be recorded and for extracts 
of the interview to be used in my thesis and other academic writing. 
In the context of this thesis, interviews are used as both primary data and for triangulation 
(Blaikie, 1991) in order to probe characteristics of the institutional contexts not captured in 
the texts and validate emerging themes/trends observed from the documentary analysis. 
4.3.4.1 Data source 5 - Recruitment of Interview Participants 
In February 2019, I embarked upon another attempt to recruit members of the alcohol 
industry for interviews. I was introduced to the senior manager for operations and policy of 
the Scottish Business in the Community by a mutual contact to negotiate access to Scottish 
based alcohol businesses for potential interviews. I was also introduced to Diageo’s Head of 
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Corporate Relations in Scotland, who kindly declined my request for an interview and 
instead directed me to another contact at the SWA. The process of recruiting potential 
interviewees was very slow and reminder emails for response were sent a couple of times 
without luck. 
In March 2019, I decided to directly contact industry actors from all the organisations who 
made submissions to the MUP consultation. I generated a list of potential interviewees by 
going through the industry submissions and noting the names of individuals/authors of the 
submissions. The names of alcohol industry actors from the oral evidence sessions were also 
noted. For organisations whose submissions did not bear an author’s name, I proceeded to 
the organisation’s website (for example, Tennent Caledonian, The Co-operative Group, SRC, 
and Pernod Ricard) and noted down the names and contact details of their chief executive 
officer or managing director. Two additional contacts were purposively added to the list 
(Greene King Brewers, and Heineken), making a total of twenty-nine potential interviewees. 
I then proceeded to locate the individuals on LinkedIn (a professional networking site). 
Twenty-five contacts were found and an introduction message requesting for connection 
was sent (see Appendix 2). Three contact names had no LinkedIn profile and their company 
website indicated that they had retired (n=2) and deceased (n=1), and two organisations had 
to be contacted by telephone (Pernod Ricard, and SLTA) to establish contact. The process of 
locating potential industry actors revealed that 13 had left the primary organisations they 
represented during the consultation. The reason was put down to organisational 
restructuring (n=1), retirement (n=3), change of role within the organisation (n=1) and eight 
had no information on their current position or had moved jobs to other non-alcohol 
industry sector. 
Of the twenty-five invitations sent via LinkedIn for an interview request, 7 responded 
positively and accepted to be interviewed, 4 declined, and no response was obtained from 
the remaining 14. Four organisations were contacted by telephone and email: 2 signalled 
interest and 2 declined. Following a positive response to partake in the study, a follow-up 
message was sent with details about the study and consent form (see Appendix 3 and 
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Appendix 4). Some industry actors (n=2) asked for the interview questions in advance and 
indicative questions were sent out to them. Convenient dates and time were agreed for the 
9 industry actors who accepted to be interviewed. The potential interviewees were offered 
a choice of Skype or telephone interview (given that the interviewees were not all based 
within my geographical location), or meeting in person at a mutually convenient location. 
Some of the potential interviewees opted for Skype (n = 3), and (n = 6) opted for a telephone 
chat rather than face-to-face interview due to their busy schedule. This worked well for me 
in terms of travel cost and time, especially for participants outside my geographic location, 
but these also presented some minor challenges – including the inability to capture non-
verbal cues (see Holt, 2010; Lo lacono et al., 2016; Deakin and Wakefield, 2014). 
Nevertheless, some non-verbal cues (for example, hesitation, repetition, long pauses, 
laughing) were captured from the audio recording and the absence of face-to-face 
interaction did not impact on the richness of the data collected, nor was it essential for the 
thesis. Overall, most of the interviewees seemed pleasant, sounded relaxed, and gave 
straightforward answers. One of the interviews did not take place, as the interviewee had a 
clash in his diary and was thus missed. Further attempts to reschedule the interview did not 
yield positive results. The interviews lasted between 10 and 40 minutes. Seven interviews 
were tape recorded and transcribed (a sample copy of one of the interview transcripts, 
transcribed verbatim and with annotations can be found in Appendix 5. All the participants 
were offered anonymity to encourage them to speak more openly and freely, and this was 
strictly adhered to. All interview recordings were deleted following transcription, and the 
transcripts are anonymised and stored on a password protected device. Interview extracts 
used in the finding chapters are anonymised to protect the identity of the interviewees. One 
interviewee did not consent to our conversation being tape recorded; and would only speak 
to me for 10 minutes and answered questions pertaining to post implementation of MUP. 
A semi-structured interview was decided to be the best approach in line with the social 
interpretivist and constructionist philosophical position (see Bryman, 2012), and also 
because of the sensitive nature of the topic and issues that emerged during the textual 
analysis of industry submission which required further exploration (see Fossey et al., 2002). 
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An interview guide was developed (see Appendix 6) accordingly, leaving room for more 
probing questions to be asked as the interview progressed. An alternate data collection 
method for this thesis considered is questionnaire and/or focus group36. The questionnaire 
approach is however best suited for answering a ‘what question’. Questionnaires also lack 
depth and do not capture the meaning and interpretations of the social world of the social 
actor (Blaikie, 2000; Bryman, 2012). The use of questionnaires and focus group were ruled 
out because of the type of participants and the sensitive nature of the questions (Barbour, 
2008) the thesis sought to explore on cleavages, intra-industry cohesion and industry 
legitimacy following the MUP debates. 
After the first three interviews with the industry actors, I decided to seek the views of the 
policymakers who were directly involved in the MUP deliberation to adequately address 
some burning questions. The list of MSPs from the HSC and FC was compiled from the 
evidence session reports. Attempts were made to contact all nineteen committee members 
through LinkedIn and then through their parliamentary webpage. Of the nineteen requests 
sent, four accepted to be interviewed, three declined, and twelve did not respond. Of the 
twelve that did not respond, one was retired, another deceased, and two were no longer in 
parliament. Of the 4 MSPs that agreed to be interviewed, 3 interviews took place. The last 
MSP never got back to me with a date despite several emails and calls to his parliamentary 
and constituency office. The analysis presented in the second and third findings chapter 
draws from interviews with the MSPs and eight industry actors. The industry actors are 
broken down as shown in the Table 4 below with their assigned participant number code. 
Table 4: Alcohol industry interview participant code 
Industry sector Participant number code 
Producers Beer producers 1, 6, 8, 9 
Whisky producers 1, 7 
Trade Associations  Off-trade trade associations 3, 5 
Producer trade associations 4 
On-trade/ consumer trade associations 2 
Source: Author 
 
36 Focus group is a form of a group interview with a moderator asking the participants questions. The 
emphasis is on the interaction within the group and the joint construction of meaning (Bryman, 2012). 
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Further reflection: The lack of industry actors participating in research interviews has been 
highlighted in the study by Hawkins and colleagues. Hawkins et al. (2012) stated that most 
of their interview participants were drawn from public health practitioners and government 
officials and only a handful of industry actors. I, however, chose to focus on and capture the 
voices of the alcohol industry actors and the Scottish policymakers directly involved in the 
legislation process. The reason behind this was because of the focus of the study seeking to 
understand industry actors’ use of frames, their internal dynamics and perception of each 
other’s legitimacy, and the policymakers’ perception of the industry’s legitimacy. The 
success in recruiting interview participants – industry actors, at the second recruitment 
attempt, could be as a result of the following: the MUP Bill was already being implemented;  
industry actors felt inclined and perhaps more relaxed to air their views; the technique for 
recruitment was different (i.e. recruiting via professional social networking site LinkedIn37). 
Most of the alcohol industry actors who agreed to be interviewed were very polite and 
pleasant. Some tried to steer me off topic though, so I let them have their say and then 
repeated the question in a different way until they gave a satisfactory response. All of the 
interviews but one were carried out via Skype. In one of the interviews, a video call was 
attempted, but this had to be abandoned due to poor connection. A telephone call was 
instead arranged. All of the interview participants were happy for the conversation to be 
recorded except one. The interviewee’s wish was stipulated in an email exchange, the 
consent form was amended by the interviewee to reflect their wishes, and a request for a 
counter signature from me agreeing to the changes were made before the interviewee 
agreed to a time and date for the interview. The interviewee was only willing to give me 10 
minutes of her time. This encounter prior to the interview spilled over into the actual 
interview and made the interview session a bit tense as the interviewee continued to 
attempt to dominate the interview session. I remained calm and asked the questions I had 
prepared and listened attentively, taking notes of the key points from her response. Most of 
my questions were however left unanswered as she passed on them. Overall, the interviews 
 
37 I am aware that people on one’s LinkedIn network and those you follow can be viewed by others, and having 
certain individuals on my network may have encouraged others to accept my invitation and speak to me. 
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went better than I had anticipated, with most of the interview participants showing key 
interest in alleviating the harms caused as a result of excessive alcohol consumption. 
 
4.3.4.2 Data source 6 - Additional Documents: Committee Reports, Transcripts of 
Parliamentary Debates, and Industry Actors’ Corporate Reports 
To augment the low interview response rate from the MSPs, I sought for additional data and 
decided to include and analyse the reports produced by the HSC and FC, which were 
presented to the parliament (see data source 1 and 3 above). I purposively searched for the 
transcripts of the parliamentary deliberations on MUP from the Scottish Parliament website. 
This search identified two meetings for Wednesday, March 14th and Thursday, May 24th, 
2012. The transcripts of these meetings were retrieved and added to the data pool. The 
transcript for March 14th, 2012, pertaining to MUP deliberations, was 53 pages long (pgs. 
7204 to 7257). This deliberation took place at the Stage 1 of the MUP Bill. The transcript for 
May 24th, 2012 covered deliberation at Stage 3 of the MUP debates. The section pertaining 
to MUP was 62 pages long (pgs. 9395 to 9457). I read both transcripts of the Parliamentary 
meetings several times in order to familiarise myself with their contents and to make sense 
of them in line with my research questions and the theoretical interests on legitimation (van 
Leeuwen and Wodak, 1999; Suchman, 1995) prior to analysis. 
The corporate reports of selected industry actors (producers and trade associations) for the 
years 2014, 2017 and 2019 were obtained from their websites. I selected 2014 in order to 
capture the industry actors’ perceptions following the passage of the Bill and the early stages 
of the MUP court challenge. I selected 2017 in order to capture industry actors’ perceptions 
at the later stages of the court challenge and pre-implementation. Finally, I selected 2019 in 
order to capture their perception post implementation of the MUP Bill. These reports were 
downloaded and read. A search for keywords such as ‘collaboration’, ‘partnership’ was 
carried out on the reports and noted. The keywords search was aimed at identifying if and 
how industry actors talk about how they work together with one another or with the 
Divided We Stand: Exploring the Alcohol Industry Framing of the Alcohol (Minimum Pricing) (Scotland) Act Consultation. 
 
 
 
PhD Thesis 2020  I. J. Amaeshi.  Page | 106 
 
 
government to achieve collective legitimacy, for societal goods, and to verify some of the 
schemes indicated by the industry actors in their written submissions. 
 
4.4 Summary 
In this chapter, I have presented the underlying research epistemology and ontology guiding 
the thesis, and the data collection methods and the rationale for selecting these methods. 
The data collection methods are documents and semi-structured interviews. Documents 
were chosen as the main data collection method because they are publicly available and give 
a good insight into how the alcohol industry actors interacted with policymakers and 
represented their organisations. The study of documents fits well with the study’s 
philosophical positions that the world, as we view it, is socially constructed, and needs to be 
unpicked for meaning making. This philosophical position guides and aligns with the 
analytical methods and the selected theoretical approaches. This chapter discussed the 
document identification process and the recruitment of interview participants. The 
documents selected for the thesis are industry actors’ submissions to the MUP consultation, 
the transcripts of their evidence sessions with the HSC and FC, the reports produced by the 
HSC and FC, which were submitted to the Scottish Parliament, the transcripts of two 
parliamentary debates, and the industry actors’ corporate reports obtained from their 
websites. Interviews with industry actors and members of the HSC and FC were used as 
additional data, as well as for triangulation to verify the results obtained from the 
documentary analysis. 
The following documents were the main data sources for the study: 
• The Scottish Parliament (7 March 2012) Health and Sports Committee, 2nd Report, 2012 
(Session 4). Stage 1 Report on the Alcohol (Minimum Pricing) (Scotland) Bill. 
• The Scottish Parliament (2012) Finance Committee, the Alcohol (Minimum Pricing) 
(Scotland) Bill. 
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• The Scottish Parliament (2012). Official Report. Health and Sports Committee Session 4 
Tuesday 17 January 2012, pages 820 – 862. 
• The Scottish Parliament (2011) Official Report. Finance Committee. Session 4. 
Wednesday 21 December 2011, pages 421 – 442. 
• Parliamentary meeting on Wednesday 14th March 2012, pages 7204 – 7257. 
• Parliamentary meeting on Thursday 24th May 2012, pages 9395 – 9457. 
Interested readers are encouraged to access the data sources via the links or the individual 
submissions directly via the links provided in the separate bibliography. Next I present, the 
analytical methods used in analysing the data generated for this thesis.  
Divided We Stand: Exploring the Alcohol Industry Framing of the Alcohol (Minimum Pricing) (Scotland) Act Consultation. 
 
 
 
PhD Thesis 2020  I. J. Amaeshi.  Page | 108 
 
 
CHAPTER 5. METHODOLOGY 2 - DATA ANALYSIS 
5.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I present the analytical methods and the steps taken to unpack the alcohol 
industry actors frames, cleavages, vested interests, and strategies used to protect the 
industry’s legitimacy by both industry actors and the Scottish Government/policymakers.  
The selected analytical method is thematic analysis. Thematic analysis is a method for 
identifying, analysing, and reporting patterns (themes) within a data. It also provides a rich, 
detailed, and complex account of the data (Braun and Clarke, 2006). There are two main 
approaches to thematic analysis: (1) data-driven or inductive thematic analysis, and (2) 
theoretical or deductive thematic analysis. This thesis adopts a theoretical approach using 
frame theory and legitimacy theory. Theoretical thematic analysis is analyst driven in line 
with the researcher’s theoretical interest on the subject matter. The theoretically approach 
derives themes which enables a researcher to replicate, extend, or refute prior discoveries 
(Boyatzis, 1989) and aligns with the interpretivist and constructionist paradigm, and the 
nature of research questions, which this thesis seeks to address. This chapter first presents 
the analysis of the data generated in the wave 1 data collection using Entman 1993 frame 
theory. It presents sample extracts to show how the data was coded using open and axial 
coding styles. Next, it presents the analysis of data collected during the first and second wave 
of data collection using Vaara et al (2006) discursive legitimation strategies and Suchman 
(1995) legitimacy theory. 
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5.2 Thematic Analysis Using Entman 1993 Frame Theory 
The first step in the analysis was to code the documents. All the data collected in wave 1 
were downloaded, printed38, read several times to understand the story from the industry 
actors perspective. The documents were clustered, first, based on the sector in which the 
organisation belong, and next, based on their position on the policy and the analysis was 
carried out first based on these clusters. All the documents were then uploaded onto QRS 
NVivo39 for coding and further analysis. Two styles of coding were applied – open and axial 
style coding. 
Open Coding - In coding the data, all aspects of the consultation submissions were coded 
line-by-line to enable key concepts in the data to be identified. According to Thomas and 
Harden (2008), free line-by-line coding enables concepts to be translated from one case to 
another. For the transcript of the oral evidence session, only responses by the industry 
actors were coded. Open coding assigned codes to texts without using the predefined coding 
instrument. It pays attention to the story and how the story is told rather than what the text 
is about. 
An example of an open coding is presented below using extracts from Molson Coors and 
Edrington Group. 
Molson Coors is the largest brewer in the UK with 2,300 UK employees and 
350 years of brewing experience. We produce a diverse, highly regarded 
portfolio of beer brands, including the UK’s best selling [SIC] lager, Carling, 
which is brewed with 100% British barley (Molson Coors MIN41, pg. 1). 
The Edrington Group owns some of the leading Scotch whisky and golden 
rum brands in the world, including [...] Edrington is headquartered in 
Scotland and is an international business employing over 2,300 worldwide, 
with over 60 per cent employed overseas (Edrington Group, pg. 1). 
 
38 Manual coding - Notes were made on the printed documents as key concepts guided by the research 
question and the frame theory principle began to emerge. 
39 NVivo software was selected to make the coding of the data manageable and for the subsequent 
organisation of the codes into descriptive and analytical themes. 
Divided We Stand: Exploring the Alcohol Industry Framing of the Alcohol (Minimum Pricing) (Scotland) Act Consultation. 
 
 
 
PhD Thesis 2020  I. J. Amaeshi.  Page | 110 
 
 
The extract above forms part of the opening paragraph of Molson Coors and the Edrington 
Group’s submission. It not only states obvious facts about the company but also 
demonstrates power and economic viability, as well as portraying the organisation as 
legitimate. There are two stories here: one on power (reflected in the size and longevity of 
the company), and another on economic contribution (in terms of employment and 
patronising British farmers). The outcomes of these multiple accounts are then interrogated 
using Entman’s framework, as a second order coding. 
Axial coding - This is the second coding style adopted.  The aim here is to locate the frames 
(Dombos et al., 2012) and the reasoning devices attached to the frames, and pair them to 
the framing element (Entman, 1993). Axial coding arranges the codes generated from the 
open coding around axes of meaning by identifying the four frame elements (i.e. problem 
definition, causal interpretation, moral justification and treatment recommendation) in the 
coded texts based on Entman (1993)’s frame theory as shown below. 
Problem Definition: The Edrington Group defines Alcohol MUP as the wrong approach to 
resolving the Scottish drinking problems. 
it appears therefore premature to introduce yet further measures and 
restrictions (Edrington Group MIN32, pg.1). 
This problem definition comes long after The Edrington Group had put forward a strong 
moral evaluation which showcases the Group’s participation in promoting responsible 
drinking, and providing statistics showing changes in the drinking patterns and a decrease in 
mortality rate from alcohol consumption as seen in the extract below: 
Edrington successfully operates its Code of Practice on responsible 
marketing and is a signatory to the Portman Group Code of Practice. The 
Group is also a member of Drinkaware and participates in “Why let good 
times go bad?," [SIC] the all-industry responsible consumption campaign. 
(Edrington Group, pg.1). 
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The causal interpretation suggests that “the measures already put in place are having a 
positive impact” (Edrington Group, pg. 1) and the treatment recommendation subsequently 
is to do nothing. 
For axial coding, it is important to identify the dimension/logic of reasoning/stories that the 
authors intend to communicate. Using the same extracts above from Molson Coors and 
Edrington Group, the reasoning devices present are stereotypes40 and syntaxes. The industry 
actors use stereotypical words such as “largest”, “world”, and “highly regarded portfolio” 
and syntax are reflected in how the sentences are formed i.e. how they choose to position 
statistics and percentages. These reasoning devices signal the presence of frames and gives 
meaning to a text (Van Gorp, 2005; Gamson and Modigliani, 1989). 
Following the two coding styles, the thematic frames – i.e. economy, legitimising, 
unintended consequences, and evidence-based frames – were  generated based on the 
researcher’s meaning making of the outcomes of the frame elements and reasoning devices. 
This step helps to increase the level of abstraction, as the framing and reasoning devices are 
separated from the specific story the text aims to convey. Next, the four thematic frames 
identified were re-categorised as economic and social frames, in order to reflect the 
perceived vested interests of the industry actors along cleavages. This is reflected as the 4th 
order coding in diagram below. Industry actors on both sides of the debate draw from the 
same frames (economy and social frames), but use them in different ways. Based on these 
different usages of frames, the industry actors were organised according to their use of 
frames which reveals the cleavages within and amongst the different sectors of the industry. 
The cleavages are further broken down into the interests and strategies for a clearer 
appreciation of the fault lines in the industry (see 5th order in figure 2 below). Based on their 
characteristics (i.e. whether they are making a business case or societal case or favouring 
 
40 Stereotypes as used in this thesis help project already stored mental image or ideas that guides the receiver 
to efficiently process the information (Entman, 1993). 
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self-regulation or government legislation) these were further broken down to reflect the 
industry’s dominant inclinations or orientations. 
 
 
Figure 2: Sample coding tree in line with Entman (1993) Frame theory 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author 
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Nevertheless, Entman (1993)’s framework only addresses a part of the research question on 
framing as a source of cleavages. It does not address the issue of legitimation, which is an 
essential part of the research question and also a key outcome of the researcher’s 
interpretation of the resultant frames. In order to delve further into this, the study engages 
in further thematic analysis based on some approaches to legitimacy theory already 
discussed in the literature review chapter and briefly highlighted below in figure 3.  For more 
insight into the coding scheme, see Appendix 7. 
 
5.3 Thematic Analysis Using Legitimacy Theory 
This analysis is based on all the data collected in Waves 1 and 2 (including interview 
transcripts). The thematic analysis here was informed and guided by Vaara et al., (2006) and 
Deephouse et al. (2017). The texts were coded freely following the open and axial coding 
principles explained in the previous section. The aim of the open coding was to find out if 
and how policymakers and industry actors used legitimation strategies in their submissions 
and comments as expressed in the emergent cleavages (see 5th order coding in the figure 2 
above).   A combination of Vaara et al. (2006) and Deephouse et al. (2017), as coding guides, 
yielded the outcomes as illustrated in the figure 3 below. Figure 3 is a continuation of figure 
2 and could be seen as the 6th order coding. A further analysis of the 6th order coding gave 
rise to the strategies used by both policymakers and industry actors to maintain the alcohol 
industry legitimacy in Scotland despite the identified cleavages.
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Figure 3: Continuation coding tree in line with Vaara et al. (2006) and Deephouse et al. (2017) Legitimacy theory 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author 
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Below, I demonstrate the open and axial coding using extracts from the transcript of the 
evidence session to the HSC by Diageo, NACM, and SWA. 
… the misuse of alcohol harms health. There is no question about that. The 
evidence is clear and we support actions to reduce the misuse of alcohol 
(Diageo, pg. 819). 
We have heard that the misuse of alcohol is an issue, but alcohol is misused 
in degrees (NACM, pg. 820). 
we believe very strongly that misuse does not have a place in that society. 
We want to address the misuse, not the use, of alcohol (SWA, pg. 821). 
The extracts above show the alcohol industry actors attempting to redefine the problem of 
alcohol consumption to focus on misuse rather than the use41 of and harm caused by alcohol. 
This is a first order story focusing on “alcohol use” and it is an example of a normalising 
account. Diageo, SWA, and NACM, in the extracts above, appear to be responding to the 
societal needs by acknowledging the presence of alcohol misuse, but at the same time 
normalising alcohol use by stating for example that alcohol is misused in degrees (NACM, pg. 
820) and that their interest is to address alcohol misuse and not its use in the general sense. 
The extracts were coded freely as ‘alcohol use versus misuse’. Guided by the research 
question and the theoretical framework, the free codes were regrouped to derive the 
descriptive codes: ‘respond to needs’ and ‘reputation building’. These descriptive codes were 
matched with the overall story and topic to derive the analytical code. The analytical code 
generated in this case is ‘conforming to demand’ and this is in line with the pragmatic 
strategy organisations adopt for maintaining legitimacy (Suchman, 1995). The extract by 
Diageo above states that they support the government’s action to reduce misuse –  this can 
be perceived as a relational management strategy, and it also normalises the government’s 
action to preserve the health of its citizens. 
 
41 This is in line with Coomber et al. (2013) and the debunked use of the term’s use/misuse/abuse typology in 
the academic circle. 
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Some other first order stories include focus on: “minority abusers of alcohol”; “complexity 
of alcohol problems”; and “the tension between reduction of harm and reduction of 
consumption”. These micro-stories were further interrogated to determine their use for: 
normalisation, authorisation, rationalisation, moralisation, and narrativisation in line with 
Vaara et al. (2006). These were subsequently rearranged depending on whether they were 
perceived to be contributing to gaining, maintaining, or repairing any of the three forms of 
legitimacy – i.e. moral, pragmatic, or cognitive – identified by Deephouse et al. (2017) and 
Suchman (1995) - sections 3.3.1 above. 
The thematic analysis driven by the research questions and the theories guiding this thesis 
produced four main interpretive themes: (a) normalisation for undermining (b) co-optation 
for neutralisation (c) authorisation (rebuttal for support) and (d) decoupling for protection 
as shown in figure 4 and figure 5 below. These themes describe how policy actors’ language 
reflects different legitimation strategies adopted. Adopting the latent approach to 
theoretical thematic analysis produced themes with relevant interpretations which help in 
understanding the alcohol industry texts and the motives behind industry actors’ choice of 
language during policy processes. The themes identified are highlighted in the figure 4 below 
and discussed in detail in chapter 6. Figure 4 should be interpreted alongside figure 3 above. 
A detailed coding guide/interpretation of Figure 4 with sample quotes can be found in 
Appendix 8. The highlighted texts in Appendix 8 is for emphasis and helps direct the reader 
to the interpretations reached in the 3rd and 4th columns of the table. 
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Figure 4: Sample coding tree in line with Vaara et al. (2006) and Deephouse et al. (2017) 
Legitimacy theory 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author 
 
5.4 Summary 
In this chapter, I have described the steps taken in the analysis of the data collected for this 
study using thematic analysis. The chapter presents a step-by-step guide of how thematic 
analysis was applied using frame theory and legitimacy theory, respectively. This thesis 
moves on to present a detailed result emerging from the analysis conducted. Throughout 
the finding’s chapters (6, 7 and 8), I provide illustrative examples originating from the data 
sources (see  section 4.3.2) and from the interview transcripts in the form of extracts in order 
to support the findings and arguments. 
 
 
1st order Open coding 
(stories) 
Multiple stories 
• Alcohol use, not abuse 
• Complexities of alcohol problem 
• Population versus targeted intervention 
4th order 
Interpretive 
Emerging Legitimation strategies 
• Normalisation for undermining 
• Co-optation for neutralisation 
• Authorisation 
• Decoupling for protection 
Moral 
Legitimacy forms 
Pragmatic 
Cognitive  
Story outcomes 
Legitimacy types 
• Gaining 
• Maintaining 
• Repairing 
3rd order 
Normalisation 
Authorisation  
Rationalisation  
 
2nd order 
Axial coding (use of 
the stories 
Narrativisation 
Legitimation 
strategies 
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CHAPTER 6. FRAMES, CLEAVAGES, AND THE ALCOHOL INDUSTRY 
6.1 Introduction 
This is the first of the three findings chapters. The findings presented here are guided by the 
research questions – How did the alcohol industry actors respond to the Scottish MUP policy 
consultation and what frames did they used to either oppose or support the policy? And, 
How do these frames inform our understanding of alcohol industry cleavages? This chapter 
focuses on cleavages and how frames used by industry actors highlights the presences of 
cleavages. Cleavages have often been looked at and understood from a structural or 
functional perspective –for example, based on the functions of specific actors within an 
industry as producers, retailers, or trade associations - (see Katikireddi et al., 2014a; Holden 
et al., 2012). Whilst recognising this conventional way of articulating cleavages, the findings 
from this research reveal a discursive perspective to the understanding of industry cleavages. 
This perspective goes beyond the structural/functional divides to highlight the presence of 
what could be described as “discursive cleavages” within the alcohol industry in Scotland. 
The findings of this research are generally in line with the broad view that language has the 
potential of offering some insights to understanding the interactions between industry 
actors and regulators (Sturdy et al., 2012; Hawkins and Holden, 2013; Hawkins et al., 2012; 
Garcia-Retamero and Galesic, 2010; Levin et al., 1998; Smith and Katikireddi, 2013). 
This chapter starts by presenting the positions of the alcohol industry actors on the bill using 
their consultation submission and comparing it to their position (information gathered at 
interview stage) after the policy was passed. Their position on the policy is the first indication 
of cleavages. Next, the chapter presents the different types of cleavages observed based on 
the structure or function of the industry actors, and also on the interests they represent. 
Next, the chapter presents the frames observed in the industry actors consultation response 
and during the interviews. The focus here is on how the frames reflects industry cleavages. 
It also shows the commonalities in the industry actors interests and blurs the historical 
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traditional functional/structural divides between industry sectors and enables cleavages to 
be appreciated through a different lens. 
 
6.2 Early Signs of Industry Division from Responses to the MUP Policy Consultation 
Twenty-one alcohol industry actors (seven alcohol producers, two on-trade retailers, four 
off-trade retailers, and eight trade associations) participated in the Scottish MUP policy 
consultation. Fifteen of them opposed the introduction of the Bill, and six supported the Bill, 
as of 2013. The position of the industry actors on opposing sides signalled a division within 
and between the different industry sectors. The positions of the specific industry actors 
during the consultation and post-2013 during the legal challenge are summarised in Table 5 
below. 
 
Table 5: Industry Actors Position on the MUP Bill 
Industry Actor Sector/ Main 
Product Portfolio 
Main Interest Position from 
consultation 
response 
Position after 
MUP passage 
Diageo Producer (Wine, 
Spirits, Beer) 
• Protecting Scottish based 
investments.  
• Protecting the overseas 
market of scotch whisky 
Oppose Oppose 
Edrington 
Group 
Producer (scotch 
whisky) 
• Protecting the overseas 
market of scotch whisky 
Oppose Oppose 
Chivas Brothers Producer (scotch 
whisky, Wine) 
• Protecting the overseas 
market of scotch whisky 
Oppose  
SABMiller Producer (Beer) • Protecting the global market 
and beer brands. 
Oppose Unsure 
Whyte and 
Mackay 
Producer (scotch 
whisky) 
• Protecting the overseas 
market of scotch whisky 
Oppose Oppose 
Tennent 
Caledonian 
Producer (Beer, 
Cider) 
• Protecting premium beer 
brands. 
Support Support 
Molson Coors Producer (beer) • Protecting premium beer 
brands. 
Support Support 
Co-operative 
Group 
Off-trade retailer • Protecting business interests Oppose  
Morrisons 
Supermarket 
Off-trade retailer • Protecting business interests. 
• Level-playing field with other 
supermarkets 
Inconclusive   
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Industry Actor Sector/ Main 
Product Portfolio 
Main Interest Position from 
consultation 
response 
Position after 
MUP passage 
Asda (oral 
evidence only) 
Off-trade retailer • Protecting business interests Oppose  
Tesco (oral 
evidence only) 
Off-trade retailer • Protecting business interests Oppose  
Mr Dave 
Bremner 
On-trade retailer • Protecting business interests. 
• Addressing loss-leader 
practices of off-trade retailers 
Support  
Mr Jonathan 
Stewart 
On-trade retailer • Protecting business interests. 
• Addressing loss-leader 
practices of off-trade 
retailers. 
• Reducing alcohol misuse 
Support  
SBPA/BBPA Trade body  
(On-trade and beer 
producers) 
• Protecting business interests. 
• Reducing tax on beer 
• Promoting pubs as a safe 
drinking space 
Oppose -
members are 
split 
 
NACM Trade body 
(Producers) 
• Protecting the business 
interests of members. 
Oppose  
SGF Trade body (Off-
trade retailers) 
• Protecting the business 
interests of members. 
• Level-playing field between 
members and the 
Supermarkets 
Oppose Support  
SRC Trade body (Off-
trade retailers) 
• Protecting the business 
interests of members. 
Oppose Support  
SWA Trade body (Scotch 
whisky producers) 
• Protecting the interests of the 
Scotch whisky market 
overseas. 
Oppose Oppose 
WSTA Trade body (wine 
and spirit retailers) 
• Protecting the business 
interests of members. 
Oppose  
CAMRA Consumer group • Protecting the interests of 
pubs and consumers. 
• Promoting pubs as a safe 
drinking space 
Support Oppose 
SLTA Trade body (On-
trade) 
• Protecting the on-trade. 
• Level-playing field between 
members and off-trade 
retailers 
• Reduce the easy availability of 
cheap alcohol 
Support  
Source: Author. 
The table above presents all the industry actors who participated in the Scottish MUP policy 
negotiation. It details their industry sector, their main product offering and interests, and 
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the industry actors’ position on the policy. Industry actors were classed as supporters or 
opposers based on their consultation response, some industry actors’ response neither 
indicated that they supported or opposed the policy and as such are classed as inconclusive. 
The last column of the table details the industry actors’ position after the passage of the 
MUP as gathered during the interviews and from their websites. Sections were left blank 
where no update was found or collected for the industry actor. Information obtained during 
the interviews confirms that following the passage of the Bill, and prior to the 
implementation of the Bill, three industry actors switched sides. Two trade associations (SGF 
and SRC), who originally opposed the Bill, switched to support it, and a consumer association 
(CAMRA), who originally supported the Bill, withdrew their support at the directive of its 
members. The study finds that spirit producers and MNC (i.e. Diageo, Edrington Group, 
Chivas Brothers, Whyte and Mackay, and SABMiller) tend to oppose MUP. Their opposition 
is because of their business interests in other territories outside Scotland and the UK which 
they clearly stated in their consultation response. Their arguments include that MUP will 
affect their ability to compete in the international market and that governments of other 
jurisdictions may introduce policies to keep their products out of their local market. In 
addition, their multi-national status can be glimpsed from the first few paragraphs of their 
submission as indicated in the sample extracts below. 
SABMiller is the UK’s largest listed drinks company with brewing interests 
in 75 countries across six continents (SABMiller, pg. 1). 
Whyte and Mackay Ltd is one of the world’s leading suppliers of own label 
and branded Scotch whisky (Whyte and Mackay MIN92, pg. 1). 
The choice of words – UK’s largest, brewing interests, world’s leading – as indicated in the 
extracts above, shows the companies’ global reach. The study also finds that producers of 
low-strength alcohol products (i.e. brewers - Tennent Caledonian and Molson Coors) with 
limited or no export capabilities supported the MUP policy. Their support for MUP could be 
tied to the company’s commitment to local (Scottish and/or UK) agenda. The first few 
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paragraphs of the submission from Tennent Caledonian and Molson Coors, as shown in the 
extracts below, hint that the company is not global. 
Molson Coors is the largest brewer in the UK with 2,300 UK employees and 
350 years of brewing experience. We produce a diverse, highly regarded 
portfolio of beer brands, […] which is brewed with 100% British barley 
(Molson Coors MIN41, pg. 1). 
As Scotland’s pre-eminent brewer, Tennent Caledonian is committed to 
Scotland and we take our responsibilities as a brewer seriously. (Tennent 
Caledonian MIN85, pg. 1). 
As already stated in section 2.4, the majority of Scotland’s brewers are micro-brewers with 
only 2% of brewers classed as medium or large (O’Connor, 2018). Micro-brewers are not 
export-oriented, and this aligns with Molson Coors’ statement that “Around 90% of the beer 
sold in the UK is produced in the UK” (Molson Coors MIN41, pg. 3). Molson Coors, however, 
is a global company with breweries in India, Canada, the United States, and Ireland following 
the company’s local acquisition of smaller breweries. Molson Coors specialises in regional 
production to meet local needs (Molson Coors, 2020) and spearheaded the campaign to save 
the Great British Pubs injecting cash into the on-trade sector (Robinson, 2017). Tennent 
Caledonian is one of Scotland’s largest brewers and the company is heavily invested in the 
Scottish on-trade retail sector (Gurjit, 2012). As of 1972, Tennent Caledonian owned at least 
500 pubs in Scotland (Gorevan, 2002), and has a close tie with Scotland’s major Pub chains 
which includes Punch Taverns (BBC News, 2011) and Belhaven Pubs (The Herald, 2002). In 
addition, Tennent Caledonian provides loans to licensees who stock its product to help with 
cashflow, re-financing and growth investment (Gurjit, 2012). It is not surprising that Tennent 
would support the MUP policy given its vested interest in the on-trade sector. The vested 
interests of the alcohol producers create a divide within the producer sector. 
Likewise, within the retail sector, on-trade retailers supported the Bill, whereas off-trade 
retailers opposed the policy. The on-trade sector support for MUP is based on the need to 
create a level-playing field with the off-trade retailers and the need to promote drinking in 
regulated environment (i.e. Pubs, Bars, and restaurants). This view is also shared by 
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Katikireddi et al. (2014a) and Holden et al. (2012). These differences and cleavages are based 
on the structure and function of the industry actors and are explained further below. 
 
6.3 Alcohol Industry Actors’ Position on the MUP: A Structural or Functional Analysis 
This section highlights the different forms of cleavages that emerged during the consultation 
process. As highlighted in the introduction chapter (see section Error! Reference source not 
found., page Error! Bookmark not defined.), the alcohol industry is divided into three 
categories of producers (based on their products – i.e. beer, wine, and spirits) and two 
categories of retailers (on- and off-trade). In the post-industrialised UK, strong boundaries 
emerged between these categories (Christiansen and Kroezen, 2016), and these are 
reflected through the functional or structural cleavages observed in this thesis and in line 
with Katikireddi et al. (2014a) and Holden et al. (2012). By structure, I mean sectoral 
differences, products, and affiliations. This thesis identified cleavages within the alcohol 
industry – intra-sectoral cleavages – and between the alcohol sectors (i.e. producers versus 
retailers) – inter-sectoral cleavages. These cleavages are usually strategic and interest-driven 
(see also Katikireddi et al., 2014a). This section now explores each of these structural or 
functional cleavages in the Scottish alcohol industry. 
6.3.1 Alcohol Producers’ Cleavages  
Findings show that the alcohol producers who participated in the MUP debate were split 
based on their products (i.e. high-strength and low-strength) and/or their business capacity 
as exporters or non-exporters. Within the low-strength group, a further divide emerges, as 
further explored below. 
6.3.1.1 Cleavage 1 - Producers of High-Strength Alcohol Products 
The producers of high-strength alcohol products rallied around on protecting their 
international market interest, which they thought would be negatively impacted by the 
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success of the bill. This group of producers includes Diageo, Edrington Group, Chivas 
Brothers, and Whyte and Mackay. Diageo has a diversified portfolio of drinks including beer, 
scotch whisky, spirits, and wines. They pride themselves as one of “Scotland’s top 
manufacturing exporters” with a majority of their drinks having “sold globally in more than 
180 markets”. Diageo has huge investments to protect in Scotland and the introduction of a 
MUP is said to jeopardise the competitiveness of the alcohol industry based in Scotland (see 
Diageo, pg. 2, written submission to the HSC). Diageo, therefore, seeks to protect its Scottish 
investment and its business interests abroad. This interest to protect business interests 
abroad is shared by all the other scotch whisky producers. Edrington Group stated that MUP 
will damage the scotch whisky industry both at home and abroad with negative 
consequences for the wider economy. They refer to MUP as a Scottish-initiated trade barrier 
and fear that the exports of their premium brands would be adversely affected overseas and 
that attempts to open new markets would be stalled (Edrington Group MIN32 paragraphs 8 
and 22). Similarly, Chivas Brothers regards MUP as a form of market manipulation by the 
government which not only hampers their export market but also damages the economy 
(Chivas Brothers MIN19, pg. 2). 
Aside from the damage to the overseas export, these producers worry about the impact of 
MUP on their home market, especially the ‘own-label products' favoured by lower-income 
consumers. They argue that own-label products would see an immediate price rise and they 
fear a significant loss of business as a result of retailers reducing the range of products 
available to Scottish consumers, alongside the negative effect of potential job losses and 
business closures (Edrington Group MIN32 paragraph 22; Diageo, pg. 4). The disagreement 
these producers have with the government and the introduction of MUP stems from their 
view that MUP would be ineffective. For example, the Edrington Group opines that tackling 
alcohol misuse would take concerted efforts over many years (Edrington Group MIN32, 
paragraph 13), and they worry that MUP would unnecessarily penalise the majority of 
consumers who drink alcohol responsibly while having little or no impact on the minority 
who have alcohol dependency issues (Whyte and Mackay MIN92, pg. 1). The position of 
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these industry actors was validated during the interview, with one of the pro-MUP industry 
actor stating: 
… most of them [high-strength producers/ opposition actors] make their 
profits outside of Scotland and in other markets. Their stance was a mixture 
of they didn’t want the Scottish Government bringing in a legislation that 
could be replicated elsewhere because it would reduce the demand for 
alcohol, they didn’t like the legislation, they didn’t like the government 
interfering with pricing and they think it should be a free market and 
government shouldn’t interfere and they didn’t like the concept as there 
was a health issue associated with alcohol so that was their rationale 
(Participant 6 – beer producer). 
To sum, their position was largely informed by their products and function in the industry. 
They argue that MUP is not evidence-based and would affect the economy negatively (see 
Chivas Brothers MIN19, pg. 4). Their collective interest is to protect their business by 
upholding the value of the free market and reducing government regulations. 
6.3.1.2 Cleavage 2 - Producers of Low-Strength Alcohol Products. 
There are three industry actors in this group: Tennent Caledonian, Molson Coors, and 
SABMiller. These industry actors were also interested in protecting their products and 
market. In addition, they emphasised their interest in society, unlike the high-strength 
producers. And as one of the interviewees put it: 
If you are in a community and you want to look after the long-term interest 
of your business, your shareholders and employees and the country has a 
problem with alcohol because they are sold cheaply and people are dying 
because of and their health and life expectancy are shortened because 
there might be drinking too much and the government wants to bring in a 
policy that is supported by the population to try and tackle that issue, then 
it’s a very difficult place to be in to say we were going to oppose it, so we 
won't (Participant 6 – beer producer). 
Following the same line of reasoning on the societal welfare, Molson Coors acknowledges 
that alcohol abuse is a “complex issue which ultimately requires fundamental cultural 
change” (MIN41, pg. 1). Molson Coors believes that society needs to “build respect for 
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alcohol in a variety of ways, including education, policy measures, and ensuring alcohol is 
reasonably priced” (MIN41, pg. 1). They also argued that “alcohol should be enjoyed 
responsibly and brought based on brand preference taste and not solely on price” (MIN41, 
pg. 1). SABMiller primarily produces beer but adopted a different point of view on MUP from 
Tennent Caledonian and Molson Coors. Some of its interests align with those of the high-
strength alcohol producers on business protection and the free market. It also shares the 
interests of the other low-strength producers on protecting the society, especially the 
responsible consumers. This interest focuses on distinguishing between categories of 
drinkers and avoiding unnecessary penalisation of adults who consume alcohol responsibly. 
However, SABMiller departs from the other low-strength alcohol producers and disagrees 
with the government, stating that the “approach the Bill outlines” is not “the most effective 
or proportionate means to address alcohol misuse in Scotland” (SABMiller, paragraph 4) and 
that the Scottish Government’s position: 
treats all alcohol the same, whereas there are certain types of drinks which 
have been driving much of the alcohol misuse. This is highlighted in the 
differences of consumption levels between Scotland and England and 
Wales (SABMiller, paragraphs 8). 
The main difference in consumption patterns between Scotland and the rest of Great Britain, 
they stated, is the higher consumption of spirits in Scotland (SABMiller, paragraphs 9). 
SABMiller’s position highlights the presence of cleavages within the low-strength alcohol 
category, and the extract above on alcohol types highlights further cleavages between the 
low-strength and high-strength alcohol producer category who oppose the Bill. 
6.3.2 Alcohol Retailers’ Cleavages  
The alcohol retail industry comprises of the on-trade and off-trade retail sector. This section 
presents the interests and disagreements of these industry actors along two main functional 
cleavages: i.e. on-trade and off-trade. 
Divided We Stand: Exploring the Alcohol Industry Framing of the Alcohol (Minimum Pricing) (Scotland) Act Consultation. 
 
PhD Thesis 2020  I. J. Amaeshi.  Page | 127  
 
 
6.3.2.1 Cleavage 3 - On-trade Retailers 
Two on-trade independent licensees participated in the debate (Mr Bremner and Mr 
Stewart). Both licensees were interested in protecting their business interest by clamping 
down on the loss-leader practices of the off-trade retailers, as highlighted by Mr Bremner. 
Mr Bremner stated that “something needs to be done to tackle the availability of low-priced 
alcohol”, and that the sales of alcohol below cost, a practice promoted within the off-trade 
retail sector, “should be challenged and eliminated” (Bremner MIN10, pg. 1). 
Similarly, Mr Stewart expressed his dissatisfaction with the attitudes of the off-trade retailers 
and their trade representatives, the SRC and SGF, who “appear to be comfortable” and allow 
their members to use “alcoholic drinks as a loss-leader in order to attract customers to buy 
their entire weekly food shopping” (Stewart MIN83, pg. 1). Mr Stewart, in protecting his 
business interests and those of other licensees, was also unhappy with the cultural changes 
that encourage “solitary drinking and ’pre-loading’” (Stewart MIN83, pg. 1), which is said to 
cause problems in the night-time economy for on-trade retailers. 
Both licensees appeal to the government and regulators for tighter control of alcohol use. 
Mr Bremner advocates for stricter government regulation of the off-trade which includes “a 
retracing of licensing, to a point where multinationals and day-to-day supermarkets weren’t 
allowed to sell alcohol in any form. Or, if this is impractical, remove the alcohol from their 
main stores altogether to separate units.” (Bremner MIN10, pg. 2). Removing alcohol from 
off-trade retail outlets to separate units has been deliberated in Ireland’s Public Health 
(Alcohol) Bill (see Calnan et al., 2018), and Mr Bremner acknowledges that this solution, 
although practical, may be open to legal challenge (MIN10, pg. 2). Mr Stewart also advocates 
for a clampdown on the off-trade retailers’ ability “to reclaim VAT on massive bulk orders of 
alcoholic liquor purchased as a promotional expense”, and for more supervision for alcohol 
advertising (MIN83, pg. 2). 
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6.3.2.2 Cleavage 4 - Off-trade Retailers 
The findings of this thesis suggest the presence of cleavages within the off-trade retail sector 
based on their interests, which are to prevent unnecessary costs associated with the 
introduction of MUP and uphold the principles of the free market 
(1) Protect their business interests and prevent unnecessary costs due to the introduction 
of MUP. 
The industry actors under this category include the Co-operative, Asda, Tesco, Morrisons, 
and off-licenses. The Co-operative stated that their organisation, alongside other retailers in 
Scotland, have spent considerable time and resource over the course of the past year 
preparing for, and subsequently implementing, the requirements of the Alcohol etc. 
(Scotland) Act 2010, and that the implementation of the Act only took place in October 2010, 
thus suggesting that the MUP Bill is premature and wasteful at this time (Co-operative 
MIN26, paragraph 1.4). A representative of Asda during the evidence session added that 
their focus as a business is on how to change their computer system, processes, and training 
to implement what will be a significant change to their business model (Asda - David 
Patterson HSC evidence session, pg. 826). 
(2) Uphold the principles of the free market, which encourage competition and prevent 
discrimination from a product offering perspective and the purchasing power of customers. 
In protecting its business interests, Morrisons stated that it is the responsibility of retailers 
to “… control the price at which goods are sold”, as this “guarantees effective price 
competition and the best possible deal for the consumer across the whole store” (MIN94, 
paragraph 2.1. see also, Co-operative MIN26 paragraphs 4.5 and 4.7). The Co-operative 
Group MIN26 stated that the MUP “proposal would restrict consumer choice” (paragraph 
4.1), “lead to wastage in stores” as it would affect their ability to use their “reduce to clear 
policies that apply to all grocery products” (paragraph 4.10; see also Asda - David Paterson, 
HSC evidence session pgs. 825 - 826), and have “disproportionate impact on the lowest 
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income groups” (Co-operative MIN26, paragraph 4.3). Within the off-trade retail sector, 
cleavages were observed between the big supermarkets and between the big supermarkets 
and off-licenses/convenience stores. These cleavages are explained next. 
6.3.2.2.1 Cleavages between the big supermarkets 
Between the big supermarkets, further cleavages were observed and these stem from the 
business interests of Morrisons Supermarket against other big supermarkets who offer 
loyalty points and the strategy for rectifying this. Morrisons stated that … 
The Bill as it stands fails to take any account of the award of cash 
equivalents by retailers [such as loyalty points given to customers based on 
the amount of money they spend] to compensate for statutory price 
increases (Morrisons MIN94, paragraphs 4.1). 
Morrisons contested that this is a serious omission, as not all retailers offer such schemes 
and that the government proceeding without any restriction on this practice could lead to a 
significant distortion of the market in favour of those retailers with loyalty programmes. 
Morrisons is interested in equality and a level playing ground with other supermarkets which 
offer loyalty points to customers. They worry that this will give the other supermarkets who 
operate this scheme an unfair advantage as customers may switch to the other 
supermarkets, not only to purchase alcohol there but also their weekly grocery. 
6.3.2.2.2 Off-licenses and cleavages 
The individual voices of the off-license traders were not represented in the written 
submissions. The representation of the off-license retailers was through their trade 
association, the Scottish Grocers Federation (SGF). The interest of the SGF, on behalf of its 
members, is to protect their business interest by seeking a level-playing field between off-
licenses and the big supermarkets. The SGF stated … 
… whilst we accept that MUP may introduce more of a ‘level playing field’ 
on price between convenience stores and larger supermarkets, we do note 
the findings of research which shows that larger multiples will make more 
of a financial gain under MUP due to their greater propensity to sell more 
alcohol than many of our members (SGF MIN71, paragraph 17). 
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Tesco’s representative contradicted the SGF’s assertion during the evidence session, stating 
that their customer might respond by shifting “from large supermarkets to smaller retailers” 
(Emma Reynolds – Tesco, HSC evidence session, pg. 832). Both the SGF and Tesco are 
interested in protecting their business interests, but their strategies differ in the sense that 
the SGF acknowledges that MUP may benefit its members, and Tesco notes that the Bill may 
disadvantage them. More on the interests of SGF as a trade association is presented in the 
section below. 
6.3.3 Cleavages Amongst the Trade Associations  
Trade associations often represent the collective views of their members (Rajwani et al., 
2015). As such, they are prone to factions and cleavages, not only between the trade 
associations representing different sectors of the industry but also within the trade 
associations themselves because of the structural composition and diverse interests of their 
members. This section examines the cleavages arising between the trade association based 
on the assumed collective interests of the group. The following trade associations 
participated in the MUP debates: SLTA, WSTA, BBPA, SBPA, SWA, NACM, CAMRA, SGF, and 
SRC. The main interests of the trade associations were to protect both business and societal 
interests. However, some trade associations exhibit a mixture of both interests, arguably 
because of their diverse membership structure. 
6.3.3.1 Business Interest Cleavage 
SWA, WSTA SRC, SGF, and NACM exhibited pro-business interests. The structural 
composition of these trade associations is homogenous in that they represent a sector of the 
industry, i.e. producers (of specific products, i.e. wine, whisky, or cider) or retailers. The SWA 
is the main trade body of scotch whisky producers, and protects the interests of over 117 
distilleries across Scotland (SWA, 2016). Its key role is to advance the global interests and 
profile of the scotch whisky brand, its members, and the industry. The WSTA represents over 
340 UK companies who produce, import, export, bottle, and retail wine and spirits. The 
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NACM represents the interests of cider makers, and the SRC and SGF represents the off-
trade retail sector. These trade associations are fundamentally pro-market, which is 
reflected in their consultation submission and their interactions with the government and 
policymakers. In protecting the rights of their members, the SWA challenged the legality of 
the MUP Bill on the basis that it contravenes the EU competition law: 
Minimum pricing is a barrier to the free movement of goods. It is likely to 
be found illegal under the EU Treaty (Article 34), and likely to be in breach 
of World Trade Organisation rules (GATT Art.III) (SWA MIN65, paragraph 
15). 
And that: 
Market access restrictions globally threaten industry competitiveness [and] 
encourage increased barriers to the trade of Scotch Whisky overseas (SWA 
written submission to the FC. paragraph 17). 
Mr Campbell Evan, representing the SWA during the evidence session to the FC, added that 
if Scotland were to set a precedent by getting past that illegality, they would be concerned 
by the principle of overcoming trade rules, and the subsequent trade restrictions by 
countries who would want to favour their local industry by keeping imports out. “Our 
concern is that countries will be allowed to bring in barriers to trade using spurious health 
rules that they will dream up to keep imports out” (see pg. 427). The WSTA supports the 
SWA stating that MUP: 
… is inconsistent with the operation of the free market for the state to 
intervene on price. This view is supported by European Competition Law, 
itself intended both to prevent barriers to free trade and to protect the 
consumer interests (WSTA MIN93, pg. 1). 
All five trade associations, responding to the committee’s call on the pricing mechanism, 
insist that the Bill, if introduced, should be re-evaluated after a time period so that an 
assessment may be made on its effectiveness in reducing misuse (see for example SWA, 
Pricing Mechanism, pg. 1 and WSTA, Pricing Mechanism pg. 1). 
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Although the SWA and WSTA favour market control, they object to the use of market indices 
such as the Retail Price Index (RPI) and Consumer Price Index (CPI) for the automatic up-
rating of the minimum price, as such regular changes would “distort the contractual 
relationship between the producer” and the retailers (SWA, Pricing Mechanism, pg. 1). In 
addition, an automatic mechanism for changing the MUP is not desirable because it would 
fail to account for changes in consumption, harm, taxation, unintended consequences, and 
the impact on different products (SWA and WSTA Pricing Mechanism, pg. 1). Each element, 
the SWA states, “must be properly assessed before any change might be contemplated. 
Thus, only a full review can be considered as a review mechanism.” (SWA, Pricing 
Mechanism, pg. 1). Despite the pro-market orientation of the SWA and WSTA, they reject 
the use of market-based indices for regular adjustment of the minimum price. 
The SGF, at the time of the debates, were pro-market as they worried about the loss of 
businesses for their members close to the Scottish-English border (SGF MIN70, paragraphs 
16 and 20). Their interest, and the SRC’s interest, changed in order to align more closely with 
the government’s interest following the defeat of the SWA in the court, as shown in the 
extracts below: 
5 or 6 years ago when the court case started, I think retailers were sceptical 
about MUP. About a year and a half before the court case was finally 
settled, we moved our position to be along the lines of not necessary taking 
a pro or negative view but simply focused on the specifics of how we 
implement it (Participant 3 – retail trade association). 
Once it became clear that the policy was going to go ahead the 
responsibility was to make sure that our retailers were able to comply 
because it was a new condition of licence (Participant 5 – retail trade 
association). 
The SGF and SRC business interests remained the same even though their strategy changed 
over the course of the debates. However, the change in strategy for the SGF brings the 
organisation closer to achieving business interests, which includes to narrow the gap 
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between off-licenses and big supermarket alcohol prices, and enable its members to 
compete with larger stores in negotiating prices with producers. 
6.3.3.2 Society Interest Cleavage 
The society interest reflects on how some industry actors talk about the society and the need 
to protect it, despite their overshadowing business interests. The SLTA and CAMRA, in their 
consultation responses, were interested in protecting consumers and society against the 
practices of big multi-national producers and retailers. SLTA and CAMRA’s interests lie in 
curtailing the easy availability of cheap alcohol in the off-trade retail sector, which fuels 
alcohol problems and causes a problem for on-trade retail establishments. 
The SLTA advocates for MUP to protect the business of its members, the on-trade retailers. 
In protecting the business interests of its members, SLTA seeks a level playing field in the 
price of alcohol, in order to stop the loss-leader practices of the supermarkets and to “stop 
those retailers who undermine the efforts of government, alcohol related public bodies and 
charities, and responsible retailers, to better control Scotland’s drinking culture” (SLTA 
MIN72, pg. 2). If MUP brings about a level playing field, society is said to benefit as consumers 
would be encouraged to drink in “regulated, safe and sociable environments of their local 
community pubs” (CAMRA MIN14, paragraph 2.5) rather than solitary drinking. A level 
playing field is also anticipated to reduce the need for pre-loading in young people, which 
causes problem in the night-time economy (SLTA MIN72, pg. 1; see also Stewart MIN83, pg. 
2). In addition, the SLTA opines that a MUP that addresses the loss-leader practices and duty 
fraud by the off-trade will benefit the exchequer in revenue generation and thus society as 
a whole (SLTA MIN72, pg. 2). 
CAMRA’s interests lie in the loss-leader practices of the supermarket and the effect these 
have on pubs. It states that “alcohol loss leaders are driving consumption away from well-
run community pubs and towards drinking at home or on the street, contributing to the 
closure of many Scottish community pubs” (CAMRA MIN14, paragraph 1.2 and 1.3). The 
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interest and strategies of CAMRA aligned with that of the SLTA pre-2013. However, their 
strategy changed in 2013, but their interests, as shown in the extract below, remained 
unchanged: 
One of our objectives is to try to keep pubs open, narrow the gap between 
supermarket and pub prices (Participant 2 – trade association). 
Participant 2 shared their concerns about consumer choices, the price they must spend on 
their drinks, the impact of government price-setting on business freedom, and the potential 
for the government to abuse the system. 
However, the SLTA caution the Scottish Government that “Minimum Price is not a panacea” 
and that they are “basically in agreement with establishing a minimum alcohol sales price 
based on a unit of alcohol …” (SLTA MIN72, paragraphs 3 and 4). They suggest that MUP 
should be introduced in addition to a “ban on off-sales promotion (MIN71, pg. 1). With 
regards to the evaluation of the minimum price, the SLTA favours the use of either the 
consumer price index (CPI) or the retail price index (RPI) in addition to the Sheffield-based 
appraisal in year 3. The CPI and RPI are both market-based inflation indexes. The SLTA stated 
that these choices were to “ensure that the price is proportionate to harm caused by 
alcohol” (SLTA Pricing Mechanism, pg. 1). 
6.3.3.3 Mixed Approach Cleavage 
Mixed approach refers to industry actors whose interests are varied because of the 
composition of their members. The SBPA and their sister trade association the BBPA can be 
said to have adopted a mixed approach of pro-business and pro-society interest. This is 
assumed to be because of their composition and the diverse interests of their members. For 
example, their members consist of beer producers and on-trade retailers (Pubs). Some beer 
producers, like Diageo, who are members, also produce other alcoholic beverages such as 
scotch whisky and vodka, which would be affected by the MUP. The SBPA stated in their 
submission that the individual views of their members vary on the issue of minimum pricing 
and that as an association they do not have a collective position (SBPA MIN19, pg. 1). The 
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interest of SBPA is to protect the business interests of its members by improving their 
members' ability to compete and remove the price variation that would arise between 
Scotland and the rest of the UK. Their sister association, the BBPA, took a firm stand and 
opposed the introduction of MUP. The BBPA’s submission positioned MUP as a form of tax 
which they referred to as “equivalence”. The BBPA aims to protect the business interests of 
its members and argues that focusing on alcohol units only to determine product price 
negates the differences in “production cost”; drinks’ “composition and characteristics”; and 
the overall effect on the “wider economy, health and social dimension” (BBPA, pg. 2). The 
BBPA is not against government tax but argued that the tax on beer should be fairer bearing 
in mind the positive association of beer to job creation and relaxation and the negative 
impact of high-strength alcohol on health42. The BBPA’s strategy here is for government 
regulation to make alcohol tax fairer. In protecting the business interests of its members and 
by advocating for a reduction in beer tax, the BBPA is seen to also advocate for societal 
interests. These societal interests are seen when they positively associate beer drinking to 
enjoyment and relaxation (BBPA, pg. 5), and promote the notion that “fairer taxes on beer 
would create 30,000 new UK jobs” (BBPA, pg. 6) and would “generate almost 50 per cent 
more in tax revenues than spirits” (BBPA, pg. 7, emphasis in original). The SBPA and the 
BBPA display similar interests in their submissions but with different strategies towards 
achieving their interests. 
Summary: The cleavages presented reflect the structure of the industry and the functional 
identities of the industry actors as producers, retailers, and trade associations, as 
demonstrated in Figure 5. The findings reinforce those of Holden et al. (2012) on 
structural/functional cleavages in the alcohol industry. Holden et al. (2012) labelled the 
cleavages they observed as intra-industry and inter-industry cleavages, and the findings of 
this study, as demonstrated above and summarised in Figure 5. 
 
42 Historically this echoes William Hogarth’s famous Beer Street and Gin Lane etchings from the 18th century 
and Warner (2002) writings on ‘Gin Wars’. 
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Figure 5: Structural and functional analysis of observed cleavages  
 
Source: Author43 
 
The reorganisation of these cleavages based on interests and strategies suggest that the 
structural approach, which is dominant in the literature, may not entirely tell the story about 
industry cleavages. For example, Buckton et al. (2019) used an ideological perspective to 
analyse the cleavages (what they also called polarisations) present in the UK sugar tax debate 
to provide more insight to and complement the structural perspective. Following this 
emerging approach to understanding cleavages, I employ a discursive approach to further 
understand and complement the findings from the structural perspective above. 
 
 
 
43 Figure 5 above does not represent all the industry actors i.e. trade associations like WSTA, and SRC who 
represent - the off-trade. This is because the analysis of the off-trade sector for 2nd level intra-sectoral 
cleavage choose not to focus on individual actors who oppose/support but represented as off-trade as a 
sector. 
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6.4 Cleavages: A Discursive Analysis of the Alcohol Industry Frames Along Interest Lines 
Despite industry actors functional or structural positioning, they tend to use some common 
frames in articulating their perspectives, but they go about it in different ways thus indicating 
cleavages along interest lines. Based on Entman (1993)’s frame theory, the study identified 
four thematic frames (economy, legitimising, socially responsible, and unintended 
consequences). These frames were recategorised based on industry actors’ interests to 
economy and social frames and are summarised in Table 7 below. In presenting each frame, 
a definition is provided, and an indication of who the main actors are, who their target 
audience is, the arguments they draw from using extracts from the data, and the dominant 
solutions they propose. 
6.4.1 Economic Frames 
This frame captures instances where industry actors use statistics in order to highlight their 
positive contributions to the economy (i.e. positive economic frames), and/or the negative 
impacts of MUP on the economy (i.e. negative economic frames), in terms of job losses, loss 
of government revenue, and reduced export. Different industry actors evoked this frame 
across functional divides, with different interests, argumentations, and solutions targeted at 
different audiences. 
6.4.1.1 Positive Economic Frames 
Positive economic frames refer to when industry actors, especially those in support of the 
MUP Bill indicate that the introduction of the Bill will benefit the economy and society. The 
main actors that evoked this frame are Tennent Caledonian, Molson Coors, SLTA, CAMRA, 
Mr Bremner, and Mr Stewart. These actors’ target audiences are the Scottish Government, 
policymakers, and regulators. The opening paragraphs of Tennent Caledonian and Molson 
Coors, for example, indicate their economic importance as shown in the extracts below: 
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Molson Coors is the largest brewer in the UK with 2,300 UK employees and 
350 years of brewing experience (Molson Coors, MIN41, pg. 1). 
A recent study by Oxford Economics (for the British Beer and Pubs 
Association) found that the sector sustains 49,960 direct jobs in Scotland 
and 71,093 in total when indirect and induced jobs are included. Tennent 
Caledonian employs directly 311 staff. … [Tennant Caledonian boasts of] A 
£3.4m investment in a bottling line at Wellpark Brewery, bringing bottling 
capability back to Scotland (Tennent Caledonian MIN85, pg. 1). 
In their consultation submission, Tennent Caledonian highlights the support they provide to 
“Scottish licensed trade through loans, representing a seven figure [SIC] investment in the 
past two months alone, at a time when small businesses have found it difficult to raise 
financial support elsewhere”. It also highlights its support “for Scottish football through its 
sponsorship [of] Scotland’s two most popular clubs, Celtic and Rangers – continuing 
Tennent’s support for Scotland’s most watched sport". The underlined words in the extract 
above show a positive economic frame. It implies that the introduction of the Bill, in line with 
their arguments presented next, will enable the organisation to continue to grow and 
continue their support to local businesses and the economy. 
In addition to their brewing capabilities, Tennent Caledonian and Molson Coors own the 
pubs that sell their products. Their arguments in support of the MUP draw from their 
grievances with the off-trade retailers, who are said to undervalue their premium products 
by selling them as loss leaders and in conjunction with other brands as stated during the 
interview. 
Equally, if I look at the commercial of it, beer and cider are sold in 
supermarkets at prices that are very low erm and we, we make most of our 
money selling to the pubs and on-trade (Participant 6 – beer producer). 
Industry actors who support the MUP did so because of the need to create a level playing 
field in terms of alcohol prices between the off-trade and the on-trade retail establishments. 
Molson Coors refers to this price difference between the on-trade and off-trade as "problem 
prices" and urges policymakers to consider this when setting the minimum price as seen in 
the extract below: 
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In determining the right level at which to set a minimum price, we would 
urge policymakers to take account of the need to address problem prices 
and protect the rights of responsible adults to enjoy a drink with friends 
and sustain a responsible, community building industry that delivers secure 
jobs (Molson Coors MIN41, pg. 1 emphasis in original). 
Mr Bremner, an independent licensee, also echoed this concern: 
That said, I do agree that something needs to be done to tackle the 
availability of low priced alcohol (Bremner MIN10, pg. 1). 
Tennent Caledonian and Molson Coors’ positions look after their business interests, their 
employees, and shareholders. The two independent retailers, Mr Bremner and Mr Stewart, 
evoke a positive economy frame by stating that the loss leader and below cost practices of 
the big supermarkets, which costs the economy and the exchequer, can be prevented with 
the introduction of a minimum price. 
It is my understanding, that although sales are made below cost, there is 
an ability to reclaim lost Vat or Duty, perhaps both, which actually results 
in no loss being made (by the retailers) (Mr Bremner MIN10, pg. 1. 
Emphasis added). 
This view was supported by Mr Stewart, the SLTA, and CAMRA: 
the resultant downward pressure on the retail price of alcohol is therefore 
funded by the taxpayer along with the costs of resulting alcohol abuse (Mr 
Stewart MIN83, pg. 2). 
The SLTA and CAMRA highlighted how the economy and the exchequer’s revenue would be 
boosted as a result of clamping down on duty fraud. The SLTA states that government 
revenue is being lost already because the failure of the big supermarkets passing on duty 
increases. 
The large alcohol retailers do not necessarily pass on any duty increase and 
in a number of cases simply force their suppliers to absorb the cost (SLTA 
MIN72, pg. 2). 
CAMRA is concerned that supermarket alcohol loss leaders are driving 
consumption away from well-run community pubs and towards drinking at 
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home or on the street, contributing to the closure of many Scottish 
community pubs. We therefore support the introduction of a minimum 
price for alcohol, set at a level to prevent below-cost alcohol sales in the 
off-trade (CAMRA MIN14, paragraphs 1.3). 
The extracts above from SLTA, CAMRA, and the two independent licensees imply that MUP 
will bring an end to the loss leader practices by the big supermarket and contribute positively 
to the economy. CAMRA advocates for MUP to help “support struggling Scottish community 
pubs” and to create a level playing field between the off-trade and pubs in line with a market 
survey it sponsored in September 2011. The market survey indicated that “[A]lcohol prices 
in the off-trade can be as much as 4 times cheaper than in the on-trade” (CAMRA MIN14, 
paragraph 2.1). 
Solutions proffered: In all, “Minimum pricing per unit of alcohol would be of huge benefit” 
(Stewart, MIN83, pg. 2, emphasis in original). Some of the solutions proffered by industry 
actors who evoked the positive economic frame are geared towards increased government 
regulation in addition to ongoing education. For example: 
we strongly believe that this measure must be supplemented with an 
ongoing focus on education and information for drinkers on the issues 
associated with alcohol abuse (Tennent Caledonian MIN85, pg. 2). 
when market failure leads to persistent below cost selling, driving a culture 
of irresponsible drinking, government intervention may be needed (Molson 
Coors MIN41, pg. 1). 
Mr Bremner argued for a UK-wide duty, stating that it has "a defining impact" in terms of 
standardisation and as additional government revenue. However, Molson Coors argues 
against using duty stating that minimum price has advantages in avoiding anomalies that 
currently exist within the UK duty system. Furthermore, a minimum price cannot be 
absorbed by retailers to keep alcoholic drinks prices artificially low (Molson Coors MIN41, 
pg. 1). 
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6.4.1.2 Negative Economic Frames 
Negative economic frames are said to be evoked when economic arguments are made with 
regards to the negative impact of MUP on businesses. This version of the economic frame 
was evoked by alcohol industry actors who oppose the MUP Bill, for example: Diageo, 
Edrington Group, Whyte and Mackay, Chivas Brothers, SABMiller, SWA, WSTA, NACM, SBPA, 
SRC, and SGF. These actors are said to target their responses at the Scottish Government, 
the HSC and FC members, and responsible consumers. The opening extracts of the alcohol 
producers who oppose MUP position the companies as active participants to the UK and the 
Scottish economy. For example: 
Diageo is the world’s leading premium drinks business and a top-20 FTSE 
100 company … (Diageo, pg. 2). 
SABMiller is the UK’s largest listed drinks company… It is headquartered in 
London, listed at number 12 within the FTSE 100 index … (SABMiller, pg. 1). 
The words underlined in the extracts above can be said to be strategic and signify authority 
and power. The extracts on their own are positive frames, but in relation to the debate and 
their oppositional stance, they portray MUP as a policy that would undermine the Scottish 
economy and the profitability of businesses as further illustrated below: 
We do not support measures, such as minimum pricing, that aim to reduce 
total alcohol consumption. Reducing consumption without significantly 
reducing the number of heavy drinkers, while undermining a major Scottish 
industry and its contribution to the economy, is not a policy that is in the 
national interest (Diageo, pg. 3). 
It is clear that the cornerstone of the preferred policy is to adopt a total 
population approach to reduce all consumption of alcoholic beverages in 
Scotland. This gives us concern since such a policy, in its application, does 
not distinguish sensible and safe drinking from excessive and harmful 
drinking (Chivas Brothers MIN19, pg. 1). 
The extracts above hint that responsible consumers would be penalised by MUP, and that 
the effect of reduced consumption would also penalise the alcohol industry, especially those 
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who produce scotch whisky, and subsequently impact on their export and revenue to the 
exchequer. This aspect of the frame is captured best in Edrington Group’s submission as 
shown in the extract below. Edrington group writing on the impact of MUP on overseas trade 
states that: 
Exports of premium brands would be adversely affected overseas by a 
Scottish initiated trade barrier. Econometric analysis suggests that 14.5% 
of Scotch Whisky exports could be put at risk. [and we] fear a significant 
loss of business, leading to job losses and closures (Edrington Group, 
MIN32, paragraph 22. Emphasis added). 
The effect of MUP on scotch whisky exports have been echoed by the SWA (MIN65, 
paragraph 21) and Chivas Brothers (MIN19, pg. 2), and other scotch producers fear that the 
impact of MUP would be felt beyond the borders of Scotland and that MUP could be used 
indiscriminately by other governments against scotch whisky, resulting to reduced scotch 
whisky export and revenue for the Scottish economy. The SWA stressed the negative impact 
of MUP on the Scottish economy and potential job losses and closure as a result (SWA 
MIN65, paragraph, 16). This spells doom and gloom for the Scottish economy considering 
the economic instabilities during a period of global recession. Job losses are mentioned 
explicitly in the submissions by SWA and WSTA to the FC. It is assumed that the FC members 
are likely to be more sympathetic to economic arguments on the negative consequences of 
MUP, and this may be the reason why the SWA and WSTA positioned their report in this 
manner (see FC written submission: WSTA, paragraphs 2.9 and 2.12, and SWA, paragraph 
22). The amount of job losses is estimated to be “around 250-400” (SWA, pg. 62). 
The SWA went on to cite examples of discrimination their products have faced from the 
Korean, Japanese, and French Governments, and suggested that other countries could 
follow-on with their own restrictions. This view was re-emphasised by scotch whisky 
producers and their trade representatives during the interviews as seen in the extracts 
below: 
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… our prices are global. We find quite often that in an international market 
there is discrimination against Scotch whisky and lots of other markets 
looks to the UK and to Scotland for when they are setting their taxation or 
restrictions regimes on their product. We think a tough regime from 
Scotland could be used as an excuse for other markets to use to 
discriminate against scotch (Participant 1 – whisky producer). 
The interest they had for promoting a higher tax on drinks of 40% ABV and 
above was largely for trade protection, to protect their own domestic 
market and I take the case for South Korea in particular (Participant 4 – 
trade association). 
Participant 1 went on to argue that beer producers supported the MUP Bill because of self-
interest and the commercial benefits MUP presents to them. 
Another negative impact of MUP on the economy, according to Diageo and WSTA, is a 
reduction in investments and loss of revenue to the exchequer due to a rise in black market 
sales. For example: 
HMRC estimates that beer and spirits in the black market worth an 
estimated £1.2bn were sold in the UK last year, up 46%, at a cost to the 
Treasury of more than £800m in lost duty. It is unrealistic to say that this is 
not a problem in Scotland and one which would not be exacerbated by the 
introduction of minimum unit pricing (WSTA, FC, pg. 72). 
Diageo suggests that their investment capabilities may be reduced because of MUP. In 
presenting their arguments, industry actors who oppose the MUP Bill present evidence from 
government sources, reputable organisations, and research which they have sponsored. 
Sometimes, some of the evidence presented are contradictory and not well referenced. For 
example, in the submission to the FC, the WSTA cite reputable organisation WHO, in the bid 
to support their claim of no link between alcohol price and misuse (WSTA, paragraph 2.2). 
The WSTA presented Italy and Spain as cases where alcohol prices are said to be low, 
compared to Finland and Iceland with higher alcohol prices and cases of increased binge 
drinking. However, the WSTA failed to highlight any cultural differences that could have 
influenced the findings or account for the differences in consumption pattern. They also 
cited examples using the UK where alcohol taxes are said to be high without a corresponding 
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drop in alcohol-related harm as predicted by health experts and the Sheffield study. This 
view is however contestable as the rate of drinking in young adults has been falling around 
the developed world for the last decade (see Measham, 2008), and this is attributed to the 
increased cost of alcohol and increased interest in healthy living. In addition, the WSTA failed 
to acknowledge that some of their members often absorb the higher taxes and do not pass 
tax increases on to the consumer, and the loss leader practices by retailers. The WHO report 
WSTA cited was not well-referenced and attempts to find the said report have been 
unsuccessful. However, another WHO report identified contradicts the WSTA’s account. 
According to the WHO (2009) report, “…the proportion of the total population reporting that 
they were heavy episodic drinkers was 54% in Ireland and 33% in Spain, (much higher than 
in) Finland (17%) and Sweden (11%)”. In addition, ample amount of evidence showing a 
correlation between increased alcohol prices and taxes and a reduction in binge drinking and 
overall alcohol consumption exists (see Wagenaar et al., 2009). Room et al. (2002) however 
warn that the effectiveness of price intervention for alcohol can be easily undermined if 
illegal sources of alcohol are not controlled. Essentially, if buyers are priced out of the 
legitimate market, it creates demand for lower cost alternatives for example, buying from 
the black market. This is true for commodities like alcohol, cigarettes, or even French lace, 
all of which were smuggled into the UK in the 17th and 18th centuries. Industry actors also 
dispute evidence from government sources. In the evidence session to the HSC, opposition 
industry actors argued against the evidence derived from the Sheffield study and other 
elasticity-based calculation, stating that they were theoretical and that the outcomes are 
likely to be different (Diageo – Michael Patten, pg. 829. HSC evidence session). 
The SWA’s comment on the amount of revenue projected to be lost from the sales of scotch 
whisky due to MUP falls into the same trap of being theoretical. SWA argued that 14.5% of 
their exports, “£500 million-worth-over a number of years”, would be lost. However, when 
questioned on how the statistics were generated, SWA stated that “it is calculated on the 
same basis as the Scottish Government’s figure: the Wagenaar elasticity of price and 
demand” (pg. 838), which industry actors like Diageo (see pg. 841 and 854) have criticised 
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the government for. In addition, the SWA (see pg. 427) and the SGF quoted losses in the 
evidence session to the FC can also be regarded as theoretical as there is no certainty that 
MUP would affect the export market. Other unintended consequences of MUP that would 
impact on the economy include reduced incentives for producers to be competitive (Diageo, 
pg. 4), increased crime rates, cross-border trade, and counterfeiting of products (Edrington 
Group MIN32, Paragraph 24; SABMiller, paragraph 21; Whyte and Mackay MIN92, pgs. 1 and 
2; WSTA MIN93, paragraph 1.11). 
Solutions proffered: The MUP Bill is a market intervention by the government and industry 
actors who oppose the Bill are wary of the impact of such market interventions as seen in 
the extracts below: 
We believe that it is for retailers to control the price at which goods are 
sold... This guarantees effective price competition and the best possible 
deal for the consumer (Morison’s MIN94, paragraph 2.5). 
Minimum prices interfere with the most fundamental aspects of a free 
market economy. (SABMiller, paragraph 11).  
Their arguments above suggest that they favour the status quo, which is to allow the market 
to control alcohol prices as opposed to government legislation for minimum price based on 
a unit of alcohol. Industry actors would prefer the government to use duty and VAT as an 
alternative to MUP. 
… it is our belief that if the Scottish Government wishes to influence the 
price at which alcohol is sold in Scotland it would be preferable to achieve 
it using a ban on sales below cost (defined as VAT plus excise duty)(Co-
operative MIN26, paragraphs 4.11). 
While SRC queries the link between price and irresponsible consumption 
and therefore does not support duty rises either, its general view is that if 
the state is going to intervene in the pricing mechanism, excise duty applied 
on a UK-wide basis, together with a ban on sales below tax10, would be 
preferable to minimum pricing as a means to do so (SRC MIN75. paragraph 
17). 
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Duty, the SRC argues, is more flexible than a fixed price per unit for all alcohol, and that duty 
can be targeted at different products depending on different perceived health and social or 
economic objectives (SRC MIN75, paragraph 17). In support of no further government 
legislation, Diageo and Edrington Group present evidence showing stability in alcohol 
consumption and a reduction in the death rate from liver disease to discredit the Bill: 
Alcohol consumption in Scotland has been stable for six years and 
indicators of health harm show a decline. This would indicate the measures 
already put in place are having a positive impact (Diageo, pg. 3). 
b. Deaths from alcoholic liver disease have also declined since 20063. 
c. Alcohol-related hospital discharges have declined over the past two years 
(2007/08 -2009/10) from 43,054 to 39,278, a reduction of 8.8%4 (Edrington 
Group MIN32, paragraph 4). 
The extracts above infer that the legislation introduced prior to the MUP Bill is effective and 
that the government should give it time to work before introducing further legislation. Chivas 
Brothers and SABMiller proffer further solutions in the form of an individualised approach 
to tackling alcohol misuse using education and personal responsibility (see Chivas Brothers 
MIN19, pgs. 1 and 2; SABMiller, paragraphs 28 and 30). An individualised approach (i.e. self-
governance) to managing alcohol misuse is one of the key principles of the neo-liberal 
ideology, which also informs the preference for market-based solutions. A summary of the 
economic frame detailing industry actors’ interests and intended audience for their 
arguments and solutions proffered is presented in Table 6 below. The chapter moves on to 
examine the social frames identified in the data. 
6.4.2 Social Frames 
The social frame captures instances where industry actors highlight their active engagement 
with the government, non-government agencies, and the civil society in resolving problems 
with alcohol misuse and/or abuse. They also position themselves as socially responsible 
organisations by advertising industry-led initiatives towards alcohol harm reduction and 
advertising their memberships of various trade bodies. The social frames can be proactive or 
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reactive; and are used by different actors with different interests, argumentations, and 
solutions targeted at different audiences. 
6.4.2.1 Proactive Social Frames 
Social frames evoked by industry actors are proactive when they control a situation rather 
than react to the situation. Industry actors who support the government intervention – 
Tennent Caledonian, Molson Coors, the SLTA, and on-trade retailers – evoked proactive 
social frames. 
The SLTA has advocated the introduction of minimum pricing controls for 
alcohol for more than 40 years, since the UK Government of Edward Health 
abolished Retail Price Maintenance (SLTA MIN72, pg. 1). 
The interests of industry actors who evoke the proactive social frames tend to align with the 
Scottish Government’s intention for social calm and to ensure that alcohol is enjoyed 
responsibly in Scotland. These industry actors highlight their ongoing collaboration with the 
government and their CSR activities: 
Tennent Caledonian plays a leading and active role in the Scottish 
Government’s Alcohol Industry Partnership of which we are a founding 
member (Tennent Caledonian MIN85, pg. 1). 
Tennent Caledonian also highlighted their “launch and expansion of the Tennent’s Training 
Academy aimed at promoting best practice in the Scottish hospitality industry” and the 
“launch of Caledonia Best – a new 3.2% ABV ale” (Tennent Caledonian MIN85, pg. 1), a new 
product line with reduced alcohol content which aligns to their UK PHRD commitments. 
The key audiences that their submissions speak to are the Scottish Government ministers, 
consumers, responsible retailers, and charitable organisations. Their interests include the 
effective control of alcohol using multiple approaches, changing the consumption habit of 
young people who are prone to misuse, introducing a MUP proportionate to harm caused, 
and reducing abuse by the minority problem drinkers as evident in the extracts below. 
Tennent Caledonian advocates for a minimum price on the condition that it “is introduced 
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as one of a range of measures aimed at tackling this issue” (Tennent Caledonian MIN85, pg. 
2). Mr Stewart affirms the government proposal would be of huge benefit if it is well targeted 
to discourage heavy drinking (Mr Stewart MIN83, pg. 2). 
Solutions proffered: The dominant solution that these industry actors propose is mainly 
government intervention in the form of legislation. Molson Coors believes that the MUP will 
help Scotland to rebuild respect for alcohol and that they would “support a UK–wide ban on 
below cost selling that takes proper account of the cost of production” (MIN41, pg. 2). 
Supporters of the Bill focused more on responsible consumption and how a pricing 
mechanism can foster responsible consumption, cultural change, and a change in attitude 
towards alcohol rather than blaming individual attitudes for problems from alcohol (Tennent 
Caledonian MIN85, pg. 2; SLTA MIN71, pg. 1). 
Tennent Caledonian (MIN85, pg. 2) and the SLTA both argue against the use of education as 
a standalone solution and that education should be used in conjunction with government 
legislation. SLTA stated: 
… those who advocate that education is the best way forward have, despite 
their efforts, failed to succeed. Those who advocate taxation, do not 
understand how the industry works. The large alcohol retailers do not 
necessarily pass on any duty increase and in a number of cases simply force 
their suppliers to absorb the cost (SLTA MIN71, pg. 1). 
Tennent Caledonian, like the SLTA, argues against the use of taxation alone because of the 
potential for off-trade retailers to undermine it and not pass VAT and duty increase to their 
customers. Mr Stewart, in his submission, advocates that the government should supervise 
the advertising of alcohol, stating that alcohol advertising is tasteless, shocking and depicts 
a lot of aggression, violence, and sex, especially in the marketing of alcopops (Stewart 
MIN83, pg. 2). 
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6.4.2.2 Reactive Social Frames 
As the name implies, reactive social frames are social frames evoked by the alcohol industry 
actors in reaction to the proposed MUP Bill by the Scottish Government. The social frames 
are said to be reactive if they deny the existence of alcohol misuse or the effectiveness of 
the MUP, challenge the evidence presented by the government and/or reinforcing the 
status-quo which aligns with market arguments and self-regulation, or attempt to shift the 
debate. This frame, when evoked, is said to target government ministers (Members of 
Parliament), consumers, and regulators. These actors are mainly those opposed to the Bill, 
for example: Diageo, Edrington Group, Whyte and Mackay, Chivas Brothers, SWA, WSTA, 
NACM, and SBPA. In addition, the social frames evoked by these industry actors can be 
positive and like those from industry actors who support the Bill, when, for example, they 
highlight the social initiatives they are involved in or list the various associations they belong 
to and/or support. 
As a producer and supplier of alcohol we take our responsibilities very 
seriously. … We are an active member of Drinkaware and a signatory of the 
Responsibility Deal. We also participate in the Scottish Government Alcohol 
Industry Partnership (Whyte and Mackay MIN92, pg. 1). 
Along with other retailers, we led the industry in tackling under-age 
drinking, with the introduction of the “Challenge 25” scheme well before it 
recently became mandatory across the licensed trade under the Alcohol etc 
(Scotland) Act 2010 (Morrisons MIN94, paragraph 2.3). 
The Co-operative Group, in their written submission, lists out the various initiatives and 
projects to promote responsible drinking which they champion, including implementing the 
“’Challenge 25’ throughout our stores well before it became a regulatory requirement under 
the Alcohol etc (Scotland) Act 2010”, and the proposed rolling out of the Drinkaware ‘unit 
awareness’ campaign throughout their stores (Co-operative Group MIN32, paragraph 3.2). 
The extracts above appear to advertise the image of the organisation positively. Highlighting 
the various CSR (i.e. ‘Campaign for Smarter Drinking’) or charitable works (i.e. financial 
support to the Drinkaware Trust) presents the organisation as accountable. 
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Reactive social frames are evident when opposition industry actors attempt to shift the focus 
of the debate from alcohol use to alcohol misuse. For example, they agree with the Scottish 
Government on the need to reduce alcohol misuse in Scotland: 
… we believe very strongly that misuse does not have a place in that society. 
We want to address the misuse, not the use, of alcohol (SWA – Gavin 
Hewitt, pg. 821 HSC oral evidence). 
We have heard that the misuse of alcohol is an issue, but alcohol is misused 
in degrees (NACM – Bob Price, pg. 820 HSC oral evidence). 
Here, the industry actors present a ‘normalising account’, by responding to needs and 
agreeing to the societal convention that alcohol misuse is a problem which harms the health 
of the consumer. It is however not unusual for industry actors to align their goals with that 
of the society or as a regulatory authority. Similar strategies have been adopted by the 
tobacco industry (see Moerman and Van der Laan, 2005). The authors stated that “In 1999, 
WHA [World Health Assembly] introduced measures to significantly curb the increase of 
tobacco use worldwide and the tobacco industry within two years introduced its own 
standards and BAT [British American Tobacco] repositioned itself to appear a “transparent” 
and responsible corporate citizen” (Moerman and Van der Laan, 2005: 379). 
On the topic of alcohol use, the SWA argued that their products are not more dangerous to 
health than a low-alcohol beer because “… it is how one drinks it that matters” (SWA – Gavin 
Hewitt, pg. 853 HSC evidence session). The strategy adopted by the SWA here is 
contestation, as they suggest that high-strength alcoholic beverages are not to blame for the 
social problems associated with alcohol use. The SWA also advocates for alcohol harm 
reduction and not just a reduction in consumption: 
What we believe is that we should seek to address and reduce alcohol harm 
… if we were to reduce consumption and not address alcohol harm, that 
would miss the target that the policy should seek to achieve (SWA – 
Campbell Evans, pg. 421. FC evidence session). 
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The SWA appears to conform to societal needs. Opposition actors, though they agree that 
there is a problem with consumption patterns and levels, they deny the evidence provided 
by the Scottish Government on the effectiveness of MUP and the link between price and 
consumption. Denial is the third reactive strategy, and it is portrayed in the extract below: 
[MUP] … will have little or no impact on the minority who have alcohol 
dependency issues (Whyte and Mackay MIN92, pg. 1). 
There is no strong evidence as to the effectiveness of minimum pricing as a 
policy to reduce alcohol-related harm (SWA, paragraph 19). 
This denial comes despite evidence from alcohol scholars on the impact of price on 
consumption (see Sloan et al., 1995; Anderson and Baumberg, 2006; Wagenaar et al., 2009; 
Stockwell et al., 2012b). Industry actors also questioned the credibility of the Sheffield study, 
stating that the results quoted are theoretical (Diageo – Michael Patten, pg. 829. HSC 
evidence session). Diageo attempts to protect their exchanges. Retailers also challenge the 
assumption that the anticipated windfall, will profit retailers, stating that the figures are 
theoretical and may not be translatable: 
We feel the windfall figures might have been overstated and that the full 
industry and consumer response has not been taken into account (Tesco – 
Emma Reynolds, pg. 832, HSC evidence session). 
… we question whether there would be a windfall figure that has been 
suggested. The number is theoretical. There might be a windfall, but it is 
questionable whether it would be the size that is quoted in the Sheffield 
research (SBPA – Patrick Browne, pg. 834, HSC evidence session). 
Here, the retailers are said to protect their propriety by communicating authoritatively. 
Opposition actors focused on the unintended consequences, the negative impacts on the 
different consumer groups, and the complexities of alcohol problems (Whyte and Mackay 
MIN92, pg. 2; Asda – David Paterson, pg. 824, HSC evidence session). They attribute these 
complexities to cultural issues which cannot be solved by price (i.e. regulation). Thus, they 
advocate for a mixture of market control, self-regulation, and education as an alternative to 
legislation. The SRC, in their written submission, stated that MUP “… is an unfair and 
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untargeted measure, penalising the majority of responsible drinkers” (paragraphs 8 and 28). 
The SRC projects an image of a fair organisation and attempts to locate a friendly audience 
(for example, low-income and majority responsible consumers) who are likely to be 
sympathetic to their course. As earlier stated, two trade bodies, the SRC and SGF, who 
represent the off-trade retailers, changed their position from opposing to supporting the Bill 
following the outcome of the legal challenge between the SWA and the Scottish 
Government. The representatives of these trade association have since committed to and 
have been involved in the implementation of the Bill as the extracts below suggest: 
I think we have taken a very pragmatic view we actually worked with the 
government to ensure that the policy was implemented erm and our 
members complied with it. It strengthened our credibility with key 
stakeholders, the government, and local authorities (Participant 5 – retail 
trade association). 
But we certainly felt that there was a point we just got on and make things 
work … I think some groups where determined to be right and there was 
just a real political will to do this, let us not worry about the rights and 
wrong and make it work and be more pragmatic (Participant 3 – retail 
trade association). 
Solutions proffered: The solution proffered, as evident in the arguments above, is to 
maintain status quo and let the market determine the price of alcohol. Some social solutions 
include co-regulation with the government and targeted intervention for those who misuse 
alcohol through an alcohol awareness programme, education, and industry-led CSR 
activities. Diageo, in their written submission, stated that they believe that “an open and 
constructive dialogue between government and stakeholders is a vital part of the process of 
good policy making [SIC]”, and that they fully endorse the government’s “objective of 
eliminating irresponsible behaviour – whether on the part of consumers, producers or 
retailers”. Diageo makes further suggestions as shown in the extracts below: 
Under co-regulation, the Government and the alcohol industry draw up 
standards together, which are strictly monitored and enforced, both within 
the industry and by Government through existing laws and regulations. 
Divided We Stand: Exploring the Alcohol Industry Framing of the Alcohol (Minimum Pricing) (Scotland) Act Consultation. 
 
PhD Thesis 2020  I. J. Amaeshi.  Page | 153  
 
 
Strengthening the enforcement of these existing laws and regulations 
would be preferable to the introduction of new laws (Diageo, pg. 2). 
In promoting the individualised approach to managing alcohol misuse, the SWA and 
Morrisons suggest that the government should focus on the minority population that misuse 
alcohol: 
The issue that we need to tackle is the 30 per cent of people who drink 80 
per cent of the alcohol (SWA – Gavin Hewitt, pg. 830. HSC evidence 
session). 
There is a strong argument that targeted interventions toward problem 
drinkers would be substantially more effective and more proportionate 
than the imposition of minimum pricing (Morrisons MIN94, paragraph 3.6). 
Morrisons went on to cite an example of the use of brief interventions in Canada and its 
effectiveness. Nevertheless, studies have shown that the effect of brief intervention 
diminishes within a year for harmful and hazardous consumers (Graham and MacKinnon, 
2010; see also Kanner et al., 2007). Alcohol brief interventions (ABI) are continuously being 
used and monitored within NHS Scotland (see ISD, 2018 publication report), but their 
effectiveness varies depending on the setting where the intervention takes place (see Platt 
et al., 2016) and how soon the intervention is initiated (Graham and MacKinnon, 2010). 
Chivas Brothers advocate for personal responsibility which they stated, “is the core message 
of our on-going social responsibility campaign, “Accept Responsibility” (Chivas Brothers, 
MIN19, pg. 2). 
These actors put forward strong arguments without corresponding strong evidence to their 
effectiveness, and they also fail to acknowledge that the “determinants of health not only 
lie at individual level, but include wider social, environmental and economic factors” 
(Graham and MacKinnon, 2010: 603). This perhaps is what these industry actors refer to 
when they state that alcohol issues are “complex”. 
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In the event that the MUP Bill is passed, Industry actors also insist that MUP should be 
discontinued if found to be ineffective following the review process and that the “sunset 
clause” for this should be stipulated on the face of the Bill. 
The scheme’s effectiveness should be subject to annual review, against 
clearly understood, transparent and objectively evidenced criteria, and the 
scheme should be discontinued should the review demonstrate its 
ineffectiveness or its introduction leading to undesirable consequences, viz 
illegal activity/illicit market (Edrington Group MIN14. paragraphs 28 and 
29). 
In adjusting MUP following its implementation, the representative from Asda suggested that 
an “annual [review] would be much more sensible and reasonable” (Asda – David Paterson, 
HSC evidence session, pg. 852), bearing in mind the contract that exists between retailers 
and producers. This option was supported by other industry actors who oppose MUP as a 
more favourable option than index-based increases. 
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Table 6: Summary of Industry Actors Position on MUP: A Discursive Approach 
  Actors Interests Audience Arguments Solutions 
Ec
o
n
o
m
ic
 F
ra
m
e
 
Positive Tennent Caledonian, 
Molson Coors, SLTA, 
CAMRA, Mr Bremner 
and Mr Stewart 
MUP would: 
• Target problem prices. 
• Protect their premium brands from 
off-trade retailers’ loss-leader 
practices. 
• Protect investments and jobs. 
• Create a level playing ground with 
off-trade retailers. 
• Protect government revenue by 
stopping the off-trade reclaiming 
VAT as a promotional expense. 
• Support struggling pubs 
Scottish Government 
Policymakers 
Regulators  
• Stop the freefall of alcohol prices 
instigated by the off-trade 
supermarkets. 
• Alcohol should be bought based 
on brand preference and taste, 
not price. 
• Market forces often fail, so 
government intervention 
becomes necessary. 
• Duty + VAT have anomalies. 
• Government regulation 
• Education 
Negative  Diageo, Edrington 
Group, Whyte and 
Mackay, Chivas 
Brothers, SABMiller, 
SWA, WSTA, NACM, 
SBPA, SRC and SGF 
MUP is 
• Illegal. 
• Affects competition and overseas 
trade. 
• Erodes price hierarchy in off trade. 
• Increases unregulated alcohol sales 
and crime. 
Scottish Government 
MP’s (HSC and FC) 
Responsible 
consumers 
• Market distortion is unwarranted. 
Government intervention on 
price is poorly targeted and 
penalises responsible consumers. 
• The impact of an automatic MUP 
increase on contracts between 
retailers and producers should be 
considered. 
• Market control 
• Ban on selling below Duty + 
VAT 
• Sunset clause 
So
ci
al
 F
ra
m
e
 
Proactive  Tennent Caledonian, 
Molson Coors, the 
SLTA, and on-trade 
retailers. 
• To change the consumption habit 
of young people. 
• MUP must be proportionate to 
harm caused and reduce abuse by 
the minority problem drinkers. 
Scottish Government 
Consumers 
Responsible Retailers 
Charities 
• Education is not the best way 
forward. 
• Taxation is easily undermined by 
the off-trade retailers and 
shouldn’t be an option 
• Regulation 
• Promoting responsible 
drinking 
Reactive  All opposition 
industry actors 
• Protect responsible consumers. 
• Helping consumers make informed 
choices 
Government ministers 
Consumer 
Regulators 
• Any intervention should focus on 
the minority with alcohol 
problems. 
• MUP presents unintended 
consequences which undermine 
government efforts. 
• Market control 
• Education (Not, problem 
drinks, but problem drinkers) 
• Sunset clause 
• Annual review with evidence 
of effectiveness 
Source: Author
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6.5 Summary 
This chapter set out to address the research questions on how the alcohol industry 
responded to the Scottish MUP consultation, the frames they used, and how these frames 
inform our understanding of the alcohol industry cleavages. Cleavages are said to arise when 
actors have an interest to protect a target audience, and a disagreement between two or 
more parties in relation to the interest to be safeguarded. The chapter presented the 
positions of the industry actors on the MUP Bill using a structural or functional approach i.e. 
based on the industry sector they belong to. This approach considered the industry actors’ 
interest and target audience. It identified two main cleavages: (1) inter-industry cleavages 
i.e. between producers and retailers, and (2) intra-sectoral cleavages i.e. cleavages within 
the producer sector and within the retail sector. Further cleavages were also identified 
within the off-trade retail sector. In this chapter, the interests of the industry trade 
associations were classified as pro-market or pro-legislation, or as a mixture of both. The 
alcohol industry actors’ frames were reorganised to show the commonalities in industry use 
of language (despite their cleavages) that would otherwise not be captured using the 
structural or functional approach. The frames identified were economic and social frames. 
These frames were further subdivided into positive economic or negative economic frames, 
and as proactive or reactive social frames. This process, highlights industry cleavages as well 
as their points of agreement across the different sectors. 
This chapter has addressed the research questions set out in the introduction and has 
reflected on how cleavages were created and expressed through language. What we do not 
know is if these cleavages impacted on the policymakers’ deliberations or their perception 
of the alcohol industry, how these potential challenges were managed, and the implication 
of these cleavages for intra-industry cohesion and legitimacy. These concerns are addressed 
next. 
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CHAPTER 7. WE LOVE YOU DESPITE YOUR SHORTCOMINGS - 
POLICYMAKERS’ PERCEPTIONS OF ALCOHOL INDUSTRY 
CLEAVAGES AND STRATEGIES ADOPTED TO PREVENT 
DELEGITIMATION 
7.1 Introduction 
As already noted in the literature review in Chapter 3 and in the first findings chapter, 
cleavages are arenas of tension and contestation, and they often emerge within industries 
with differentiated products (Barnett, 2006; Kim, 2017) and large groups with different 
interests (Olson, 1965). Following my analysis, the key finding here is that contrary to the 
postulations of cleavages, the collective legitimacy of the Scottish alcohol industry is 
unharmed. This is a puzzle. For example, the then Cabinet Secretary Nicola Sturgeon stated  
… our alcohol industry is an important part of our economy. […] we will 
continue to offer support to businesses to grow including in the export 
market (Parliamentary meeting on March 14, 2012, pg. 7205)  
… none of the motivation behind the policy is an intention to damage 
legitimate business interests (see HSC report 2012, paragraph 307). 
The Scottish Government has continued to interact and collaborate with the alcohol 
industry, and the industry has continued to sell its products to consumers both at home and 
overseas. Given this scenario, and in line with literatures on corporate political activity – firm 
size and resource capability (Hillman and Hitt, 1999), firms level of power based on 
(economic) resources controlled (Hillman et al., 2004; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978), and 
legitimacy (Suchman, 1995; Diez-Martin et al., 2013) – it is evident that the industry did not 
lose its legitimacy and the government was solidly behind it. 
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In order to explore the identified puzzle further, this chapter addresses the research 
question: How do policymakers (as legitimacy conferrers) perceive and respond to cleavages 
without negatively affecting industry legitimacy? This question focuses on policymakers as 
conferrers of industry legitimacy (see Deephouse et al. 2017), and examines how the 
committee reports44, parliamentary deliberations, and interviews with MSPs dealt with 
industry actors’ cleavages in relation to their legitimacy as an industry. Deephouse et al. 
(2017)’s paper examined the various conferrers of legitimacy and how the conferrers of 
legitimacy evolved over time in the literature to include media, investors, and other 
stakeholders, of which policymakers are one of such groups. The focus of this thesis is on the 
discursive45 strategies that the policymakers used, to maintain the legitimacy of the alcohol 
industry in Scotland. The study finds that the policymakers, during their deliberations in 
parliament and through the committee reports, adopted some discursive legitimating 
strategies which helped to uphold the alcohol industry's legitimacy. This chapter explores 
the policymakers’ perception of the alcohol industry and their cleavages, and then discusses 
the legitimation strategies observed in policymakers’ texts and transcripts of parliamentary 
debates. 
 
7.2 Policymakers’ Perceptions of the Alcohol Industry and their Cleavages 
Evidence from the interviews, the committee’s report, and the transcripts of the 
parliamentary debates suggests that the Scottish Government perception of the alcohol 
industry is mixed (i.e. between favourable and unfavourable perceptions). On the favourable 
side of things, one of the MSPs during the parliamentary debates stated that he was “… not 
 
44 The committee reports formed the bases of the parliamentary debates and subsequent amendments to the 
MUP policy. 
45 The term discursive as used in this context of this thesis pertains to language use and should not be confused 
for discourse theory or discourse analysis. 
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opposed to working with the alcohol industry (Simpson – Labour MSP. Parliamentary 
debates 24/05/2012, pg. 9401), which is in line with the Scottish Government’s view that 
… the Bill looks to an increase in the productive Scottish economy, some of 
which will filter back to the Treasury. (HSC report 2012, paragraph 316). 
In addition, when MSPs were asked if the Scottish Government trusted the industry, the 
response was positive. 
I think we do trust the industry. I understand why the industry would be 
worried, although some MSPs were angry that the industry took it [the 
MUP policy] to court, after the judgement came out, the anger all 
evaporated away (MSP 1). 
MSP 1 added that "[T]he relationship between the government and the industry remained 
cordial even during the court proceedings". However, MSP 3 had a different view, which was 
unfavourable, whilst reflecting on the performance of the SWA and SGF representatives 
during the evidence session. 
I think they [SWA and SGF] lost a lot of credibility with members of the 
committee, certainly myself (MSP 3, emphasis added). 
This view stemmed from the fact the two industry actors denied that preloading as a 
phenomenon even existed. MSP 3 added that the industry actors made things up as they 
went along during the oral evidence session and that that did not do them any favours. He 
continued, stating that there were lots of issues with their credibility, that the evidence they 
gave was not credible and lots of it were assertions, but this loss in credibility was “short-
lived” (MSP 3). Reflecting on the legal challenge by the SWA, MSP 3 stated that the legal 
challenge was justifiable but “it lost them a lot of goodwill in parliament because it looked 
like they were disputing parliament authority on that issue”. The position of these MSPs 
aligns with Barnett (2006) assertion that organisations that stand out and oppose a 
government policy often do not stand to gain a favourable reputation. It is worth noting that 
during the interviews, the MSPs tended to use the phrases reputation and legitimacy 
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interchangeably. However, reputation refers to an organisation’s unique feature, whereas 
legitimacy is a shared feature beyond the individual organisation (see King and Whetten, 
2008). When asked how the government and MSPs viewed the alcohol industry in general, 
the responses from the MSPs interviewed were positive: 
I don’t think anyone is against the alcohol industry as such, exports of 
whisky are very important to Scotland, most people and I think everyone in 
the committee would support that. I don’t think anyone in the committee 
was antagonistic to the alcohol drinks industry … I would say on the whole, 
we have a positive attitude towards the alcohol business (MSP 2). 
The government in Scotland and the UK, in general, have a good 
relationship with the industry, the policy was not to anyway damage the 
alcohol industry. In an economic, sense, the whisky and gin and the beer 
industry is a big financial contributor to the economy (MSP 1). 
MSP 1 went on to justify his response by comparing the alcohol industry to the tobacco 
industry on the grounds of health benefits and the extent of harm caused. A similar 
comparison was made by Simpsons, an MSP during the parliamentary debates who quoted 
the World Health Organisation (WHO) stating, “The World Health Organisation is clear that 
there should be no input from the tobacco industry in discussions, but the alcohol industry 
is quite different” (Parliamentary debates 24/05/2012, pg. 9401). The reference to the WHO 
by the MSP in this regard positions the alcohol industry as legitimate compared to the 
tobacco industry. This position was also echoed by industry representatives during the 
interviews as shown with the extracts below: 
I think there are fundamental differences between tobacco and alcohol, the 
differences are the evidence on harm for tobacco is much more. There is 
nothing like a safe cigarette, while with alcohol, moderate consumption is 
said to be healthy (Participant 7 – beer producer). 
cigarette is a minority sport and not a majority sports, everyone in Scotland 
or a vast majority consumes alcohol responsibly whereas with cigarette it 
was a minority and the health impact was quite profound and the cigarette 
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industry was covering up the impacts of cigarettes on human beings 
(Participant 6 – beer producer). 
Despite the unfavourable dispensation, there was still a willingness to protect and continue 
working with the industry as shown in extracts from Nicola Sturgeon (see HSC report, 
paragraph 307), and the extracts from MSPs, which constitute a positive step to prevent the 
delegitimisation (or sustain the legitimacy) of the alcohol industry. 
The strategies used by the government to protect the legitimacy of the alcohol industry are 
explored in the section below. 
 
7.3 Policymakers’ Discursive Legitimating Strategies 
The preceding chapter identified two linguistic cleavages/frames – i.e. economic and social 
frames from industry actors’ submissions. These were further divided into positive and 
negative economic frames, and proactive and reactive social frames. The findings presented 
in this section, in line with Suchman (1995), van Leeuwen (2007), and Vaara et al., (2006)’s 
frameworks suggest that policymakers can use paradoxical legitimation or delegitimation 
strategies to uphold the legitimacy of an industry simultaneously, despite their structural 
and linguistic cleavages. For instance, this study suggests that they simultaneously or 
consecutively: (1) normalise and undermine, (2) co-opt and neutralise, (3) support and rebut, 
and (4) attack and protect. Using these strategies simultaneously appears to help create the 
balance that necessitated the sustained legitimacy of the alcohol industry in Scotland (See 
Table 7, and Figure 6 below). These strategies are further examined below. 
7.3.1 Normalisation for Undermining (i.e. Normalise and Undermine)  
Normalisation is a way of conferring legitimacy by reference to normal or natural behaviours 
(Vaara et al., 2006). My findings show that policymakers, in response to industry actors’ 
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frames and linguistic cleavages, try to normalise the emergent cleavages as a normal 
characteristic of both intra-industry competition and the policymaking process. The HSC 
acknowledged that industry actors can afford to take different perspectives and that 
competition is an integral part of life and business. Cleavages are thus, an expression of 
competition and “it is only natural” as noted by MSP 2. 
they did take different views; those that export was against, and those that 
were in support, like Tennent Caledonian46, I think that was logical. For 
some Scottish business with a high-end product if the cheaper products are 
forced to be more expensive that would probably help the better-quality 
products (MSP 2). 
When asked if the division affected the committee’s deliberations, MSP 1 replied, “No, I 
don’t think so” and went on to say that the presence of cleavage is a … 
strength rather than a weakness. The committee system that we operate 
in Scotland is very good for accommodating and allowing people to voice 
their opinion. It is not a case of divide and rule (MSP 1). 
The extracts above recognise the role of competition and healthy debate within the market 
and political systems in Scotland. 
[It was] just a natural consequence of the nature of the change that is being 
made and the fact that they were tackling problems being created by one 
part of the industry, which would have a benefit for the other side of the 
industry (MSP 3). 
Positioning cleavages as core to market competition normalises them and protects the 
legitimacy of the alcohol industry. Apart from the normalisation of cleavages, as an essential 
element of market competition, they also manifest in the policymaking process itself, where 
different actors formed different alliances. The findings suggest that the government also 
sought to normalise the discursive contestations between industry and other actors, as a 
 
46 Tennent Caledonian’s is predominantly a Scottish based business with limited or no export business side at 
the time (i.e. prior to its takeover by the C&C group). 
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way to maintain the legitimacy of the industry. For instance, the MSPs interviewed agreed 
that all the subjects discussed at committee stage never always had a consensus: “there is 
always a division amongst witnesses on the evidence” (MSP 2). This view was also shared by 
a representative of a trade association: “[T]he government understands that some will agree 
with them and others won't. They are used to it” (Participant 2). This is a normalisation 
strategy because it references a normal or natural functioning or behaviour” (Vaara et al., 
2006: 797). 
However, the normalisation of cleavages and competition in the policymaking process, in 
this instance, worked in favour of the Scottish Government. In the case of the MUP debates, 
the committee and the government took advantage of the industry cleavages and the 
differences in the opinions of the witnesses, in order to discursively undermine the position 
of the industry. For example, the government ministers used the comments of industry 
actors who supported MUP to undermine the position of those who did not support it as 
illustrated in the snippet in Box 1 below on the consumption patterns of young people. 
 
Box 1: Extract from HSC report, (2012) pg. 21 paragraphs 105 to 107. 
As one of the MSPs acknowledged during the interview, the division amongst industry actors, 
“… strengthened the government's position that some alcohol industry members did support 
105.  Young people‘s attitude to drink was of particular concern to some witnesses. Dr Gillan told the 
Committee—  
“We adults have not yet grasped how the drinking culture among young people has changed, even 
compared with the culture when we were young.”90  
106.  The drinks industry also recognised a change in the behaviour of the younger generation, particularly 
when it came to “pre-loading”. Michael Patten of Diageo suggested they were less responsive to pricing than 
policymakers may wish. He said— 
“We have seen shifts in the culture around alcohol consumption that need to be addressed, but we are 
not going to succeed in doing that using the pricing mechanism.”91  
107.  Paul Waterson of the Scottish Licensed Trade Association took a contrasting view, putting pricing firmly 
in the centre of the discussion. He told the Committee—  
“A change is taking place that is being driven by price, which is taking people out of the controlled 
environment and allowing them to drink at home. It is quite an easy equation to do. There is no doubt 
that young people are strategic when it comes to planning their drinking on the basis of price.”92  
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the minimum pricing” (MSP 2). The interviewee went on to say that “if the whole industry 
were [SIC] united against it [i.e. the MUP Bill], I suppose it would have had some effect” (MSP 
2, emphasis added). By effect, the MSP meant “… the opponents in parliament would have 
been in a stronger position if there had been nobody from the alcohol industry supporting it 
and giving evidence to that effect” (MSP 2). Some industry actors corroborated this view: 
It would have been much easier particularly if the SLTA had opposed the 
MUP; and if the whole industry had been opposed, then, indeed, the 
political argument would have been easier to engage with; and I think there 
would have been hesitation from the Scottish Government, in going ahead. 
Just as there is hesitation in the UK Government about going ahead with 
the MUP (Participant 4 – trade association). 
In other words, the way a government frames a policy and the evidence it presents to 
support its position can fuel cleavages amongst the different actors, and at the same time 
normalise these cleavages, as a form of competition or as part of the normal policy process. 
In line with Sturdy et al. (2012), the SNP government’s health-focused manifesto can be said 
to have used the MUP consultation process to gather support and to recruit industry actors 
to “help in the implementation” of the policy (MSP 1). One way to make sense of this 
contradictory position of normalising for undermining is to argue that while the government 
sees competition as normal, it does its best to pander to the excesses of competition in line 
with societal expectations. The balance here between normal competition and abnormal 
competition (i.e. the excesses of competition) is an expression of moral legitimacy. In that 
regard, normalisation for undermining, as a legitimating strategy, protects industry actors’ 
moral legitimacy by realigning the industry to accepted societal norms. Cleavages 
characterised as part of the policy process, in this instance, may undermine the industry but 
also support the recruitment of industry actors to help implement the will of the government 
as explained next. 
7.3.2 Co-optation for Neutralisation (i.e. Co-opt and Neutralise) 
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This strategy, as the name suggests, involves identifying with the opponents’ views in order 
to co-opt them. In that regard, opponents could also be positioned as partners (Luyckx and 
Janssens, 2016) and thus help legitimise the opponents. Luyckx and Janssens referred to 
these as “discursive co-optation”. In their reports, the committee sometimes sided with the 
industry actors. For example, the HSC did not disagree with the industry on the point of 
better education for consumers. They also acknowledged the role of the industry actors in 
the implementation process, as stated by an MSP during the interview: 
It was good to bring the industry in and they did come up with ideas that 
would help in implementing and on the issues regarding the misuse of 
alcohol (MSP 1). 
A trade representative also corroborated this view during the interview: “the policy is here, 
and implementation seems to have gone smoothly and I think we helped to play a big part 
in that happening” (Participant 5 – retail trade association). MSP 1 went on to state that it 
was natural for someone involved in the industry, who feels the minimum pricing will restrict 
them, to go against the bill. Nevertheless, the evidence for change for those who supported 
the Bill was said to outweigh the evidence of the positive benefits of alcohol, especially when 
it comes to health matters, law and order, the damage to family setting, and the disruption 
in homes. That type of evidence “is what led to the conclusion” (MSP 1). 
The HSC, in their report, acknowledged the views of industry actors from both sides of the 
debate. They presented SLTA’s Paul Waterson’s view, which puts pricing at the centre of the 
debates. The Cabinet Secretary also acknowledged the point raised by Diageo’s Michael 
Patten on the response of young people to pricing and pre-loading culture, and stated that 
the University of Sheffield study “found a “slightly smaller” but “still significant” impact on 
18-24-year-olds. She also acknowledged that the modelling did not address binge drinking 
(Nicola Sturgeon, Parliamentary debate 14/03/2012. pg. 7211), thus validating Diageo’s 
position. In another instance, the HSC also presented the accounts of two retailers who 
stated that there would be no windfall, or at best, the windfall would not be as large as 
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quoted by the Sheffield study; they then presented a counter-narrative from another 
industry actor who states that the biggest benefactors of any windfall will be the larger 
supermarkets. Responding to these cleavages, the HSC presented another quote from The 
Centre for Economics and Business Research (CEBR), an organisation widely referred to by 
industry actors who opposed the Bill stating that the retailers stand to benefit "at the 
expense of the poor consumers in Scotland". The HSC also drew from the opinion of a health 
researcher who states that it does not matter who takes the extra revenue and that what 
matters is that there are fewer causalities because of alcohol consumption. 
Quotes from industry actors who supported the Bill helped to strengthen the government’s 
position and in one instance (see paragraph 171), an opposing view from an industry actor 
(Diageo) who opposed the Bill was presented. The quote by Diageo advocated that a higher 
MUP value of 70p should not be considered, claiming that there would be “loss of utility and 
enjoyment, reduced consumption, and the impact on the domestic industries” (HSC report, 
paragraph 171). A third extract from a non-industry person (see paragraph 172) advocating 
for a 50p MUP was next presented. Notwithstanding, positioning the industry actors against 
each other in this manner has a cancelling effect on the industry actors’ argument, but in a 
way that does not delegitimise the industry. 
Another strategy observed in the policymakers report, is discursive antagonism47. This 
consists of counter-narratives that neutralise industry actors’ concerns in a way that 
preserves or produces a positive image of the industry actor under scrutiny. Discursive 
antagonism is not a criticism of the industry actor nor is it intended to undermine the 
industry actors’ credibility (see Luyckx and Janssens, 2016).  
The government and the committee selectively used the evidence from industry actors who 
opposed the Bill and focused on evidence from non-industry actors. The non-industry actors’ 
 
47 Discursive antagonism is captured as Narrativisation in van Leeuwen and Wodak, (1999) and as 
Mythopoesis in Vaara et al. (2006). 
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evidence used were the Wagenaar systematic review48, the two studies by the ScHARR at 
the University of Sheffield, and evidence from prominent researchers including Stockwell. 
These studies were referred to in the discussions on the link between price and consumption 
of alcohol. For example, the HSC noted that the “assumptions made in the Financial 
Memorandum (FM) regarding the price-consumption-harm link were challenged by a 
number of industry organisations” (HSC report 2012, paragraph 284), but this was 
neutralised by stating that the actors “did not present any “evidence to contradict the 
modelling of impacts on harmful drinking”” (HSC report, paragraph 286). 
The WSTA and the SGF shared their concerns that the FM did not consider the impact of the 
Bill on the lowest income group. The FC noted their concerns but provided counterevidence 
which showed that “the alcohol related [SIC] death rate in the most deprived 20% of our 
population is five times that of the least deprived 20%”, thus, suggesting “the impact on 
people with low incomes should continue to be evaluated, should the Bill become law.” (FC 
report, paragraph 48 and 49). 
On the ScHARR modelling, the FC “recognises that there are conflicting views from 
stakeholders on the extent to which MUP will change the habits of harmful drinkers”. The 
Committee notes that while concerns have been expressed regarding the modelling, that no 
evidence to contradict the ScHARR modelling has been presented to the Committee. They, 
however, recommend that: 
Should the bill become law, the Committee considers it crucial that the 
impact of minimum unit pricing is evaluated, particularly its impact on 
harmful drinking, including establishing whether and the extent to which 
the policy has resulted in savings to the NHS and the justice system (FC 
report, paragraph, 35). 
 
48 The Wagenaar systematic review considered 100 separate studies reporting over 1,000 statistical estimates 
over the last 30 years. 
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The extract above shows that although the FC neutralised industry actors concerns, they did 
not disregard them. They acknowledged their concerns and suggested future evaluation. In 
this case, co-optation for neutralisation helps to realign the industry actors’ interest to 
societal needs and upholds the alcohol industry’s pragmatic legitimacy (Suchman, 1995). 
7.3.3 Rebuttal for Support (i.e. Rebut and Support)  
Legitimation can be derived from reference to authority (Vaara et al., 2006) or individuals 
within whom institutional authority is vested (van Leeuwen, 2007). This is technically called 
authorisation (Vaara et al., 2006; van Leeuwen, 2007; van Leeuwen and Wodak 1999). In the 
context of this study, three forms of authorisation are noted. Firstly, the HSC and the Scottish 
Government downplayed the possible negative impacts of MUP by acknowledging and 
providing alternative explanations to the negative unintended consequences cited by 
industry actors. Secondly, the HSC, the FC, and the Scottish Government offered support to 
the industry based on some expert views. Thirdly, the committees and the Scottish 
Government counteracted industry actors and at the same time alleviated their concerns, 
again based on some comments from experts. 
7.3.3.1 Alternative Explanations 
Policy actors, in their reports, presented alternative explanations for the negative 
unintended consequences cited by industry actors in their submissions. Some of these 
consequences include the effect of differential prices between Scotland and England, which 
are anticipated to increase cross-border and internet sales of alcohol, black market activities, 
home brewing, counterfeit products, and job losses, and reduce exports. Writing on the 
consequences of the Bill, the HSC presented a quote from Stockwell, an authority which 
acknowledged the presence of some of these unintended negative consequences: 
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We need to think of the big picture. We must acknowledge that, with such 
a major change, there will be some unintended negative consequences, but 
they can be managed in other ways. The overall public health safety 
benefits are massive and should not be sacrificed for such concerns (HSC 
report, paragraph 194). 
The extract above, as presented in the report, downplays the unintended negative 
consequences of the Bill raised by industry actors by stating that “… they can be managed in 
other ways”. Using an extract from Asda’s David Paterson during the evidence session, which 
focused on the effect of the price differences between England and Scotland and the 
possibility of increased online alcohol retail and its impact on the Scottish economy (see HSC 
report paragraph 214), policymakers downplayed the concern of cross-border and online 
shopping by citing the Financial Memorandum (FM): 
The Financial Memorandum that accompanied the Bill on introduction 
suggests that most consumers of low cost [SIC] alcohol do not purchase 
drink online (HSC report, paragraph 215). 
However, the SGF, WSTA, and Asda dispute this, stating that the “Scottish Government 
underestimated the potential of the policy to boost both internet and cross-border sales” 
and that the potential for a rise in grey and black markets and counterfeit products have not 
been properly accounted for. The HSC responded: 
The Committee also notes the view expressed by others that, while people 
at the lower end of the socio-economic spectrum could proportionately 
face more of a financial impact, they also carried the greatest burden of 
harm from alcohol and, therefore, could be the group to benefit most (HSC 
report, paragraph 296). 
In their report, the FC noted the industry actors’ concerns on the negative economic impact, 
but they addressed their fears by stating that numbers of job losses suggested were 
hypothetical: 
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It is difficult for us to say that there will be nil impact, but we are not 
persuaded by the figures in the Scotch Whisky Association’s claims. (FC 
report, paragraph 71). 
The HSC also concluded that the SWA’s assertions on the impact on whisky exports lacked 
enough evidence, but recommended that the Scottish Government should continue to 
monitor the effect of MUP on whisky exports and job losses (HSC report 2012, paragraph 
319).  In addition, the FC noted that: 
… “all minimum price scenarios modelled result in estimated increased 
revenue to the alcohol industry (excluding VAT and duty)” in both off and 
on-trade sectors (FC report, paragraph 57). 
The outcome of the alternative explanation offered by the policymakers is to downplay the 
unintended negative consequences cited by the industry and prevent unnecessary 
embarrassment to the government. 
7.3.3.2 Counteracting Industry Actors’ Comments 
The findings of this study also suggest that the policymakers ignored most of the arguments 
presented by industry actors and used evidence from other non-industry actors to buttress 
their positions. This form of authorisation, according to van Leeuwen (2007), focuses on the 
authority of individuals in whom institutional authority is vested. 
… well, we didn’t make use of this in this regard because they [Alcohol 
industry actors] said it wouldn’t work apart from one or two exceptions, 
erm but that went counter to the other evidence we had. We did record 
what they said but we came to a different conclusion (MSP 1, emphasis 
added). 
When the views of industry actors who oppose the bill were cited, MSP 1 stated that they 
made recommendations that would counter what they said. The government did not pay 
much attention to the differences within the industry but focused on the evidence presented 
by non-industry supporters of the Bill. For example, the WSTA and Edrington Group 
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questioned the Scottish Government’s intention to introduce MUP when the statistics show 
a reduction in health harms. The committee reacted positively by questioning the reliability 
of the results contained in the Sheffield report, and whether it could be applied 
retrospectively to recent recorded data to test whether they would have predicted the 
reduction in the number of alcohol-related deaths that have actually occurred (HSC report, 
paragraph 46). 
On the issue of the windfall figures, the HSC presented three consecutive extracts from 
industry actors who oppose the Bill (see paragraphs 196 - 198). These extracts were from 
Tesco, Asda, and the SBPA. The extracts portrayed the different interests of these actors on 
this issue, but these were immediately counteracted by four extracts from the CEBR, 
Stockwell, Rice, and the Institute of Fiscal Study (IFS), all four having a different view on the 
subject (see paragraph 199 - 202). Policymakers counteracting industry actors’ comments 
help provide justification for the Bill, a form of rationalisation (van Leeuwen and Wodak, 
1999; Vaara et al., 2006) which helps to uphold the legitimacy of the industry actors. 
7.3.3.3 Offering Support to the Industry 
In the committee reports and during the parliamentary debates, the cabinet secretary 
repeatedly states that the Scottish Government continues to support the alcohol industry as 
shown in the extracts below.  
It is also important to say again, as I have said all along, that our alcohol 
industry is an important part of our economy… we will continue to offer 
support to businesses to grow (Cabinet Secretary – Nicola Sturgeon 
Parliamentary meeting, pg. 7205). 
I am keen to continue to work with the supermarkets and the wider industry 
– that comment applies to the entire alcohol industry… None of the 
motivation behind the policy is an intention to damage legitimate business 
interests. The alcohol industry is extremely important to Scotland. Our 
intention is to deal with the health harms that are done by alcohol misuse 
(Cabinet Secretary – Nicola Sturgeon, HSC report, paragraph 307). 
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This outward show of support paves the way for future collaborations, helps prevent 
industry stigmatisation, and reinforces the alcohol industry as stakeholders in the Scottish 
economy and the alcohol policy table. From the extracts above, Nicola Sturgeon attempts to 
destigmatise the industry, arguably because of the perceived benefits of alcohol sales to the 
economy. The view on the legitimacy of the alcohol industry was reinforced during an 
interview session – “I have not heard anyone say that the whisky or the alcohol industry is 
not legitimate. We all agree that they are legitimate” (MSP 2). Policymakers offering support 
to the industry actors’ help prevent stigmatisation of the alcohol industry and preserve their 
moral legitimacy (Suchman, 1995; Diez-Martin et al., 2013). 
7.3.4 De-coupling/Demystify for Protection (i.e. Attack the Product and 
Protect the Producer) 
This is the last strategy observed in committee reports and during the parliamentary 
debates. The committee’s reports increasingly focused on alcohol as a substance and the 
need to change the culture of excess. This increased focus deviated attention from the 
industry actors. The committee and the Scottish Government avoided direct criticism of the 
industry but rather used positive language such as “continue to work with [the industry]” 
(HSC report, paragraph 309, emphasis added), “the unbalanced relationship” (HSC report, 
paragraph 10), “changing the culture” (HSC report, paragraphs 86 and 103) without linking 
the culture of alcohol misuse to the practices of the industry. The increased focus on the 
substance (alcohol) appears to exonerate the industry from the damage caused by their 
product and this is buttressed in the extract below by Nicola Sturgeon: 
I make it clear at the outset, as I hope I have been clear all along, that the 
Scottish Government is not anti-alcohol. We are not against drinking, but 
we are very much against the problems that are associated with excessive 
consumption of alcohol (Parliamentary debates 14/03/2012 - Nicola 
Sturgeon, pg. 7204). 
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The extract above focuses on the consequences of alcohol as a product without implicating 
the producers or retailers. The Cabinet Minister is not saying that alcohol is bad per se. The 
strategy observed here is one of deflection, which helps to uphold the alcohol industry’s 
legitimacy. Another example of a reduced focus on the industry can be seen from the 
actions/inaction of the committee in representing the views of industry actors who support 
the policy. In the written submissions by the SLTA, Mr Bremner, Mr Stewart, and CAMRA, 
these organisations highlighted that introducing a MUP for alcohol will prevent VAT and Duty 
fraud practices of the off-trade retail sector to the benefit of the exchequer. This was 
however omitted, or not referred to in the committee reports. Including this in the 
committee reports would have been damaging to the industry. The Scottish Government’s 
aim for introducing the MUP Bill, as reflected in the interviewee’s response, was: 
… regarding peoples’ health and how alcohol impacted people’s health and 
wellbeing and it was not a policy to say drinking per se is bad it was a policy 
to say the abuse and overuse of alcohol is something that would damage 
your health. It was not a policy to restrict or damage the industry but the 
damage it [alcohol] causes to the individual (MSP 1, emphasis added). 
The aim is for Scotland to have a better relationship with alcohol. I think 
and most people think that alcohol is not a bad thing in itself, but it is to 
have a better relationship (MSP 2). 
The successful de-coupling or demystification of alcohol as a product from its producers 
helped to uphold and preserve the alcohol industry’s moral and cognitive legitimacy 
(Suchman, 1995). The Scottish Government and the policymakers’ de-coupling of alcohol as 
a product from the alcohol industry itself is linked to the ongoing relationship fostered over 
the years, the positive contribution of the alcohol industry to the Scottish economy, and the 
health benefits attributed to the moderate consumption of alcohol.  
The discursive strategies adopted by the Scottish Government to preserve the legitimacy of 
the alcohol industry is summarised, in Table 7 below and Figure 6 below. Figure 6 highlights 
the outcomes of the observed strategies under two headings: (1) (Re)alignment, and (2) de-
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stigmatisation. These outcomes in turn produce three further outcomes in line with 
Suchman (1995) to protect the alcohol industry’s prior moral, pragmatic, and cognitive 
legitimacy.
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Table 7: Summarising the legitimating strategies observed and their intended outcomes and implications for legitimacy 
Legitimating 
strategies 
Definition Sub-strategies Examples  Intended outcomes Implications for 
Legitimacy  
Normalisation for 
Undermining 
Legitimation by reference 
to normal or natural 
functioning or behaviour 
(Vaara et al., 2006). 
Cleavages as 
competition between 
industry actors 
Cleavages are an expression of 
competition “it is only natural… 
they did take different views” 
(MSP 2). 
To realign the industry 
actors to accepted 
societal norms 
To protect industry actors’ 
legitimacy. 
 
Cleavages as 
characteristics of the 
policy process  
“there is always a division 
amongst witnesses on the 
evidence” (MSP 2) 
Co-optation for 
Neutralisation   
Identifying with 
opponents and presenting 
counter-narratives aimed 
at preserving a positive 
image of the actor under 
scrutiny which is opposite 
to the criticism as well as 
a negative image of the 
opponents to undermine 
their credibility (Luyckx 
and Janssens, 2016). 
Discursive co-optation 
(Luyckx and Janssens, 
2016) 
It was good to bring the industry 
in and they did come up with 
ideas that would help in 
implementing and on the issues 
regarding the misuse of alcohol 
(MSP 1). 
To realign the industry 
actors’ interest to 
societal needs 
To uphold the alcohol 
industry pragmatic 
legitimacy 
Discursive antagonism 
(Luyckx and Janssens, 
2016) 
actors did not present any 
evidence to contradict the 
modelling of impacts on harmful 
drinking (HSC report, paragraph 
286). 
Counter evidence the retailers stand to benefit "at 
the expense of the poor 
consumers in Scotland" (HSC 
report). 
Authorisation - 
Rebuttal for 
Support 
Legitimation by reference 
to authority (Vaara et al., 
2006). Referring to the 
authority of actors and 
individuals in whom 
institutional authority of 
Alternative explanations We must acknowledge that, with 
such a major change, there will 
be some unintended negative 
consequences, but they can be 
managed in other ways (HSC 
report, paragraph 194). 
To downplay the 
unintended 
consequences cited by 
industry actors and 
prevent stigmatisation 
Maintain moral legitimacy 
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Legitimating 
strategies 
Definition Sub-strategies Examples  Intended outcomes Implications for 
Legitimacy  
some kind is vested (Van 
Leeuwen, 2007) 
Offering support I am keen to continue to work 
with the supermarkets and the 
wider industry (HSC report, 
paragraph 307). 
Counteracting Our recommendation came not 
from the industry but the others 
(MSP 1). 
De-coupling/ 
Demystify for 
Protection 
The increased focus on 
the positive attributes of 
the industry 
 The Scottish Government is not 
anti-alcohol. We are not against 
drinking, but we are very much 
against the problems that are 
associated with excessive 
consumption of alcohol 
(Parliamentary debates March 
2012 Nicola Sturgeon, pg. 7204). 
To uphold/preserve 
the alcohol industry’s 
legitimacy and 
prevents de-
stigmatisation. 
Uphold and preserve the 
moral and cognitive 
legitimacy of the industry. 
 
Source: Author 
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Figure 6: Legitimating strategies and outcomes for legitimacy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author 
 
In summary, the Scottish Government is happy to continue working with and supporting the 
alcohol industry and acknowledge that they trust the industry, yet they ignore their concerns 
on the Bill. According to Suchman (1995: 575), “audiences perceive the legitimate 
organisation not only as more worthy, but also as more meaningful, more predictable, and 
more trustworthy”. The industry actors’ position on the MUP policy may have impacted on 
their reputation and trust levels, but overall, their legitimacy was not damaged. The thesis 
considered two broad areas (trust and credibility/reputation), albeit loosely, during the 
interviews in order to help evaluate the policymakers’ perception of the industry as a 
legitimate entity. This chapter moves on to examine the impact of industry cleavages on the 
inter-industry dynamics and the strategies industry actors adopted that helped to prevent 
delegitimisation (and sustain legitimacy). 
 
 
Normalise and 
undermine 
Strategies Outcomes (1) 
Industry 
Legitimacy 
Pragmatic legitimacy 
Outcomes (2) 
(Re)alignment 
Co-opt to 
neutralise 
Moral legitimacy 
Support and 
rebut 
Cognitive legitimacy De-stigmatisation 
Protect and 
attack 
Discursive legitimation strategies  
Normalisation. Authorisation. Rationalisation. 
Narrativisation (Vaara et al. 2006). 
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7.4 Summary 
This chapter addresses the question on how policymakers as legitimacy conferrers perceive 
and respond to cleavages without negatively affecting the alcohol industry’s legitimacy 
during the Scottish MUP policy deliberations. The key finding from this chapter is that 
policymakers adopted discursive legitimation strategies observed in the works of Vaara and 
colleagues especially Vaara et al., (2006) in order to protect the alcohol industry’s legitimacy. 
The discursive legitimation strategies adopted by the policymakers during the policy process, 
as evident in their committee reports during the parliamentary deliberations and at the 
interviews, confirm that the Scottish Government and policymakers did not propose the 
MUP policy with the intention of delegitimising the alcohol industry. This thesis moves on to 
examine how the frames and language adopted by the alcohol industry actors during and 
after the policy process could have contributed to the management of the industry’s 
legitimacy despite their division on the policy. 
 
  
Divided We Stand: Exploring the Alcohol Industry Framing of the Alcohol (Minimum Pricing) (Scotland) Act Consultation.  
 
 
 
PhD Thesis 2020  I. J. Amaeshi.  Page | 179  
 
 
CHAPTER 8. DIVIDED WE STAND - CLEAVAGES, AND THE 
ALCOHOL INDUSTRY STRATEGIES FOR MAINTAINING COLLECTIVE 
LEGITIMACY 
8.1 Introduction 
The literature tells us that cleavages result in the inability of members of a group to present 
a unified voice when faced with external threats, and loss of reputation (Christiansen and 
Kroezen, 2016; Winn et al., 2008), and reputation is closely linked to legitimacy. This result 
chapter explores why alcohol industry cleavages did not result to loss of legitimacy. The 
preceding results chapter shows how the Scottish policymakers, as conferrers of legitimacy, 
adopted discursive legitimating strategies in order to preserve the alcohol industry’s 
legitimacy. This chapter explores how industry actors discursively sustained their collective 
legitimacy despite their cleavages, thus paving way for future and continued collaboration 
(see Deephouse et al., 2017). 
The findings suggest that alcohol industry actors deploy some strategies in order to maintain 
industry cohesion. This is in line with Deephouse et al. (2017) on how organisations in an 
organisational field confer legitimacy on one another. The strategies observed in this study, 
are classed broadly as discursive and relational strategies and it is said to have contributed 
to upholding the alcohol industry’s pragmatic, moral, and/or cognitive legitimacy. This 
chapter starts off by exploring the industry actors’ perception of their differences, and 
legitimacy before moving on to examine the observed strategies from their consultation 
submissions and their interview response. 
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8.2 Intra-industry Perceptions of their Differences 
The legitimacy of an organisation comes under attack when their business practices conflict 
with stakeholders’ or societal expectations (Suchman, 1995). As such, intra-industry 
legitimacy can be a function of how industry actors, as legitimate stakeholders (competitors 
and collaborators) (Mitchell et al., 1997), perceive each other and their ability to collaborate 
with one another. The findings here show that there are three distinct groups of intra-
industry perceptions: (1) positive perception, (2) negative perception, and (3) mixed 
perception. A summary of the three distinct groups are presented in Table 8. Industry actors’ 
perception and/or endorsement of each other is necessary and a good step towards 
attaining inter-industry cohesion, and this contributes to furthering their legitimacy (See 
Deephouse et al., 2017). 
Positive perception: Intra-industry positive perception arises when industry actors justify 
their positions and actions, as well as those of other actors in the industry. They see nothing 
wrong in either supporting or opposing the MUP. For them, it is the normal course of doing 
business and being in the marketplace. For example, Participant 4 (a trade association 
representative) opposed the MUP and justified their association’s position, stating: “MUP 
was an issue of such enormous importance to our members, we felt it was good to challenge 
the government even if there were some reputational downside as a result. It was 
definitively worth tackling and taking up with the Scottish Government for the long-term 
interests”. A representative of a high-strength alcohol producer stated that their “intention 
was not to oppose the mechanism that will reduce alcohol-related harm” (Participant 7). As 
an organisation, they worried about the effectiveness of the policy and the impact on the 
industry. Participant 7 had a positive perception of their rivals, but suggested that MUP is a 
complex social issue with multiple interwoven firms, and as a result there is bound to be a 
very broad spectrum of perspectives which does not make the other actors more or less 
legitimate (Participant 7). This view from Participant 7 appears to normalise cleavages, and 
thus the absence of cohesion on MUP as a policy issue. This view was shared by other 
producers of high-strength alcohol beverages and their trade representatives. 
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Negative perception: This presents as some form of dissatisfaction against how either a firm 
or the industry responded to MUP. It sometimes manifests as an expression of mistrust as 
seen below: 
… there is this whole element of trust with the other industry because it 
seems to the whole [names trade association] that last time we were left 
to fight the battle and take the costs and the bad publicity and all the 
hassles (Participant 1 – whisky producer, emphasis added). 
Participant 1 also stated that the MUP "lessened the trust" within the alcohol industry as it 
became clearer that the members’ interests were not hugely aligned. For example, “the beer 
companies argued their case very heavily quite actively and I guess it highlights that they 
won't hesitate if there were a difference of views on a particular topic to work against us” 
(Participant 1). The industry sector that exhibited this type of behaviour most are producers 
of high strength alcohol beverage. 
Mixed perception: This perception arises when an industry actor is ambivalent and ad hoc 
in approach. This is particularly true for industry actors who switched position on MUP. Their 
perceptions tend to vary and are dependent on their positions on MUP at any given time. 
Participant 2 (trade association), speaking on their ability to work with other industry actors, 
stated that they “had a slightly different objective to other industry actors”, and that when 
their objectives align, they work with other industry actors and when they don’t, “we don’t”. 
Participant 2 stated that “… the fact that we changed our position on MUP has made it 
difficult for others to work with us because of problems with consistency”. This lack of 
consistency impacts on trust and future relationship. Participant 3 (retail trade association), 
speaking on the public perception of the industry, stated that the industry’s reputation was 
damaged, and this encouraged them as a trade body to switch position in order to maintain 
their legitimacy and a positive public perception of the retail sector. Participant 3 went on to 
state that “over the last 18 months to the implementation of MUP, trust from the 
government to our organisation improved”, and this is due to their revised position on MUP. 
Participant 3 implies that MUP has affected the alcohol industry reputation with the 
government, particularly for producers who opposed the Bill, but not the retailers since they 
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moved to support the Bill. This aligns with Deephouse et al. (2009: 9)’s assertion that 
“organisations that stand out, gain a favourable reputation” sometimes. The industry sector 
that exhibited this type of behaviour most are trade associations representing the off-trade 
retail sector. 
 
Table 8: Summary of intra-industry perception of legitimacy 
Perceptions Descriptions Dominant Actors 
Positive Industry actors justify their position and 
actions and those of other industry actors 
Producers of high-strength alcohol 
and their trade representative 
Negative Dissatisfaction on other industry actors’ 
response to the MUP 
Producers of high-strength alcohol 
Mixed Industry actors who switched position on 
MUP during the debates 
Trade Associations representing the 
off-trade retail sector 
Source: Author 
These perceptions obviously suggest that the industry was not homogenous and that the 
MUP offered a space for contestations of perceptions, which could have had negative 
implications for the collective legitimacy of the industry (Christiansen and Kroezen, 2016). 
However, this did not happen, which makes one to wonder why that was the case. The study 
finds that the industry actors used both discursive and relational strategies to manage and 
maintain their collective legitimacy, despite their contested and conflicting perceptions of 
themselves and each other. These strategies are further explored below. 
 
8.3 Alcohol Industry Actors’ Strategies for Managing Legitimacy 
Applying van Leeuwen and Wodak (1999)’s discursive legitimation framework and Suchman 
(1995)’s legitimacy theory, the industry actors adopted two main broad strategies for 
managing their perception of legitimacy. One is discursive and the other is relational. 
Discursive strategies, as the name implies, draw from the use of language, while relational 
strategies draw from relationships, networks, and partnerships for social capital 
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development. The finding in this chapter suggests that industry actors used both discursive 
and relational strategies in a complementary fashion to uphold their legitimacy at the 
industry level. Whilst they used discursive strategies to avoid or minimise conflicts amongst 
themselves (i.e. avoidance strategies), they used relational strategies to attract/build 
relationships with each other beyond the MUP debate (i.e. attraction strategies), as 
highlighted in Table 9 and Figure 7 below. Avoidance strategies manifest through discourse, 
whilst attraction strategies manifest through relationship building. They collectively and 
complementarily enhance the alcohol industry legitimacy. These strategies are explored 
further below under the broad headings of ‘discursive’ and ‘relational’ strategies. 
8.3.1 Discursive (Avoidance) Strategies  
These strategies involve the use of language to avoid delegitimation. During the interviews, 
industry actors presented a balanced argument in ways that promote mutual respect. For 
example, they did not talk ill of each other, and their communication with one another was 
open, as demonstrated below. Secondly, although their perceptions of MUP, as a collective 
threat, varied, overall, they talked down the threat level. Finally, they communicated 
indirectly through their trade associations, which projected the perception of unity. The key 
theme uniting all three sub-strategies is avoidance and the outcome is a stable perception 
of each other. The industry actors avoided scenarios that would result to conflicts and 
collective reputational crises. These sub-strategies are explored below under the following 
headings – quality and balance of the debate (i.e. how industry actors rationalise the 
arguments they presented), industry sense-making of MUP as a collective threat (i.e. the 
narrativisation of events), and the role of the trade associations. 
8.3.1.1 Quality and Balance of the Debate 
During the debates and at the interviews, industry actors presented balanced arguments, 
which showcased their interests or points of view in an authoritative manner. They did not 
talk ill of each other and they were respectful throughout. For example, here are some 
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responses when participants were asked how they felt about other industry actors who had 
different views and interests to theirs: 
erm [hesitation] I think they misjudged it. Most of the people that opposed 
MUP make their profits outside of Scotland and in other markets. Their 
stance was a mixture of they didn’t want the Scottish Government bringing 
in a legislation that could be replicated elsewhere because it would reduce 
the demand for alcohol and they didn’t like the concept as there was a 
health issue associated with alcohol so that was their rationale. It is a 
perfectly legitimate rationale to have and I am not going to criticise it erm 
[hesitation] but on a moral basis we took the view that they were wrong 
because it had a democratic support so, it was about self-interest and 
community interest (Participant 6 – beer producer). 
I think on a matter like this there is a variety of perspectives and all the 
perspective are legitimate. I haven’t seen anyone in the industry not 
motivated by positive intent to reduce alcohol misuse. No one in the 
industry will say we will hold a negative view of others who genuinely 
motivated to do the right thing (Participant 7 – beer producer).49 
[We] don’t pitch ourselves against other trade associations, that was their 
view and we represent different parts of the industry, so we all have 
different views (Participant 5 – retail trade association). 
The participants also noted that they communicated their intentions to one another, 
promoting a free flow of ideas, reducing elements of surprise, and keeping the channel for 
future collaborations open. 
we were pretty clear about how we communicate with other people; we 
say this is where we are going, we shared press comments with other 
groups (Participant 3 – retail trade association). 
We work with the industry to make sure those in support were saying 
similar things to us. We presented a joint letter from the CEO at the time 
which was signed and sent to the government (Participant 2 – trade 
association). 
The key thing is understanding why some of them came to this position. It’s 
all about minimising surprise, you don’t have to agree with them as long 
 
49 It is worthy to note that both Participants 6 and 7 are from the same industry sector i.e. producer company 
and both manufacture low-strength alcohol products, but their views are dissimilar. 
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you know what they are going to do and why, and that’s a good way to 
maintain relationships (Participant 5 – retail trade association). 
Every member is entitled to their opinion and the fact that they disagree 
with each other does not mean they cannot work together (Participant 8 – 
beer producer). 
The ability to communicate clearly, authoritatively, and convincingly are strategies for 
maintaining both pragmatic and moral legitimacy, which reflects a positive normative 
evaluation of the organisations and their activities (Suchman, 1995). Some industry actors 
(i.e. producers) represented themselves during the debates as well as being represented by 
their trade associations. During the interviews, some trade associations talked about the 
importance of open communication amongst industry actors and the benefits of presenting 
a unified front with members from the same sector putting forward a submission to the 
consultation and participating in the debates. This shows strength in numbers and could 
persuade policy actors positively. As one trade association representative stated, “as a trade 
group it was helpful when members put in a submission and lots of time, they will be making 
similar arguments but sometimes it is added weight” (Participant 3). This strategy, according 
to Suchman (1995), helps industry actors to stockpile legitimacy and maintain 
interconnections. Industry actors perceive each other’s views as legitimate. This is what van 
Leeuwen and Wodak (1999: 150) referred to as legitimation by utility of the social practice – 
i.e. instrumental rationalisation – and this arguably contributed to maintaining industry 
cohesion despite the structural and linguistic cleavages identified. 
8.3.1.2 Industry’s Perception of the Nature of MUP Threat 
MUP, as a government Bill, is aimed at tackling alcohol misuse and associated problems, and 
by nature, it may come across as a potential collective threat to the industry. The findings 
from this study suggest that industry actors present a narrativisation50 account on the 
perceived collective threat levels of the MUP debate. Their stories, as told during the 
 
50 Narrativisation as a legitimating strategy, supports other types of legitimation, such as authorisation and 
rationalisation (Vaara et al., 2006). 
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interview on the threat level of MUP, were mixed. However, as much as possible, they tried 
to talk down the threat. Overall, they provided evidence of acceptable, appropriate, or 
preferential behaviour (van Leeuwen and Wodak, 1999). For example, the narrative 
presented in the extracts below implies that MUP is not a collective threat to their business 
or those of their members, as it would benefit them financially. 
Our position I guess we could see that it would benefit our business. We 
could also see some concerns around several different areas (Participant 1 
– whisky producer). 
I think it is not a major threat. For us the concern was telling us how to set 
prices on alcohol (Participant 3 – retail trade association). 
is not an existential threat it is just something the industry has to adjust to 
(Participant 5 – retail trade association). 
From the extracts above, industry actors are seen to talk down the threat level. Their 
concerns stem from “excessive government interference on pricing” and the lack of evidence 
on the effectiveness of MUP (Participant 3). Industry actors who acknowledge that the MUP 
is a threat, focus on the threat level on individual products, for example, the threat posed by 
MUP on scotch whisky, which is said to lie with the uncertainty of the effect on the product 
in the global market (Participant 1). Another participant added MUP is: 
a threat in total level of consumption. The modelling that was done by 
Sheffield University erm suggested it will reduce consumption by anywhere 
up to 10% so it’s a threat to total consumption. It is a threat to certain type 
of alcohol and it's a threat to alcohol sold at very low prices (Participant 6 
– beer producer). 
The extract above by Participant 6 represents an example of a negative narrativisation. A 
negative narrativisation in this case is the acknowledgment that MUP is a threat to total 
consumption and certain types of alcohol. The impact of these on the organisation is their 
subsequent actions/response and their perception of own legitimacy (see Nix and Wolfe, 
2015 on the impact of negative publicity on the self-legitimacy of the police). From the 
extracts on page 183, section 8.3.1.1 above, Participant 6 is defensive of their organisation’s 
position as evident through their hesitation: “… erm [hesitation] but on a moral basis we 
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took the view that they were wrong because …”. Nevertheless, Participant 6 still perceives 
its organisation as legitimate, but by accepting that MUP is a threat to total consumption, 
the industry actor admits that their legitimacy is being threatened and justifies their actions, 
which were to support MUP (i.e. conforming to ideals – a strategy for gaining moral 
legitimacy) and stating: “it [MUP] had a democratic support”. The ‘democratic support’ in 
this case stems from the fact that Alcohol MUP was part of the SNP manifesto commitment 
to tackle alcohol abuse and that the public voted the SNP into government on the merit of 
their manifesto (see Scottish National Party Manifesto 2011; The Scottish Parliament, 2011: 
pg. 2116 and 9444). 
Another industry actor speaking on the threat levels of MUP challenged the MUP Bill stating: 
“the industry saw the bill as an unproven method with no justification and incompatible with 
the law” (Participant 7). This gives the impression that as long as the industry actors 
perceived the law to be on their side and the MUP Bill incompatible with the law, the Bill is 
not a threat as such. van Leeuwen and Wodak (1999: 104) refer to this as “legal 
authorisation”. Legal authorisation, is reference to a legal document or law, and in the case 
of MUP, the industry actors made reference to the UK and European Competition laws 
(under Article 28 of the EC Treaty: “Quantitative restrictions on imports and all measures 
having equivalent effect shall be prohibited between Member States) and the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) rules (see written submission to the HSC by Diageo, pg. 3; SABMiller, 
paragraph 23 and WSTA MIN93 paragraph 1.9). 
Participant 4 presented a mixed view of the threat level of MUP stating: 
It is too early to take a view of the threat to the industry, the threat to the 
scotch industry remains overseas, not at home. I don’t think it’s a big threat 
to whisky domestically because all drinks are affected (Participant 4 – trade 
association). 
The perception of MUP as a collective threat to the industry was neutralised and downplayed 
by Participant 8 who affirmed that MUP is a single issue and the industry has several other 
issues to think and deliberate on, and not agreeing as an industry on MUP does not mean 
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every other aspect of the industry stops working. MUP is not a big enough threat to topple 
the industry because the industry has been in existence for many years and the industry is 
used to regulations being imposed on them. This view was affirmed by Participant 5: 
So, it is [MUP] not a huge area of conflict, we have difference with people, 
but we don’t fall out about it as it is a legitimate point of view (Participant 
5 – retail trade association). 
The ability of the industry actors to talk down the perceived threat may have prevented the 
deinstitutionalisation of the industry (see Piazza and Perretti, 2015; Vergne, 2012). 
Coincidentally, this talking down of the threat was not only done by the industry actors. The 
fact that the MSPs were also sucked into this line of thinking confirms the success of the 
strategy in avoiding delegitimisation. When the MSPs were asked about their views on the 
threat level of the MUP, their opinions were also mixed: 
erm, No. I don’t think it is [a threat]. It is however a threat for 
manufacturers particularly the ones that make the cheap drinks. The 
premium products have nothing to fear (MSP 3). 
I wouldn’t say there was no threat but on balance, it was felt the benefit on 
health far outweighs any threat to the industry (MSP 2). 
We did say that we think that introducing MUP that the industry would be 
damaged, our reports suggested that we could control the abuse of alcohol 
without damaging the industry and that has been proven (MSP 1). 
Even though MUP was perceived to be a threat by MSP 3 for manufacturers of cheap drinks, 
the MSP quickly neutralised the threat level by stating that the “premium products have 
nothing to fear”. The second and third extracts above, the MSPs rationalise the threat level 
of MUP, with MSPs 1 and 2 stating that MUP was not perceived to be a threat to the industry 
and that the high-strength alcohol producers “had record-breaking figure since minimum 
pricing has been introduced” (MSP 1) and MSP 2 rationalising his views based on health 
benefits of MUP. 
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8.3.1.3 The Role of Trade Associations in Protecting and Unifying the Industry 
The trade associations play a huge role in unifying the different sectors of the industry they 
represent. They shield their members from public discourse and thus save them the dangers 
of reputational and legitimacy damage. This is a clear avoidance strategy. When industry 
actors were asked why they did not feature a lot during the debates the responses recorded 
ranged from trusting their trade representatives to keeping a low profile in order to minimise 
reputational backlash. As one industry actor put it: 
We kept our heads down (laughs) we let the [trade association] make the 
arguments on our behalf, so we stayed very quiet and let the [trade 
association] run the debates with the government and all other public 
messaging. There is nothing to be gained by us talking in public and making 
lots of noise in public and the association is very well equipped to do that 
on our behalf that's why we are members and we are happy to let them do 
all that work for us (Participant 1- whisky producer). 
Participant 1 stated that from the company’s perspective, because they were not visible 
during the debates, they were not in the media, and they had not suffered as a business. 
Participant 1 acknowledged that, at the industry level, their trade association suffered a little 
bit of reputational damage, more so from the government than from the consumers. Their 
trade association took the bullet on their behalf. 
Another trade association representative that was interviewed stated that their members 
had confidence in them and did not need to make personal representations during the 
debates because “where the retail industry interests are aligned as a whole, we can 
represent them" (Participant 3). Taking a step back away from the public is a self-
preservation strategy for managing pragmatic legitimacy, as the action benefits the 
organisation (Suchman, 1995). Participant 3 went on to state that their members trusted 
their judgement and gave an example of events that happened around the time of the 
implementation of MUP. 
During the time of implementation, you see very few references to 
individual retailers in the media and an awful lot of reference to the trade 
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associations, that was because our members encouraged journalists to 
speak to us because the issues discussed were trickier and there was a 
higher risk to their [members] reputation. Our members were confident in 
our position as a trade group and how we represented them. We [the trade 
association] don’t have the same kind of reputational risk that retailers 
would have, and it would look like they [our members] are obstructing or 
specifically tied into the MUP stuff (Participant 3 – retail trade association. 
Emphasis added). 
Another trade representative stated that their members were 100% in agreement of how 
they were represented (Participant 4). The trade associations – for example, the SWA who 
spearheaded the court action against the government, according to another interviewee – 
suffered some reputational damage, as highlighted in the extract below: 
[…] the SWA reputation took a hit within the political arena primarily and 
maybe a tiny bit with the population as a whole (MSP 1). 
During the interview, Participant 4 noted that they recognise that other actors “had a 
legitimate interest to serve” but the relations “remain relatively good”. This show of mutual 
respect for the other industry trade associations position contributes to their overall 
legitimacy, as it gives a sense of industry cohesion. 
The findings, so far, suggest that industry actors used some avoidance strategies to maintain 
their legitimacy and industry cohesion. These strategies were mainly discursive and in line 
with the literature on discursive legitimacy (van Leeuwen and Wodak, 1999). The section 
below explores how the industry actors also used relational strategies complementarily to 
foster their cohesion and legitimacy. 
 
8.4 Relational (Attraction) Strategies 
This is the second broad strategy observed from the interviews with industry actors. 
Relational strategies consider how business relations amongst industry actors and industry 
actors’ relationships with the government contribute to maintaining and stabilising the 
cohesion and legitimacy of an industry (see Liedong et al., 2014; Chizema et al., 2015). These 
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strategies are used to attract and develop social capital and capabilities (see Lorenzoni and 
Lipparini, 1999; Lechler et al., 2019; Friday et al., 2018). Business relations enhance trust and 
social capital, which in turn validates the legitimacy of each party in the relationship, as 
industry actors work together to produce outcomes to conform to societal needs and gain 
pragmatic legitimacy (Suchman, 1995). The relationships industry actors build with the 
government through platforms such as SGAIP and the UK Government PHRD alcohol 
partnerships help to realign the industry to societal expectations, and they gain moral 
legitimacy in the process (Suchman, 1995). First, I examine the business relations between 
industry actors, and then the relationship between industry actors and the government, and 
how these fosters collective legitimacy. 
8.4.1 Business Relations and Inter-dependency 
Despite the intra-industry cleavages and issues around trust observed during the MUP 
debates, industry actors still find common grounds and continue to collaborate. This ability 
to continue to collaborate confers legitimacy by endorsement on each participant (see 
Deephouse et al. 2017) This could be attributed to the ongoing inter-personal relationships, 
which predate the MUP and this creates a sense of industry cohesion. During the interviews, 
some of the representatives of the trade associations stated that they collaborated with 
other trade associations during the MUP consultation: 
we knew each other very well and we recognise that we were having to 
represent our members in different ways reflecting the fact that 
memberships did take different positions, but our working relations with 
the trade bodies remained excellent. What we do share is that we should 
all be working jointly on the question of alcohol abuse even though we 
didn’t agree on MUP (Participant 4 – trade association). 
We do work together through the SGAIP. MUP has not been a huge 
contention, it's just part and parcel of the situations (Participant 5 – retail 
trade association). 
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We had a joint submission on erm MUP with another trade group and we 
tend to do that on several alcohol policy issues (Participant 3 – retail trade 
association). 
Most industry actors identified as members of SGAIP and other groups working towards 
reducing problems associated with alcohol and this helps foster industry cohesion. It is 
however unusual for industry actors to disagree, as stated by Participant 3: "we always work 
across a pretty broad spectrum of issues so there are some areas where we all agree and 
where we have medium disagreement”. Participant 1 stated that future collaboration is not 
affected by their disagreement on MUP because they have business relations and that they 
trade with other producers on-trade division. Participant 1, who is a whisky producer, added 
“It is much more or less like understanding why you agree with them and what kind of 
partnerships or alliance you can form around it or what actions you can take or other areas 
you agree” (Participant 1). Participant 6, a beer producer, also acknowledged the role of 
business interests in furthering industry connectedness amidst the differences between 
industry actors stating that they will “happily work [i.e. trade] with rival producer companies 
in future”. The lack of cohesion on a policy issue does not necessarily mean a total lack of 
cohesion; it is just a point of view. Suchman (1995) referred to this as “stockpiling 
interconnections; a strategy for maintaining cognitive legitimacy. 
The ongoing industry collaboration during and after the MUP debate can also be seen 
through how industry actors talk about their collaborative work on their website and in the 
annual or corporate reports. Some industry actors, following the MUP debates, indicated 
that they continue to fund the Drinkaware Trust51. For example, the Edrington Group, in its 
2014 annual report, stated that they have “consistently promoted responsible consumption 
both independently and through partnerships through the Drinkaware” (Edrington, 2014). 
Tennent Caledonian, in their 2018 annual report52, stated that they continue to support the 
 
51 The Drinkaware trust is an independent and a common purse where industry actors contribute money for 
financing projects aimed at combating alcohol problems (Baggot, 2006). 
52 The report also stated that they discontinued their membership with 4 trade bodies - the Portman group, 
the BBPA, Mature Enjoyment of Alcohol in Society (Ireland) and the Alcohol Beverage Federation of Ireland. 
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Drinkaware Trust and the SGAIP initiatives (C&C Group, 2018), and have ongoing 
collaboration with suppliers and customers like Tesco and Asda in their delivery of goods to 
minimise their carbon footprint (C&C Group, 2019 annual report). 
Diageo, in their 2014 annual report, stated that they formed a global alliance with 13 other 
beer, wine, and spirit producers in 2012 (the early years of the MUP debates) (Diageo, 2014). 
Their alliance’s commitments include reducing underage drinking; strengthening and 
expanding marketing codes of practice; providing consumer information and responsible 
product innovation; reducing drink driving; and enlisting the support of retailers (Diageo, 
2014: 19). Diageo went on to state that all the signatory companies pledged to ensure that 
progress in implementing the commitments is transparent and independently assured. This 
partnership was also mentioned in their 2017 annual report, signalling ongoing collaboration 
between members of the alliance amidst the MUP crisis. The partnership commitments 
ended in December 2017, according to Diageo’s 2019 annual reports, but the signatory 
companies remain committed to the spirit of the five commitments and the ten action areas 
(Diageo, 2019). Maintaining/building reputation was a constant theme throughout Diageo’s 
2014 annual report. 
Industry actors continue to work collaboratively through their trade bodies on issues of joint 
interest. For example, the BBPA continues to campaign for better rates for pubs, beer duty 
reduction, developing a customer unit awareness campaign for the on-trade in partnership 
with Drinkaware, and implementing Challenge 21 through the pubs (BBPA 2014) and the 
SWA continues to campaign for fairer excise duty for scotch whisky (SWA, 2017). This section 
of the findings moves on to examine the partnership between industry actors and the 
government as a relational strategy. 
 
The reason given was so that the organisation can achieve greater efficiency for their responsible drinking 
programmes by focusing their efforts and working directly with their customers and consumers (C&C Group, 
2018). The underlying reason for this dissociation could be due to the lack of consensus with other members 
of the trade bodies for example the BBPA. The BBPA in their written submission stated that their members 
lacked consensus on the MUP issue. 
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8.4.2 Government and Industry Partnerships 
The Scottish Government and the alcohol industry have maintained good relationships, 
irrespective of their differences over policy issues. Through the SGAIP platform, industry 
actors forge relationships and work together with the government and other alcohol 
stakeholders. The Scottish Government still sees the alcohol industry as legitimate, as 
already noted in introductory section of this chapter (see extracts from Cabinet Secretary). 
When asked about government relationship, the trade representative for whisky producers 
replied: 
[We] work extremely closely with the government across a very wide range 
of issues […] It was the issue of MUP where there was the real, serious 
difference, but I do not believe that that have deteriorated the relations 
with the Scottish Government (Participant 4 – trade association). 
As earlier stated, government ministers during their parliamentary debates and the 
interviews stated that they would continue to work with the industry. Participant 7 
acknowledged this partnership stating that “the alcohol industry in the main, is thought to 
be a partner to government in dealing with harms”. Participant 8 added that they still 
collaborate with the government and that the government needs the industry to implement 
any policy set out. This implies that the participants see their organisation and the industry 
as key stakeholders the government cannot do without if they are to achieve their aims on 
alcohol harm reduction. The alcohol industry actors forming partnerships with the 
government is an example of conforming to demands by co-opting constituents to build 
reputation, a strategy noted by Suchman (1995) for gaining pragmatic legitimacy. 
Participant 5, representing the retail trade association from the extract below, stated that 
their actions following the court ruling helped their members’ reputation and enhanced the 
failing relationship the retail sector had with the Scottish Government following the debates. 
I don’t have a strong sense that it has damaged our reputation because we 
put a lot of effort into it, in fact, we developed a partnership with the 
government to make sure that it [MUP] was going to be implemented 
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smoothly and that our members complied with it, I think from that point of 
view it probably strengthened our credibility and reputation with key 
stakeholders, the government and local authorities (Participant 5 – retail 
trade association). 
From the extract above, Participant 5’s organisation is said to have conformed to demands 
and ideals (Suchman, 1995) by choosing to work with the Scottish Government. This is a 
strategy for gaining pragmatic and moral legitimacy because it responded to societal needs 
and produced proper outcomes, which helped to align the organisation to the Scottish 
Governments’ intentions and thus the societal needs. Partnership with the government and 
industry is said to have its benefits (Baggot, 2006). As noted above, industry actors 
acknowledge their involvement with the SGAIP and the PHRD. The SGAIP covers industry 
partnership schemes such as BBN, BID, CAP, PASS, Pubwatch, and Purple Flag. As part of the 
PHRD pledge A7(a), alcohol industry actors pledged to “provide support for schemes53 
appropriate for local areas that wish to use them to address issues around social and health 
harms, and act together to improve joined up working between such schemes operating in 
local areas” (DOH, 2011b; Hadfield and Measham, 2014; Knai et al., 2015). These schemes 
however remain active and Tennant Caledonian in its 2018 annual report stated that they 
recently joined the BBN scheme (C&C Group, 2018: 43). The Edrington Group in their 2018 
annual report stated that they continue to honour their pledges54 under the PHRD and 
continue to fund the BBN scheme (Edrington, 2018). 
In addition to partnering with the SGAIP and PHRD, Diageo stated that they embarked on a 
two-year partnership with the UN Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) in their 2017 
Addendum to the Annual report. The partnership aims to reduce death and injuries from 
traffic accidents in more than 60 countries, with a focus on those with the highest road traffic 
death rates (Diageo, 2017). Diageo also co-hosted a women’s empowerment ‘round table’ 
with the UK Government, peer companies, and NGOs in February 2017. They also convened 
a conference in March 2017 with peers and the civil society on how smallholder farming 
 
53 These schemes are replica of the SGAIP scheme already discussed above in Chapter 2 section 2.5.1. 
54 For example, “over 99% of back labels in the UK now carry a responsible consumption message” (Edrington, 
2018). 
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collaboration could improve social, economic, and environmental considerations (Diageo, 
2017). 
These affiliations and schemes industry actors identify with are thought to increase the 
positive perceptions of the sponsors (Yoon and Lam, 2012) and confer legitimacy 
(Giesbrecht, 2000). The ability of the industry actors to continue collaborating with the 
government and with one another is evidence that the cleavages observed during the MUP 
debates did not affect their ability to work together, and confers legitimacy based on positive 
endorsement of each other within the organisational field (Deephouse et al. 2017). 
 
Table 9: Summary of industry actors’ strategy for avoiding delegitimation 
Strategies Dimensions Outcomes 
Avoidance They don’t talk ill of each other Preserve intra-industry relationship 
The talk down the threat Realign the industry to societal norms 
They talk indirectly through the trade 
associations 
Promote the perception of cohesion 
Preserves the reputation of individual 
business 
Attraction  They collaborate with each other To build social capital 
To produce proper outcome which conforms 
to societal needs 
They partner with the government  To realign the industry to societal norms 
Source: Author 
 
Figure 7: Diagram showing the relationship between industry strategies and industry 
legitimacy 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author 
Strategies Outcomes (2) Outcomes (1) 
Avoidance 
Attraction Enhanced Trust 
and Social Capital 
Positive 
Perception 
Industry 
Legitimacy 
Cognitive Legitimacy 
Pragmatic Legitimacy 
Moral Legitimacy 
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In line with Suchman (1995)’s legitimacy theory, it was observed that the alcohol industry 
actors adopted both proactive and reactive strategies in response to increased regulative 
threats associated with MUP. Industry actors opposed to the MUP Bill from the texts 
analysed are seen to adopt a more reactive strategy, and supporters adopt proactive 
strategies. The proactive and reactive strategies observed are summarised in Table 10 below 
and Table 11 shows the different legitimisation strategies portrayed by industry actors on 
the different sides of the MUP debate. 
Table 10: Summary of reactive and proactive strategies adopted by industry actors 
Reactive Proactive 
Enhancing the legality/illegality of MUP narrative  Participation in the consultation process (a form 
of lobbying)  
Putting up a legal challenge against the 
government (a form of delay tactics) 
Emphasis on on-going government partnership, 
CSR activities, and achievements on the pledges 
made through the PHRD 
Emphasizing the lack of evidence on the 
effectiveness of MUP and lack of evidence linking 
price and misuse 
Guarding access to internal industry documents 
and potential research on the harmful effect of 
alcohol 
Calls for more evidence to be provided (a form of 
delay tactics) 
Selectively using research evidence to their 
favour 
Citing mistakes in the Sheffield Study and 
emphasizing on conflicting messages uttered by 
government officials, for example, the public 
health Minister Anne Milton’s utterance on the 
illegality of MUP (marginalization tactics) 
Sponsorship of research and promoting results 
from such research as evidence 
Blaming the consumers for irresponsible use of 
their products and not the product itself (blame 
passing/deflection tactics) 
 
Blaming one another for the cause of alcohol 
problem (evidence of cleavage) 
 
Increased focus on individual responsibility and 
promoting personal choice (blame and deflection 
tactics) 
 
Source: Author 
Table 11: Legitimising strategies adopted by industry actors  
Legitimacy type Opposition actors Supporters 
Pragmatic Conform to demands by responding to 
needs. 
Select the market by locating friendly 
audiences. 
Allaying constituent concerns by denying 
the existence of problems. 
Image and product promotion through 
Conform to demands by responding 
to needs and reputation building, 
and image advertising. 
Protect exchanges by 
communicating honestly. 
Reputation building through self-
advertising. 
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Legitimacy type Opposition actors Supporters 
advertising. 
Moral Select domain by (re)defining goals 
Manipulate the environment by 
persuading select consumer groups. 
Monitor ethics by consulting professions. 
Protect propriety by communicating 
authoritatively and stockpiling esteem. 
Present normalizing account by excusing/ 
justifying their position. 
Protect propriety by communicating 
authoritatively and stockpiling trust. 
Cognitive  
 
Provide normalizing account by 
explaining. 
Not applicable. 
Source: Author 
 
8.5 Summary 
This chapter addresses the question on how the alcohol industry actors discursively confer 
legitimacy on each other despite their cleavages. The actions of and language used by the 
alcohol industry actors in their consultation submissions, during the oral evidence sessions 
and at the interviews, may have contributed to preserving the legitimacy of the alcohol 
industry. This chapters identifies the two key strategies – discursive and relational strategies 
–  as strategies which may have contributed to maintaining the collective legitimacy of the 
industry.  Industry actors’ perception of each other were sometimes positive, negative, or 
mixed, and this was observed to be sector-dependent and also dependent on their position 
in the food-chain so to speak  i.e. how powerful or economically relevant they are and their 
level of dependency. These perceptions, the management strategies adopted, and the 
anticipated outcomes are captured and summarised in Figure 8 below. 
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Figure 8: Summary of how industry actors mitigated against delegitimation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author  
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CHAPTER 9. DISCUSSION 
9.1 Introduction 
This thesis set out to understand how alcohol industry actors interacted with policymakers 
and between themselves during the MUP policy consultation, the frames they used, the 
cleavages that emerged within the industry, and how the strategies adopted by both alcohol 
industry actors and policymakers to prevent the delegitimisation of the Scottish alcohol 
industry. The focus is on the language frames used during the consultation process. 
Language, as already established in Chapter 2 of this thesis, is important for everyday 
communication, and it needs to be understood and interpreted. However, language 
interpretation is subjective and context-dependent (Leeds-Hurwitz, 2009; Berger and 
Luckmann, 1966). 
Language is used not just for communication but also to make sense of the world, command 
authority, and to impress their ideas upon others (Leeds-Hurwitz, 2009). They also use 
language to frame and influence actions. Frames provide a viewpoint that can help 
policymakers and individuals understand an issue (Van Gorp, 2010). As such, frames are 
usually used in policy formulation processes as linguistic devices to influence, shape, and 
elicit public support. Language is critical to framing, and has been explored in the literature 
on alcohol policy process and the alcohol industry, but further exploration is required in the 
areas of industry cleavages and industry quest for maintaining legitimacy. 
Drawing from frames as linguistic devices, this thesis identified four frames – i.e. (1) economy 
frame; (2) legitimising/socially responsible frame; (3) evidence-based/scientific frame; and 
(4) unintended consequences frames. These frames are said to be socially relevant as they 
can help to understand the challenges of alcohol in Scotland and MUP, as a mechanism for 
curbing harmful alcohol consumption and the associated harms. In order to understand the 
alcohol industry actors’ use of frames, this thesis reviewed the available literature on framing 
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and the alcohol industry actors’ use of frames. The identified gaps in the literature informed 
the research question of this thesis. 
One of these gaps is the low attention paid to how cleavages, as a frequent strategy used by 
industry actors in the policy formulation process, are discursively constructed and enacted. 
The review identified that although alcohol industry actors used the same frames (for 
example during the MUP debates), their presentations were different and positioned the 
industry actors on opposite sides of the ongoing debates (Holden et al., 2013; Katikireddi et 
al., 2014a). This is a gap that is worthy of further exploration. Another gap is the seemingly 
inadequate attention paid to frames as legitimating devices. As such, an additional literature 
review on organisational legitimating strategies was conducted. These gaps informed the 
research questions which linked framing and cleavages observed to industry actors’ 
legitimation strategies. 
Intuitively and empirically, cleavages would normally impact negatively on the cohesion of 
an industry (see Christiansen and Kroezen, 2016) and therefore are capable of adversely 
affecting their legitimacy, by undermining their ability to organise themselves against threats 
(Barnett, 2006). Despite the cleavages between the alcohol industry actors, their legitimacy 
was not affected, nor did it affect their ability to collaborate with each other in other ways 
or with the government. This thesis argues that the maintenance of this collective legitimacy 
can elude the previous structural approaches to studying cleavages (Holden et al., 2012; 
Christiansen and Kroezen, 2016; Buckton et al., 2019) because the cleavages are being 
viewed discursively. 
This chapter brings together and discusses the findings of this thesis in relation to the 
research questions that the thesis sets out to answer and the wider literature on alcohol 
policy, the alcohol industry, cleavages, and legitimation strategies. 
Overall, the key findings of this thesis can be summarised as follows: 
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1. The literature review on the alcohol industry actors’ use of frames suggests that the 
alcohol industry actors’ frames highlight the differences amongst industry actors. In 
addition, frames have not been studied in relation to their use as legitimisation tools. 
2. The literature on the industry actors’ influencing strategies for alcohol policy suggests 
that industry actors use language (frames) in addition to their CSR activities for 
reputation management. This thesis observed strategies similar to those identified in 
Suchman (1995)’s works on “Managing Legitimacy: Strategic and Institutional 
Approaches” in the language used in the consultation submissions. 
3. The literature on cleavages and the alcohol industry is sparse. This thesis’ findings 
suggest that cleavages between industry actors go beyond the structural and 
functional boundaries to reveal intra-sectoral divides based on interests. Cleavages 
are evident in the language/frames used by industry actors, based on their business 
and perceived societal interests. Thus, cleavages can be better understood by 
examining the discursive components of frames. 
4. Cleavages within an industry are thought to impact on the industry’s collective 
legitimacy and their ability to organise (Christiansen and Kroezen, 2016). This thesis 
finds that the collective legitimacy of the alcohol industry was not affected despite 
the differences within the industry. Their legitimacy was not damaged as a result of 
the discursive legitimation strategies adopted by both the industry actors and the 
policymakers during the policy deliberation. 
5. Cleavages between alcohol industry actors are not big enough to result in 
delegitimisation, as long as the industry is economically viable and the effect of its 
products on the consumer can be managed. 
Having summarised the key findings of this thesis, this chapter presents the empirical and 
theoretical contribution of these findings. 
It is worth noting that the study by Hawkins and McCambridge (2020a) considers the level 
of advocacy work carried out by industry actors (i.e. the SWA), first at the UK level then at 
the EU level; although this is not focus of this thesis, it shows that industry actors who 
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support the MUP and yet not challenging the activities of the SWA were silent partners to 
their quest. The lack of open confrontation amongst industry members support the hybrid-
frame model and perhaps contributed to preserving the industry’s legitimacy. 
 
9.2 Empirical and Theoretical Contribution to the Literature 
Frames involve the use of language and have been treated as a standalone influencing 
strategy in literature. Although many frames have been identified to be used by alcohol 
industry actors in the literature (see Anderson and Baumberg, 2006; Casswell, 2013; Hawkins 
and Holden, 2012; Holden et al., 2012; Yoon and Lam, 2012; Drummond and Chengappa, 
2006; Hawkins et al., 2012; McCambridge et al., 2013), they are rarely used to identify 
industry cleavages in the policymaking process – for an exception, see Holden et al. (2012). 
One thing central to the above industry actors’ influencing strategies is language, which the 
literature is yet to explore fully. Nevertheless, a few scholars like Hawkins, Holden, 
McCambridge, and Katikireddi and colleagues have started this conversation, and this thesis 
builds on these works by exploring the potential of frames as a legitimation tool. 
Notwithstanding, Holden et al. (2012) and Katikireddi et al. (2014a) have advanced this 
discussion on frames and the alcohol industry by identifying the presence of cleavages and 
examining the differences in the frames that the different sectors of the alcohol industry 
sponsor. Their works classify cleavages based on the function/ structure of the industry they 
belong to. For instance, Katikireddi (2013) and Katikireddi et al. (2014a) studied how 
changing the policy framing by public health advocates helped prioritise public health 
considerations of the MUP policy. The authors identified the presence of cleavages within 
the alcohol industry actors through the frames they championed. Industry actors in favour 
of MUP, according to the authors, adopted a ‘hybrid framing’, which is said to have 
maintained several parts of the critical frames used by industry actors who opposed the MUP 
policy. Katikireddi et al. (2014a), in discussing the alcohol industry actors and the differences 
in the frames they sponsor, they categorised the actors based on their function, as producers 
and retailers. This thesis builds on and extends this body of works by offering a discursive 
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approach to understanding industry actors’ differences based on their interests, which are 
reflected in the frames used, and explores the potential of frames as a legitimating tool. 
Frames can therefore be seen as a means of lobbying and categorising industry actors’ 
cleavages. This could be seen as a significant contribution to the literature given the apparent 
lack of similar findings in the literature. 
Linguistic-based cleavages go beyond the structure or function of the industry actors. By 
analysing the actors’ responses using the linguistic approach, the division lines between 
industry actors based on their structure and function begin to blur out, and one can then 
appreciate the diversity in the industry actors’ positions on the Bill. The linguistic approach 
to understanding cleavages teases out the subtle differences in the frames used jointly by 
industry actors. Anglin et al. (2000), writing about how frames are depicted in the media, 
identified that actors on opposing sides used similar frames, but the thrust of their discussion 
was different (see also Katikireddi et al., 2014a). This thesis supports Anglin et al. (2000) and 
Katikireddi et al. (2014a)’s conclusions on the similarities between frames evoked by industry 
actors with opposing interests. In analysing industry actors’ frames linguistically, industry 
actors like Molson Coors, who opposed the MUP Bill, appear to side with the government on 
the issue of maintaining social calm. A discursive analysis enables such similarities in industry 
actors’ interests to be teased out and develops our knowledge of cleavages. This thesis has 
been able to reclassify cleavages moving them away from the functional/structural approach 
to the discursive which focuses on their interests. In addition, the reactive social frames 
identified align with the work of Deegan (2006), who stated that organisations facing 
delegitimisation are reactive and respond to crisis on an event-by-event basis, whilst linking 
those to wider issues. 
This thesis goes a step further to examine the effect of intra-industry cleavages on the 
alcohol industry’s legitimacy following the outcome of the MUP Policy debate. The literature 
on cleavages, organisational legitimacy, and its impact both in relation to the alcohol industry 
and in general is sparse. But we learnt from the literature that collective actions lead to 
legitimation (Barnett, 2006), that organisations that distinguish themselves and/or support 
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the government stand to gain favourable reputation (Deephouse et al., 2009), and that 
cleavages impact on collective legitimacy (Christiansen and Kroezen, 2016). The interview 
data indicated that the division within the alcohol industry on MUP helped strengthen the 
government’s position (MSP 2) and the differing opinions from participants during the 
evidence session strengthened the consultation process (MSP 1). Thus, it can be said that 
the Scottish Government and policymakers capitalised on the cleavages amongst the 
industry actors and utilised the consultation process in order to mobilise stakeholders and 
implement pre-existing set of policy aims (see Sturdy et al., 2012). 
This thesis found that alcohol producers were divided on MUP policy, based on their product 
offerings (i.e. high strength or low strength), and the retail sector was divided based on their 
function as either on-trade or off-trade retailers. The trade associations that represented 
companies with different interests and products were reported to have had problems 
reaching a consensus on the MUP policy (see Holden et al. 2012). For example, the 
BBPA/SBPA members did not have a uniformed voice on MUP and their submission indicated 
a deep rivalry between their members and with the producers of high strength alcohol 
products. Despite the rivalry between their members, the BBPA/SBPA as an organisation, 
chose to oppose the MUP policy. This move is simultaneously expected and unexpected. It 
is unexpected in the sense that its members comprise of brewers and pubs whose products 
and business are least likely to be affected by MUP. It is expected because of one of its lead 
members, Diageo, an MNC which has a mixed product portfolio comprising of beer, spirits, 
and wine and is also a lead member of the SWA who strongly opposed the MUP Bill and took 
the Scottish Government to court. Diageo continues to assert itself as a leading actor within 
the UK alcohol industry and the UK alcohol policy. Conversely, the SWA represents whisky 
producers and they had a unified view on the MUP policy. The cleavages observed from 
within the trade associations, were mainly as a result of clashes between the pro-business 
interests of the individual companies, and this has been reported in the works of Holden et 
al. (2012: 6). This thesis acknowledges the work of Holden et al. (2012) and suggests that the 
power imbalance amongst members of the SBPA/BBPA could have been the reason why 
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Tenant Caledonian chose to exit the group (see footnote 52 above). Other trade bodies who 
supported the Bill, for example the SLTA, displayed a mix of pro-society and business 
interests. The SLTA as the trade body for on-trade licences, has always campaigned for a level 
playing field in terms of alcohol pricing with the off-trade in an attempt to reduce pre-
loading, encourage the patronage of on-trade licences, and stop the closure of pubs and 
subsequent loss of jobs within the sector. The SLTA interests can be argued to be a move to 
halt the deinstitutionalisation of the alcohol industry. Deinstitutionalisation in this case is as 
a result of cultural-cognitive pressure and comes in the form of a decline in numbers of pubs 
and an increased focus on alcohol harms (see Christiansen and Kroezen, 2016; Suchman, 
1995). 
The outcomes of the MUP debates and the cleavages observed suggest that frames used by 
alcohol industry actors can reinforce existing preferences amongst MUP policy advocates 
rather than help to form new attitudes or change old ones. 
The empirical work of Vaara and Tienari (2008) on how corporations legitimise their  
decisions highlights the inherent politics of legitimation. The authors advised that future 
studies should pay attention to the textual strategies employed by actors as this may enable 
one to appreciate how legitimacy is created and manipulated in texts. This suggestion is at 
the heart of this thesis. Through textual analysis, the thesis highlights how policymakers 
adopted certain legitimating strategies through their choice of words as expressed in policy 
texts to mitigate against the loss of legitimacy for the alcohol industry. However, these 
interactions expressed through texts can be interpreted as expressions of power (Habermas, 
1975). This can be more pronounced in elite struggles as highlighted in this study. In this 
regard, it might be interpreted that the inability of cleavages to negatively affect inter- and 
intra-industry legitimacy could be a function of power balance/equilibrium between the 
elites (i.e. the government and the alcohol industry). It is possible that the result might be 
different in situations of unequal power (see Gramsci, 1971). Although this is not covered in 
this study, it is a suggested area for further empirical work. 
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Frame theory has been used  in media studies, and in the study of industry and policy texts. 
This thesis combined frame theory and legitimacy theory to the study of the alcohol industry 
to understand the rationale behind the alcohol industry actors’ use of frames in their 
response to the MUP consultation. The application of legitimacy theory is novel for two 
reasons. Firstly, to rationalise and establish a link with the use of frames as a legitimising 
tool, and secondly, it provides a basis for understanding how the Scottish policymakers, 
through policy debates, protected the legitimacy of the alcohol industry amidst the rising 
alcohol problems, which threatens the industry.  
Legitimating strategies proffered by Suchman (1995), Vaara et al. (2006), and Luyckx and 
Janssens (2016), as well as the broader legitimacy theory literature, have been reported to 
be used by organisations to manage their legitimacy, present a positive image of their 
organisation, and to legitimise their corporate decisions. This thesis shows that these 
legitimating strategies can be used by legitimacy conferrers i.e. policymakers and the 
government to uphold or protect an industry from delegitimisation. The alcohol industry in 
Scotland is a viable business and continues to contribute to the Scottish economy, so it would 
be a disadvantage for the Scottish Government financially if they were to be stripped of their 
legitimacy. The use of legitimacy theory also extends the literature on strategies adopted by 
alcohol industry actors by showing that frames can be used strategically as a legitimation 
tool for collective legitimacy purposes. 
This thesis brings together two different theories - frame theory and legitimacy theory - in a 
complementary manner in order to understand how the industry actors construct the world 
around them when their existence and business practices are under scrutiny. The application 
of legitimacy theory to the study of the alcohol industry extends the works of Christiansen 
and Kroezen (2016), Hawkins et al (2012) and other alcohol framing studies and studies on 
corporate influence on health policies. 
The study by Christiansen and Kroezen (2016), for example, examined how the alcohol 
industry maintained its business practice through the use of business collective actions to 
address alcohol issues. These collective actions occur through the trade bodies and through 
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issue-based industry collectives (IBICs) (see section 2.4 above on PHRD, CAP, BBN and 
Challenge 21). Christiansen and Kroezen (2016) used institutional theory to explain how the 
alcohol industry shaped their environment in response to social issues attributed to their 
product. This thesis uses legitimacy theory to understand industry actors’ use of frames 
during the Scottish MUP debates and the potential for the different positions adopted to be 
a strategy for collective legitimacy seeking and management. Alcohol industry texts are 
rarely interpreted through the lens of legitimacy theory. The combination of legitimacy 
theory and frame theory to understand the alcohol industry texts is novel and helps 
policymakers, the government, and other relevant stakeholders to understand the alcohol 
industry’s framing of issues. Writing on collective actions aimed at maintaining an 
organisation’s legitimacy, Christiansen and Kroezen (2016) found that the alcohol industry 
used IBICs for collective legitimacy. This thesis demonstrates that the different frames 
evoked by alcohol industry actors, irrespective of their different positions and the cleavages 
displayed, could have prevented the deinstitutionalisation of the industry. As such, they 
constitute a collective legitimation tool. This thesis supports a legitimacy explanation for 
industry use of frames during the MUP consultation process. 
Barnett (2006) writing on organisations willingness to form collectives in the face of 
legitimacy threats, noted matured organisations form collectives quickly and break off to 
resume competitive action once the legitimacy threats passes. However, organisations at the 
end of their life cycle, don’t bother because the benefits of collective actions are diminished. 
In the first results chapter, chapter 6, I noted that SABMiller despite being a brewer (although 
an MNC), opposed the MUP Bill unlike most other brewers. The reason could be that the 
organisation did not see any value in forming a collective with other brewers as the 
organisation was in the middle of a hostile takeover by Anheuser-Busch InBev and other rival 
brewers – Molson Coors. 
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9.3 Possible Policy Considerations and The Wider Utility of the Findings 
The Scottish Government was the first government to ban smoking in enclosed public places 
(Scottish Parliament website, 2005; Katikireddi et al., 2014a), following the introduction of 
the Smoking, Health and Social Care (Scotland) Act 2005. The policy was later adopted in 
England, Wales, and Northern Ireland the following year. A decade later, the Smoking 
Prohibition (Children in Motor Vehicles) Bill was passed in December 2015 (Payton, 2016). 
Scotland was also the first government to introduce a lower limit for blood alcohol 
concentration in 2014 (BBC News, 2015). Now, the government has succeeded in passing the 
Minimum Pricing for Alcohol (Scotland) Bill. Following the policy trends in recent years it is 
anticipated that more policies would be introduced in the future on public health grounds. 
The SNP can be said to have the political will to introduce the MUP policy as indicated during 
the interview with Participant 5. They had the backing of the Greens and the Conservative 
Party, with the lead political opponent being the Scottish Labour Party. The political 
cleavages between the political parties are thought to impact on the policy process but this 
is outside the scope of this thesis and the data obtained for this thesis may not be able to 
substantiate this. 
Additionally, the lobbying power of industry actors on individual politicians at the Scottish 
parliament, or lack thereof, may have played a role in the policy outcome (see Hawkins and 
McCambridge, 2020a; Hawkins and McCambridge, 2019). The Scottish policy system is 
distinct from that in Westminster (Cairney, 2013), with fewer stages for the Bill to be passed 
and reduced opportunity for industry lobbying due to the multi-level governance style. The 
MUP debates in the Scottish Parliament became more of a political contest and the focus of 
the debate shifted away from the industry (producers, wholesalers, and retailers) to the 
substance (alcohol), and in other scenarios, shifted to the legal issues associated with pricing, 
competition law and international trade (see Hawkins and McCambridge, 2020b; Holden and 
Hawkins, 2016). As one MSP indicated during the interviews, “we were all trying to deliver 
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the best possible health benefits irrespective of our party differences” (MSP 3), and this 
could have contributed to upholding the legitimacy of the alcohol industry. 
The Scottish Government needs to pay attention to the potential unintended consequences 
accompanying any policy initiative. Some suggested measures that could be put in place to 
counter or mitigate against the unintended consequences highlighted by industry actors in 
their submissions include - measures to discourage online alcohol purchase from other 
territories that are not currently under the MUP rule, the imposition of an import levy on 
online orders for alcohol purchases originating from outside of Scotland and a strict penalty 
for non-compliance with the introduced pricing strategy. Measures already put in place to 
ensure effective monitoring and evaluation of the success and/or failure of the policy include 
the MESAS evaluation and the sunset clause on the face of the Bill (Hawkins and 
McCambridge, 2020c). 
From a public health perspective, the concern remains data collation, and measuring the 
effect of the MUP policy on consumption levels, and consumption patterns for the target 
group (harmful and hazardous consumers) at risk of alcohol misuse. The key metric here 
nevertheless is the reduction of overall population level harms, but this has the potential to 
over-generalise the effect of the policy and miss out data on the at risk group. Cairney (2008), 
writing on multi-level governance, stated that health advocates are better able to gain access 
and develop a close working relationship with politicians and civil servants. Public health 
advocates should seek opportunities to lobby Westminster to introduce MUP as this would 
address the unintended consequences related to cross-border and internet sales of alcohol 
from other countries of the UK where the MUP does not yet apply. They should also be 
prepared to tackle health inequality issues that make individuals from low-economic 
background prone to developing an unhealthy relationship with alcohol. This can be 
achieved by coordinated policy action across government department and levels of 
government (CSDH, 2008). 
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The ideas and claims made by industry actors – especially on the EU competition and single 
market law, state interference (freedom), and the idea of penalty on responsible consumers 
– have wide currency and prominence in the parliamentary debates. These ideas were 
championed by the Labour Party during the parliamentary debates and had more to do with 
political will power and inter-party cleavages rather than intra-industry cleavages. The 
interview data indicates that the Labour party was opposed to the MUP legislation as a party 
and had an alternative proposal which they felt was best suited for the government and the 
economy (MSP 3). The Labour party considered alternative legislation including the 
introduction of additional duties on drinks with high impact and caffeinated drinks like 
Buckfast. They sympathised with the aim but not the method (MSP 3). The findings of this 
thesis are relevant to policymakers and health advocates working on other issues (i.e. 
addictive or controversial industry’s) and in other contexts. This thesis identifies other 
potential ways of perceiving frames as a corporate tool for legitimation, the politics of health 
policy, and the effect of cleavages on the policy process. In conclusion, the discursive 
approach to understanding cleavages has the potential to help diffuse the tensions 
associated with cleavages and mitigate against the loss of legitimacy from the policymakers, 
damage to industry cohesion and future collaboration between industry actors and 
policymakers in Scotland. 
This thesis focused on MUP deliberations in Scotland and can be said to have an inherent 
geographical restriction which may make the applicability of the findings to less developed 
economies difficult, for example. The political ideologies at Holyrood Palace linked to the 
public health concerns in Scotland are different from that in Westminster, and the MUP 
discourse in Scotland contributed to the frames used in the response by industry actors. This 
makes the generalisation of the findings to other countries of the UK difficult. Nevertheless, 
the findings are relevant to policymakers. Policymakers need to understand that industry 
actors come with their own policy agenda to the negotiation table and would use every 
strategy available to attempt to influence the policy process. The findings of this thesis are 
relevant to policy researchers and researchers studying the addictive industry as it provides 
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a platform for future studies. This thesis can be extended by studying the internal dynamics 
of members of trade bodies and how decisions are reached. Also, the make-up of the 
parliamentary committees and their impact on industry actors’ performance during the 
evidence session is also, worthy of further examination. 
It is recognised that legitimacy theory has varying schools of thought. This thesis has focused 
on a particular strand of legitimacy scholarship (i.e. organisation studies-based legitimacy 
theory). This school of thought does not necessarily focus on power dynamics and relations 
amongst actors. There may be power dynamics amongst the actors studied in this thesis, 
although power relations are not central to the problematisation of this study. Nevertheless, 
it is suggested that future studies may want to explore this aspect drawing from the 
legitimacy theory literature by scholars following the Marxist ideology focus on hegemony 
and power dynamics between the elites and the masses (see Althusser, 1965; Gramsci, 1971; 
Habermas, 1975). It is anticipated that such approaches might offer some insight to further 
understanding of the alcohol policymaking space in Scotland. 
 
9.4 Summary 
Most of the alcohol producers that participated in the Scottish MUP debates are MNCs who 
have been in business for many years. They exhibit great deal of business rivalry, and most 
have undergone a series of mergers and acquisitions. The MNCs, in their submissions, often 
state the numbers of employees worldwide as opposed to country-level employees – the 
exception to this being Tennent Caledonian who recently expanded their business since 
becoming part of the C&C group. The off-trade retailers are classed as big companies. They 
have traded for many years and have multiple retail outlets. Like the producer companies, 
they state a total number of employees as opposed to the number of employees directly 
involved with alcohol sales. Information provided by all the industry actors signal that they 
are a successful business that contribute to the economic development of their resident 
countries. The producers and retailers that participated in the Scottish MUP consultation 
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engage in numerous corporate reputation management activities. The Table 12 below 
presents a summary of the contribution this thesis makes and evidence to support these. 
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Table 12: Thesis contribution and evidence 
Contribution/ Gap Evidence 
Empirical  This thesis builds on, and extends the works of Holden et al. (2012) and Katikireddi et al. (2014a) on alcohol industry frames and intra-industry 
cleavages by offering a discursive approach to understanding frames as a lobbying tool. It goes a step further to examine the effect of cleavages on 
intra-industry trust and the industry actors’ ability to organise themselves for collective legitimacy. The thesis finds that industry cleavages did 
impact on intra-industry trust, but the business relations over the years, and inter-personal relations amongst industry actors provided a cushioning 
effect, thus enabling the different sectors of the alcohol industry to continue to work together. 
The thesis extends the works of Christiansen and Kroezen (2016) on collective legitimacy by demonstrating that industry actors discursive and 
relational strategies, in addition to the actions of interest-based industry collectives (IBICs) and trade groups contributed to maintaining the 
collective legitimacy of the alcohol industry. 
It supports the works of Barnett (2006) on collective actions resulting to legitimation, Christiansen and Kroezen (2016) on the negative impact of 
cleavages on collective legitimacy, Entman (1989) frame theory on audience behaviour following an exposure to frames.  
Recommendation – future study may be required to understand the internal power dynamics of members within a trade body, the impact and 
management of cleavages and the decision-making process. 
Theoretical  The thesis shows that frame theory and legitimacy theory can be used in a complementary manner to understand the alcohol industry frames 
during a policy debate. 
The thesis uses legitimacy theory to extend the literature on the alcohol industry strategies to show how intra-industry cleavages contributed to 
maintaining the industry’s’ collective legitimacy. 
This thesis extends the understanding of legitimacy theory by showing that the Scottish Government and policymakers as an external source of 
legitimacy can tap into the legitimacy theory principles as discussed by Suchman (1995), Vaara et al. (2006) and Luyckx and Janssens, (2016) to 
prevent the delegitimisation of the alcohol industry. 
This thesis supports a legitimacy explanation for industry use of frames during the MUP consultation process. 
Policy process It confirms the public health ideological trends of the SNP government in Scotland. 
The thesis identified the presence of political cleavages between the different political parties and suggests that these differences could have 
contributed to maintaining the alcohol industry’s legitimacy. 
Source: Author 
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CHAPTER 10. CONCLUSION 
10.1 Introduction 
This chapter summarises the thesis and evaluates if it achieved the set aims of the study. 
The aim of this thesis was to advance the understanding of cleavages, expressed as frames, 
and their potential in the maintenance of industry’s collective legitimacy.  The objectives of 
this thesis were to: (1) identify and collate texts submitted by the alcohol industry actors to 
the MUP policy consultation, (2) identify the different frames used by the alcohol industry 
actors, (3) understand the implications of the frames for industry cohesion and legitimacy, 
(4) ascertain why industry cleavages did not result to loss of industry reputation and 
legitimacy, (5) identify any strategies that could have contributed to upholding the industry’s 
legitimacy, (6) collect additional/necessary policy documents/data that could help explain 
the result – i.e. conduct interviews with alcohol industry actors and policymakers, and (7) 
highlight the contribution the thesis makes to the wider literature on the alcohol industry, 
Scottish alcohol policy, alcohol framing, legitimacy and legitimation. To the best of my 
knowledge, and as evident from the finding chapters (Chapter 6, Chapter 7 and Chapter 8 ), 
the aims and objectives set out above for this thesis were achieved. Next, I present a 
reflection on my multiple identities and world views, and the impact these had on the thesis. 
Finally, I present the limitations of the thesis and some suggested recommendations for 
future studies. 
 
10.2 Reflection on Researcher’s Multiple Identities and World Views 
My medical background and interest in public health resulted in the decision to pursue a 
PhD. Nothing could have prepared me for the many challenges encountered, the bumps on 
the way, and changes in the direction of my research than my earlier studies and 
experiences. My interest in alcohol studies was ignited following the introduction of the 
public health responsibility deal (PHRD) by the 2010 UK coalition government. The PHRD was 
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positioned as an alternative to government legislation, which aimed to encourage business 
actors and health practitioners to work together to resolve public health problems. I 
followed the media debates with keen interest and started to read up on the political 
activities of big businesses and their involvement in policy processes. My search led me to 
an article by Gilmore and Collins (2011), who regarded big corporations as “vectors of 
diseases” and argued that big corporations should not be involved in policymaking. Further 
searches led me to articles by Hawkins, Holden, and McCambridge published between 2012 
and 2013. These studies left me with unanswered questions. I questioned the one-sidedness 
of the arguments in the papers and the extent corporate entities moderated their language 
when addressing different stakeholders during a policy lifecycle. My passion for this thesis 
was driven by the intention to understand the alcohol industry, the strategies they adopt to 
influence alcohol policy debates, and their impact on policymaking. But it turned out that 
there is more to be understood about the alcohol industry and the machinery which is 
policymaking. 
10.2.1 A Non-drinker Identity 
I grew up in eastern Nigeria in West Africa, a country where alcohol is not widely consumed 
in public by women. Women seen consuming alcohol or smoking in public were regarded as 
loose and said to lack self-control (McEwan, 1981; see also: Suggs, 2009). The emphasis on 
self-control for women limits their freedom of self-expression and promotes a male-centred 
value system. Writing on the cultural meaning of drinking behaviour of Malawians, Suggs 
(2009) identified alcohol consumption as a “masculine privilege” and the public bar as “a 
male space” with women drinking “in the privacy of homes”. The gender difference in 
alcohol consumption in public places is not restricted to the African continent. In the 
nineteenth and twentieth-century Britain, women were ostracised from drinking 
establishments and this was a common phenomenon at the time (Borsay, 2006; Gutzke, 
2014). Drinking establishments consisted predominantly of male revellers with women 
running the early modern alehouses (Harrison, 1971; McEwan, 1981). Women shied away 
from alehouses because of the stigma of prostitution (McEwan, 1981), and this, in addition 
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to the temperance movement (Harrison, 1971), helped maintain the gender divide in 
alehouse patronage and kept alcohol consumption in women at an artificially low record 
during the post-war period (Borsay, 2006). Being drunk in public is not socially accepted in 
Nigeria (Ibanga et al., 2005), as is the case in twenty-first century Britain. Drunken behaviour 
was frowned at especially by Christians and other groups who perceive themselves to hold 
a high moral compass. My non-drinker identity is further compounded by my upbringing in 
a Catholic Christian family and the fact that my father was a preacher who never drank or 
entertained guests with alcohol in our home. In addition to my upbringing, my interest to 
pursue a career in medicine and the increasing knowledge of the health effects of alcohol 
consumption influenced my relationship with alcohol even as an adult now. I regard myself 
as a ‘lifelong non-drinker’. 
My family orientation against alcohol and academic background will always be questioned 
(Bauman, 2004 notion of ‘fluid identities’). However, I do not intend to eliminate bias arising 
from these multiple identities, but rather I want to explore them in relation to the impact it 
has on this thesis, as did Thomson and Gunter (2011). Researcher bias has been explored by 
Podsakoff et al. (2003). The authors examined the extent to which method biases influenced 
behavioural research results and suggested some tactics for managing such bias. The tactics 
suggested including procedural remedies, through the study design and the use of variables 
from different sources (for example, the use of triangulation for interpreting the results) 
(Podsakoff et al., 2003). These tactics I reflected upon during the planning and execution of 
this thesis. I use the term bias here loosely to highlight what other scholars have considered 
during their research. This study is located within the school of social science and researcher 
subjectivity is inherent or expected as I discuss much later in this chapter in section 10.3. 
10.2.2 My Stance and Experience 
In the initial stages of the research, my non-drinker and public health identity appeared to 
dominate and becloud my judgements. This was evident in my writing as pointed out on 
several occasions by my supervisors. I became more aware of my somewhat judgemental 
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stance and had to constantly moderate the interpretation of events to give a near balanced 
view. It is however imperative that I am reflexive in my account of how industry actors use 
frames to make sense of their social world and avoid imposing my own frames in the 
discussions about the texts. At every step of the thesis (especially at key decision times), I 
discussed, reflected (sometimes asking myself difficult questions such as those presented in 
Ballinger (2003: 68) – although not following the same sequence), and rationalised what I 
was doing and the reasons for doing so with family members and my supervisors. This helped 
to keep my research in check. As I got more confident with my chosen theories and analytical 
methods, my writing and interpretations became more nuanced. My non-drinker identity, 
although a source of potential conflict, is also positive and serves as an original contribution 
to the field of alcohol studies and framing. A perspective of a non-drinker, ethnic minority 
female on alcohol issues and alcohol industry frames brings a whole new dimension of focus 
to the topic in a way that has never been interpreted (see Thomson and Gunter, 2011). 
This thesis now examines the limitations of this thesis and further reflections on the failed 
initial attempt to recruit interview participants. 
 
10.3 Limitation of the Thesis 
Doctoral research is usually a one-person research (Braun and Clarke 2006). This is often 
cited as a limitation by doctoral and early career researchers carrying out research work 
alone. The limitation here comes in the form of researchers’ ideologies and experiences (or 
lack of it). These limitations were however managed by regular contact with my supervisors. 
For example, the frames and themes derived were discussed with my supervisors and the 
final frame headings were negotiated to ensure that the headings rhymed with the coding 
guide and the content of the coded extracts. This process although allowed for consistency 
in the chosen method; however, it fails to provide a multi-person perspective from a variety 
of people with different expertise and the final decisions for doctoral thesis lies with the 
researcher. 
Divided We Stand: Exploring the Alcohol Industry Framing of the Alcohol (Minimum Pricing) (Scotland) Act Consultation. 
 
 
PhD Thesis 2020  I. J. Amaeshi.  Page | 219  
 
 
This thesis focussed on the Scottish MUP consultation. The rationale for this has been 
explained in the introductory chapter (see section 1.2). This inevitably introduces a 
geographical bias. The geographical bias may limit the extent to which the thesis can make 
claims about the generalisability of positions, arguments, and frames used by the different 
industry actors, especially with regards to the rest of the UK or in emerging or developing 
country context. In addition, limiting data collected to submissions to the Scottish MUP 
consultation may have inadvertently excluded some industry actors that submitted to the 
Westminster consultation. For example, the study by Katikireddi (2013, see table 6.1) 
included submissions from industry actors such as Society of Independent Brewers, Portman 
Group, NOCTIS, and Sainsbury’s. These industry actors did not feature in the Scottish 
debates. Notwithstanding, this does not affect the results presented in this thesis as the 
arguments presented by these four industry actors (as presented in Katikireddi 2013 
doctoral thesis) are no different to that presented by industry actors included in this thesis. 
This thesis used publicly available documents obtained from the Scottish Parliament 
website. The alcohol industry, like the tobacco industry, guards their internal documents 
away from the public (Bond et al., 2009). According to Hawkins et al. (2012), one problem 
with studying this type of industry has to do with gaining access to relevant company 
documents that might not be in the public domain and also gaining access to top 
management staff for interviews. This notion by Hawkins et al. (2012) proved to be true 
during this research. It was quite a challenge accessing various industry actors as I had no 
prior relationship or contacts with the alcohol industry or their representatives. The one 
acquaintance I was introduced to, tried to link me up to senior members of various alcohol 
contacts by way of email introduction, but this proved unsuccessful. I recognise that these 
are hard to reach participants (Shaghaghi et al., 2011), so I embraced every networking 
opportunity availed to me and attended two social policy seminars in London. The seminars 
were attended by delegates from a wide range of alcohol-producing companies and trade 
associations. I felt out of place (see a quote by Abu-Lughod, (1988), cited in Finlay, 2003: 7), 
not only because I was the only black African at the event, but also because I was a young 
woman, a complete outsider to the set of people in the room. However, I summoned up 
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courage, moved around the room and spoke to different industry actors, exchanging 
business cards with a few (those whose organisation I was interested in recruiting for my 
research). The industry actors I networked with showed interest in my research and some 
commended me for my bravery in attempting to tackle my proposed research questions. 
However, a few encounters made me feel awkward and I questioned my motive for 
embarking on the research process. Several emails following the seminars, yielded no 
commitment from the industry actor to partake in my study. On further reflection, I doubt I 
would have been emotionally and psychologically capable of interviewing the industry 
actors I interacted with during the seminars. This self-awareness stems from my limited 
experience as a researcher in conducting research interviews (albeit in the early years of my 
research) with powerful, politically motivated industry actors (see Gough, 2003a). The 
possibility that the industry representatives would take advantage of the interview scenario 
and deviate from the focus of the discussion was high as noted by Wilkinson (1988 on 
functional reflexivity); Parker (1992, researcher-participant relationship); and Gough (2003b 
on power relations). As a result, I was quite happy to settle for and use an alternative data 
collection method, i.e. documents. 
These challenges made the use of publicly available documents a necessity. However, the 
use of consultation submissions was within the scope of the study’s research questions, and 
augmenting the industry actors’ consultation submissions with interviews, committee 
reports, and transcripts of parliamentary meetings on MUP in the second phase of the study 
was beneficial and helped to understand the motives behind industry actors use of frames 
and the role of policymakers in legitimating industry actors amidst the differences between 
and within the different sectors of the alcohol industry. 
This thesis has focused on frames used by industry actors in the texts submitted during a 
single alcohol policy issue. Future studies may consider widening the research scope to 
include texts targeted at other stakeholders, for example annual or CSR reports, and perhaps 
conduct a comparative study between two or more policy issues or compare frames used by 
alcohol industry actors with other stakeholder’s submissions to the MUP. The research 
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methods could be elaborated to include an observational-style study to cover the lifecycle 
of the policy instead of snapshots of events in the life of the different organisations. 
The strength of the thesis includes the analysis of the complete corpus submitted by alcohol 
industry actors to the Scottish MUP policy consultation and these included the analysis of 
the oral evidence submitted to both the HSC and the FC and the committee and 
parliamentary reports. A previous doctoral study by Katikireddi (2013) only analysed 
submissions to the HSC for all stakeholders’ submissions for the 2010 MUP deliberations and 
the study was not limited to the Scottish MUP debate. The use of thematic analysis guided 
by frame theory and legitimacy theory is an advantage as this enabled the frames identified 
to be re-evaluated and the rationale for their use in maintaining collective legitimacy 
understood. Future researchers are however cautioned not to generalise the findings from 
this thesis to other policies or other industry actors’ and should pay attention to the context 
of the policy issue and the industry been studied. 
Another limitation identified with regards to the interviews conducted was the small amount 
of interview participants. The data could have been richer if industry actors like the SLTA, 
who supported the MUP, or the CEOs of other brewers (for example Heineken and Greene 
King), who were known supporters of MUP, were reached. Perhaps also a representative 
from the SBPA, as this would help advance understanding of intra-industry dynamics within 
a trade association setting. Also restricting the interview data sample to MSPs who were 
members of the committee was limiting as most of the members were either retired, no 
longer in parliament, deceased, or simply unreachable. In hindsight this was the right choice 
as MSPs who were not in the committee at the time may not have been able to offer insights 
into the deliberation, apart from the deliberations at the parliamentary sittings. This 
limitation was managed by the inclusion of the committee’s report, and transcripts of the 
deliberations at parliamentary meetings as they capture the voice of the group without the 
need to speak to the MSPs directly. 
10.3.1 Limitation of Thematic Analysis  
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Thematic analysis as a method, according to Braun and Clarke (2006), is not always 
recognised and given credit in the same way as other analytical methods, for example 
narrative analysis and grounded theory. Thematic analysis is frequently criticised for lacking 
transparency, as there is no clear demarcation if the themes reported were data or theory 
derived (Dixon-wood et al., 2005). The theoretical approach has been criticised especially 
because of its potential to omit ‘nuanced data’ not captured by the theory or the research 
question. These criticisms are in-turn advantageous because the theory-driven thematic 
analysis is useful for large data and the interpretation is supported by the data (Braun and 
Clarke, 2006; Dixon-wood et al., 2005). Nevertheless, thematic analysis is very flexible and 
can be applied to studies irrespective of the theoretical or epistemological principles guiding 
the study. It also provides a rich, detailed, and complex account of the data (Braun and 
Clarke, 2006), and enables a researcher to replicate, extend, or refute prior discoveries 
(Boyatzis, 1989). This thesis presents some suggested recommendation for future research. 
 
10.4 Recommendations 
Throughout this thesis, I have shown that the policy arena is an arena of contestation and 
that language is an important part of the process. The language presented as frames are 
used to construct issues and these can influence and shape the attention given to the issue 
and the management strategies put in place to resolve such an issue. I have also shown how 
frames, as used by industry actors, were extracted from the texts they produced and how 
they provided a possible explanation for their use bearing in mind the policy context. Based 
on the findings of the review, the following are suggested recommendations. 
The government and policymakers are reminded that industry actors have different 
interests and use language to present these. As such they need to train their personnel to 
understand how industry use language for influencing policies. Policy actors advocating a 
policy issue should be forthright with their arguments and in their presentation of evidence. 
For 21st century Scotland, introducing a strict alcohol policy could be the way forward to 
bring about a change in attitude and the consumption culture of the Scots. The Scottish 
Divided We Stand: Exploring the Alcohol Industry Framing of the Alcohol (Minimum Pricing) (Scotland) Act Consultation. 
 
 
PhD Thesis 2020  I. J. Amaeshi.  Page | 223  
 
 
Government needs to stand firm with bold policy decisions, no matter how unpopular these 
decisions prove to be, for the sake of public health, and put in place the right evaluation 
method/process to ascertain the effectiveness of such a policy. 
The use of statistics (i.e. large numbers and percentages) have been shown to produce a 
framing effect (see Levin et al., 1998; Tversky and Kahneman 1981; Chong and Druckman, 
2007b), but no study has considered the effects of the statistics used by alcohol industry 
actors during alcohol policy negotiations on policymakers or other stakeholders. Further 
studies may be necessary to ascertain the role and consequences of statistics as used by 
alcohol industry actors during policy negotiations in producing framing effect process. 
Alcohol advertising regulations should be reviewed and enforced in order to prevent 
unnecessary exposure of alcohol to children and young people. This recommendation is in 
line with the study by Savell et al. (2016), who suggest that “contemporary policy 
environment in Europe and the United States is ineffective in limiting both young people’s 
exposure to alcohol marketing and the general effect of marketing on alcohol-related harm”. 
Following the implementation of MUP it is recommended that a follow-up study is 
conducted to ascertain the impacts, both positive and negative, of the policy and the 
industry’s take on the implementation outcome. Given the unintended consequences 
detailed in their submissions, the careful monitoring of the impact of the policy should be a 
prerequisite for the government and public health activists. 
Finally, there is this sense that the Scottish Government is a winner because of the successful 
passage of the MUP Bill. A bit of caution needs to be exercised because as the Government 
takes on a social issue, the proffered solutions might not always be the best or preferred 
approach. Rather than a win-lose mentality, a better approach would be a win-win mentality 
where industry actors work together creatively with the government for the benefit of the 
society. 
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10.5 Conclusion 
This thesis has hopefully advanced the knowledge and understanding of the alcohol 
industry, the alcohol industry’s use of frames during the Scottish MUP policy deliberation,  
cleavages within the alcohol industry, and the alcohol industry’s relationship with the 
Scottish government in their quest for legitimacy. It identified and collated relevant industry 
texts submitted during the MUP policy deliberation, carried out interviews with members of 
the alcohol industry and MSPs, and highlighted the contributions that this thesis makes 
empirically, theoretically, and to the policy process. The contribution of this thesis is twofold. 
Firstly, this thesis updates previous studies on framing the alcohol MUP debate, which 
focused on the legislative process of 2010 and the second attempt by the SNP government 
to pass this into law in 2012. Secondly, it applied legitimacy theory to the study of industry 
framing in ways absent from previous studies. 
The alcohol industry is important to the Scottish economy, and the Scottish Government 
would not jeopardise the economic benefits of the alcohol industry to the country by 
delegitimising the industry. The government’s intention remains to reduce the harms caused 
by the misuse of alcohol at a population level, and a population control measure using a 
pricing mechanism was the only way forward based on research evidence produce by the 
ScHARR study and given the restrictions placed on a devolved administration by the UK 
Government. Education has its benefits, although these benefits are limited in hazardous 
and harmful consumers, hence the population-wide approach of a pricing mechanism. The 
government nevertheless needs to continuously evaluate its alcohol control policies to 
ensure effectiveness and equity. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 1: Characteristics of Industry Actors 
Producers Characteristics  
Diageo • Created in 1759 by a merger of Guinness and Grand Metropolitan. 
• Renamed ‘Diageo’ in 1997 with its headquarters in London (Diageo, 2017a). 
• Operates in 21 geographic markets, in over 180 countries and 32,000 
employees worldwide. 
• Diageo has championed many alcohol misuse prevention programmes through 
own programmes and through partnership and collaboration with others 
(Diageo, 2017b). 
Tennent 
Caledonian 
Breweries UK 
• One of UK’s oldest breweries, dating back to the 1550s. Based at the historic 
Wellpark brewery in Glasgow and employs over 300 people. 
• Became part of the C&C group in 2009, retaining its name (Tennent 
Caledonian, 2016a). 
• Broadened its export market since 2009 globally to Australia, Canada, and Italy 
(Tennent Caledonian, 2016d). 
• Works with Portman Group and SGAIP; supports varied CSR activities and local 
charities (Tennent Caledonian, 2016b). 
Chivas Brothers 
Ltd and Chivas 
Brothers UK 
• Founded in 1975. Headquarters in France with a corresponding brand head 
office in London (Chivas Brothers, 2017). 
• Number 2 worldwide producer of wine and spirits and number 1 in premium 
and prestige spirits. 
• Chivas Brothers has 101 production sites in 24 countries including Scotland. 
Has 18,000 employees worldwide. Company turnover of €8682 million in 
2014/15 and a share capital of €411,403,467.60. 
• CSR involvement include economic efficiency, community wellbeing and 
environmental protection (Pernod Ricard, 2017). 
The Edrington 
Group 
• History dates to the mid-nineteenth century. 
• Famous for its scotch whisky. 
• Expanded its portfolio to include golden rum in 2008. 
• Scottish based headquarters, with 60% of its workforce based abroad 
(Edrington, 2012a). 
• Funds the Drinkaware campaign and makes charitable donations through the 
Robertson trust fund since 1961. 
• A key supporter of the SWA’s environmental strategy (Edrington, 2012b). 
Molson Coors • Dates to 1774 in England and 1786 in Canada. Formed in 2005 by a merger of 
‘two equals’ Molson and Coors. 
• In 2008, it formed a joint venture with SABMiller forming MillerCoors which 
combined the US and Puerto Rican businesses. 
• In 2016 it acquired the remaining shares from the MillerCoors venture with 
SABMiller and became the third world largest brewer (Molson Coors, 2016a). 
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Producers Characteristics  
• Employs 18,000 people (Molson Coors, 2016b). 
• Teamed up with twelve other leading beer, wine, and spirits companies in 
October 2012, to form the International Alliance for Responsible Drinking 
(IARD). Plays an active role in achieving the set commitments of the IARD 
(Molson Coors, 2016c). 
SABMiller • Dates to 1895. Parent company South African Breweries (SAB, 2017). 
• Involved in a lot of hostile takeovers from smaller brewers and rivals. Acquired 
the US Miller Brewing Company in 2002 to form SABMiller (SAB, 2017). A 
multinational brewing company with its headquarters in England. 
• World's second-largest brewer measured by revenues. Operated in over 70 
global markets (CPL, 2016; SAB, 2017; SABMiller, 2017). 
• Acquired by Anheuser-Busch InBev in October 2016 after which the trading 
name SABMiller ceased to exist. 
• Surrendered its interests in the MillerCoors beer company to Molson Coors in 
December 2016 (SABMiller, 2017). 
• Engaged in multiple CSR and sustainable development initiatives prior to its 
acquisition (SAB, 2017; SABMiller, 2017). 
Whyte and 
Mackay 
• Its root can be traced back to Glasgow in 1844 (Whyte and Mackay, 2015; 
Scotchwhisky.com, 2017). 
• Formed partnership in 1882 (James Whyte and Charles Mackay) to form the 
Whyte and Mackay brand. 
• Retained original name from 1882 despite series of mergers and acquisitions 
over the years. 
• Acquired by Emperador Distillers Inc. a Philippines based company since 2014 
to date (Scotchwhisky.com, 2017). 
Off-trade 
Retailers 
 
Co-operative 
Group 
• UK’s largest co-operative business; owned by over 5million members. 
• 2,800 retail stores and 70,000 employees (Co-op, 2015: 3). 
• Started in 1844 and in 1863, formed a co-operative wholesale society which 
provides co-op products sold across the stores (Co-op.2015). 
• Signatory to the UK Public Health Responsibility Deal (PHRD) and supports 
Drinkaware financially. 
WM Morrison 
supermarket 
• Founded in 1899. Headquarters in Bradford. 
• The first supermarket opened in 1961. 
• Fourth largest UK supermarket chain. 
• Runs over 500 stores and employs 130,000 staff. 
Asda • Dates to 1949. Founded in 1965 following a merger between the Asquith 
family supermarket and Associated Dairies company of Yorkshire (ASDA, 
2016). Headquarters in Leeds. 
• Has 525 stores across the UK and 160,000 employees. 
• Once the second largest UK supermarket chain between 2003 and 2014 by 
market share (ASDA, 2017). 
• A signatory to the UK PHRD. 
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Producers Characteristics  
Tesco • Started in 1919 as a market stall in London. The first supermarket opened in 
1950 and in early 2000 business expanded online (Tesco Plc, 2017a). 
• World largest retailer with 476,000 employees. 
• UK largest retailer with 3,500 stores and over 310,000 employees (Tesco Plc, 
2017b). 
• Signatory to the UK PHRD and lead retail partner of Drinkaware. 
• CSR activities include ‘Challenge 25’, Community Alcohol Partnership (CAP). 
Trade 
Associations 
  
WSTA • Headquartered in London. 
• Represents over 340 UK companies who produce, import, export, bottle, and 
retail wines and spirits. 
• Promotes the political goals of its members, in addition to providing legal, 
regulatory, tax advice and market research (WSTA website; IAS factsheet, 
2013). 
• CSR initiatives promoted include PHRD, CAPs, voluntary labelling scheme, 
challenge 25 (WSTA, website). Supports Drinkaware (WSTA, 2017b) and SGAIP. 
SWA • Main trade body of scotch whisky producers, dates to 1921 (SWA, website). 
• Headquartered in Edinburgh and oversees over 117 distilleries across Scotland 
(SWA, 2016). 
• They advance the global interests and profile of scotch whisky, its members, 
and the industry. 
• SWA achieves its aim by consistently “building strong relationships with all 
levels of government and opinion-formers and by making a visible impact on 
public debate” (SWA, Website). 
• SWA has led the alcohol industry’s legal campaign against the Scottish 
Government’s introduction of a MUP for alcohol, lodging a formal complaint 
to the European Commission and seeking a judicial review in the Court of 
Session in Edinburgh (IAS factsheet, 2013). 
SBPA/ BBPA • Leading body representing Scotland’s brewers and Pubcos (SBPA website). 
Founded in 1904. 
• Engage in policy development, lobbying, media and public relations and 
compile industry statistics and guidance (IAS factsheet, 2013; BBPA website). 
• Supports 60,000 jobs in Scotland and contributes £1,500 million in tax. 
• CSR activities include challenge 21; PASS scheme, unit awareness campaign, 
the law on serving drunks, Best Bar None (BBN), Purple flag and Pubwatch. 
Provides members resource for premises security (BBPA, 2017a). 
SLTA • Founded in 1880 and represents all sectors of the Scottish licensed trade 
Industry. 
• Members include publicans, hoteliers, restaurateurs, late night entertainment 
venues, clubs, licensed grocers, drinks suppliers and license trade servicing 
companies (SLTA website). 
• Protect and promote the rights and interests of licensee members especially 
with regards to trade and advice members on matters affecting their business. 
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Producers Characteristics  
CAMRA • A consumer campaign group; founded in 1971. 
• Head office in St Albans Herts with over 185,000 members worldwide (CAMRA 
Website). 
• Acts as the consumer's champion in relation to the UK and European beer and 
drinks industry. Supports the growing interest in real Cider and Perry (CAMRA 
Website). 
• CAMRA campaigned for the following: cutting tax on real ale, Perry, and 
Ciders; protecting pubs; promoting pubs and campaign to support Scottish 
pubs on behalf of its members. 
NACM • The national trade body for apple and Perry Cider producers in the UK. 
• Founded in 1920, with its main office in London (NACM Website). 
• Signed up to two pledges (alcohol labelling; advertising, and marketing) 
through the PHRD (DOH, 2011a). 
• Collaborated with Portman Group and SGAIP to develop sponsorship 
guidelines in Scotland (DOH, 2011b). 
• At the EU level, it represents its members through its membership of the 
Association of the Cider and Fruit Wine Industries of the EU (NACM Website). 
SGF • A national trade association that represents the convenience store in Scotland 
and some producers. 
• Represents over 3,000 members. 
• Key activities: lobbying, advice, networking and communicating the needs of 
its members to Parliament and the media. They provide online training 
materials to members. 
SRC • Trade association for the retail sector in Scotland. 
• Key activities: lobbying the government and relevant stakeholders; providing 
valuable economic evidence and key facts (STP website). 
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Appendix 2: Introduction Letter to Potential interviewees 
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Appendix 3: Follow-up Letter to Interview Participants 
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Appendix 4: Sample Consent Form 
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Appendix 5: Sample of Interview Transcript 
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Appendix 6: Interview Schedule for Industry Actors and the MSPs 
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Appendix 7: Showing the coding scheme with selected extracts from industry submission 
 
Extracts 
Coding levels 
1st Open code (the 
story) 
2nd Axial coding (of the 
story) using Entman 
(1993) frame element and 
reasoning device 
3rd Resultant 
frames from 
axial coding 
4th Vested 
interest 
embedded in 
the resultant 
frames 
5th Preferred strategies 
for protecting interests 
Edrington Group MIN32, pg.1 
The Edrington Group owns some of the leading 
Scotch whisky and golden rum brands in the world, 
including...  
Edrington is headquartered in Scotland and is an 
international business employing over 2,300 
worldwide, with over 60 per cent employed overseas. 
 … it appears therefore premature to introduce yet 
further measures and restrictions  
Edrington successfully operates its Code of Practice 
on responsible marketing and is a signatory to the 
Portman Group Code of Practice. The Group is also a 
member of Drinkaware and participates in “Why let 
good times go bad?," [SIC] the all-industry 
responsible consumption campaign. 
The main story here 
is one of longevity, 
size, and economic 
viability, which is an 
expression of power 
Problem definition – MUP 
is the wrong approach 
Moral evaluation – alcohol 
consumption pattern and 
mortality rate are on the 
decrease 
Causal interpretation – 
measure in place are 
sufficient 
Treatment 
recommendation – is to do 
nothing 
Syntax – Sentence 
construction i.e. the 
rationale behind the 
choice of statistic they use 
especially when writing 
about the negative effects 
of the policy 
Economy 
frame 
Protecting the 
industry from 
the negative 
economic 
impacts of the 
policy 
Strategy – Market control 
and self-regulation 
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Molson Coors MIN41, pg.1 
Molson Coors is the largest brewer in the UK with 
2,300 UK employees and 350 years of brewing 
experience. We produce a diverse, highly regarded 
portfolio of beer brands, including the UK’s best 
selling [SIC] lager, Carling, which is brewed with 
100% British barley  
In determining the right level at which to set a 
minimum price, we would urge policymakers to take 
account of the need to address problem prices and 
protect the rights of responsible adults to enjoy a 
drink with friends and sustain a responsible, 
community building industry that delivers secure 
jobs. 
 
The extracts show 
significant 
expressions or 
markers of power 
and reach e.g. 
longevity, size, and 
expertise 
Problem definition – MUP 
would be beneficial 
Moral Evaluation – to 
address problem prices 
and sustain a responsible 
industry 
Causal interpretation – 
problem prices drives 
alcohol misuse 
Treatment 
recommendation – 
government legislation 
supported by on-going 
consumer education 
Syntax – sentence 
formation 
Stereotypes – use of 
signals that could 
introduce unconscious bias 
e.g. “largest brewer” 
Economy 
frames 
Protecting their 
business and 
consumers 
interests, while 
promoting an 
overall positive 
outcome for 
consumers (e.g. 
enjoyment) and 
society (e.g. 
jobs) 
Strategy – Government 
regulation to ensure 
equitable standards, 
complemented by 
consumer education. 
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Appendix 8: Sample quotes and interpretations in line with Vaara et al. (2006); Deephouse et al., (2017) and Suchman (1995) 
 
55 Tennent Caledonian’s is predominantly a Scottish based business with limited or no export business side at the time (i.e. prior to its takeover by the C&C group). 
Actors Quotes Vaara et al. (2006) Deephouse et al., (2017) and Suchman (1995) 
P
o
lic
ym
ak
er
s 
… they did take different views; those that export was against, and those that were in 
support, like Tennent Caledonian55, I think that was logical. For some Scottish business 
with a high-end product if the cheaper products are forced to be more expensive that 
would probably help the better-quality products (MSP 2). 
Normalisation Cognitive legitimacy – Comprehensibility 
(competition is taken for granted). 
I make it clear at the outset, as I hope I have been clear all along, that the Scottish 
Government is not anti-alcohol. We are not against drinking, but we are very much 
against the problems that are associated with excessive consumption of alcohol 
(Parliamentary debates 14/03/2012 - Nicola Sturgeon, pg. 7204). 
Rationalisation  Cognitive legitimacy (acceptance of alcohol as 
a tradition), and Moral legitimacy 
(moralisation of the problems of alcohol)  
The Financial Memorandum that accompanied the Bill on introduction suggests that 
most consumers of low cost [SIC] alcohol do not purchase drink online (HSC report, 
paragraph 215). 
Authorisation  Cognitive legitimacy -Reference is made to an 
authority (i.e. the Financial Memorandum) to 
appease and/or provide ‘reasoned 
explanation’ to industry concerns on the 
unintended consequences.  
I think we do trust the industry. I understand why the industry would be worried, 
although some MSPs were angry that the industry took it [the MUP policy] to court, 
after the judgement came out, the anger all evaporated away (MSP 1). 
I think they [SWA and SGF] lost a lot of credibility with members of the committee, 
certainly myself (MSP 3) – this was in response to the issue of pre-loading i.e. drinking 
at home prior to going out for further drinks. 
Moralisation  Moral legitimacy – the policymakers provide 
justification and excuse industry actors 
behaviour. 
Should the bill become law, the Committee considers it crucial that the impact of 
minimum unit pricing is evaluated, particularly its impact on harmful drinking, including 
establishing whether and the extent to which the policy has resulted in savings to the 
NHS and the justice system (FC report, paragraph, 35). 
Narrativisation and 
Rationalisation 
 
Pragmatic legitimacy - evaluation of benefits 
and harm 
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MUP was an issue of such enormous importance to our members, we felt it was good 
to challenge the government even if there were some reputational downside as a 
result. It was definitively worth tackling and taking up with the Scottish Government for 
the long-term interests (Participant 4) 
Rationalisation and 
Moralisation 
Pragmatic and Moral legitimacy – To protect 
exchanges and propriety 
MUP is a complex social issue with multiple interwoven firms, and as a result there is 
bound to be a very broad spectrum of perspectives which does not make the other 
actors more or less legitimate (Participant 7) 
Normalisation Cognitive legitimacy – provides explanation to 
cleavages. Normalises cleavages as an element 
of competition within a heterogenous 
organisation (taken-for-grantedness) 
When asked about their perception of other industry actors, in case of future 
collaborations, one interviewee responded drawing from past experience i.e. the 
Scottish MUP debate  
 
“…there is this whole element of trust with the other industry because it seems to the 
whole [named trade association] that last time we were left to fight the battle and take 
the costs and the bad publicity and all the hassles” (Participant 1). 
Moralisation, 
Normalisation, and 
Rationalisation 
Pragmatic legitimacy – self-interested 
calculations on what they stand to 
lose/achieve in the absence/presence of trust 
between the different actors  
 
Moral legitimacy – makes a normative 
evaluation of their reputation and identity 
“Quantitative restrictions on imports and all measures having equivalent effect shall be 
prohibited between Member States) and the World Trade Organisation (WTO) rules 
(written submission to the HSC by Diageo pg. 3; SABMiller paragraph 23, and WSTA 
MIN93 paragraph 1.9). 
Rationalisation, and 
Authorisation 
 
Pragmatic legitimacy – highlight the legal 
consequences of quantitative restriction 
 
Moral legitimacy – they protect their 
proprietary by embedding their organisation 
within a credible institution (i.e. the WTO) 
When asked about their organisation’s position on MUP, the interviewee’s account was 
extensive but not dramatic. 
 
Our position, I guess we could see that it would benefit our business, erm particularly 
because one of our brands … which is number 1 in the UK market in scotch and the 
biggest brand in Scotland and we could see that MUP would actually help that brand, … 
but we could also see some concerns around a number of different areas. One of the 
prime concerns was how spirits are taxed using the duty regime ... We also feared I 
Narrativisation  
Moralisation 
Moral legitimacy - raises moral question (i.e. in 
principle …). The actor communicates 
authoritatively and speaks as a matter of fact 
(explain) 
 
Pragmatic legitimacy – considers the benefit of 
the position of their organisation 
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Source: Author 
 
guess excessive government interference on pricing … we worried about the 
government basically deciding the prices of our product erm not that it would affect us 
very much but as a principle, it’s not one that any business I guess is keen on that 
government sets the price … (Participant 1 – opposing actor – see appendix 5, page 1, 
right column for full response). 
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